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ABSTRACT
The next generation mobile network (i.e., 5G network) is expected to host emerging use
cases that have a wide range of requirements; from Internet of Things (IoT) devices that
prefer low-overhead and scalable network to remote machine operation or remote health-
care services that require reliable end-to-end communications. Improving scalability and
reliability is among the most important challenges of designing the next generation mobile
architecture.
The current (4G) mobile core network heavily relies on hardware-based proprietary
components. The core networks are expensive and therefore are available in limited lo-
cations in the country. This leads to a high end-to-end latency due to the long latency
between base stations and the mobile core, and limitations in having innovations and an
evolvable network. Moreover, at the protocol level the current mobile network architecture
was designed for a limited number of smart-phones streaming a large amount of high
quality traffic but not a massive number of low-capability devices sending small and
sporadic traffic. This results in high-overhead control and data planes in the mobile core
network that are not suitable for a massive number of future Internet-of-Things (IoT)
devices.
In terms of reliability, network operators already deployed multiple monitoring sys-
tems to detect service disruptions and fix problems when they occur. However, detecting
all service disruptions is challenging. First, there is a complex relationship between the
network status and user-perceived service experience. Second, service disruptions could
happen because of reasons that are beyond the network itself.
With technology advancements in Software-defined Network (SDN) and Network Func-
tion Virtualization (NFV), the next generation mobile network is expected to be NFV-based
and deployed on NFV platforms. However, in contrast to telecom-grade hardware with
built-in redundancy, commodity off-the-shell (COTS) hardware in NFV platforms often
can’t be comparable in term of reliability. Availability of Telecom-grade mobile core net-
work hardwares is typically 99.999% (i.e., “five-9s” availability) while most NFV platforms
only guarantee “three-9s” availability – orders of magnitude less reliable. Therefore, an
NFV-based mobile core network needs extra mechanisms to guarantee its availability.
This Ph.D. dissertation focuses on using SDN/NFV, data analytics and distributed
system techniques to enhance scalability and reliability of the next generation mobile core
network. The dissertation makes the following contributions. First, it presents SMORE,
a practical offloading architecture that reduces end-to-end latency and enables new func-
tionalities in mobile networks. It then presents SIMECA, a light-weight and scalable mo-
bile core network designed for a massive number of future IoT devices. Second, it presents
ABSENCE, a passive service monitoring system using customer usage and data analytics
to detect silent failures in an operational mobile network. Lastly, it presents ECHO, a
distributed mobile core network architecture to improve availability of NFV-based mobile
core network in public clouds.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of smart phones and wireless connected devices, mobile
networks (the current 4G-LTE and next generation 5G) have become a critical infrastruc-
ture; Smart phone traffic will exceed PC traffic by 2020; Global mobile data traffic will
grow 3X as fast as fixed IP traffic from 2015 to 2020 and will be 16% of total IP traffic by
2020 [3]. Although details of the 5G mobile network architecture are still emerging, the 5G
architecture is expected to enable numerous use cases with a wider range of characteris-
tics than what is possible today, from broadband access to massive Internet of Things to
ultrareliable communications (e.g., E-health services) and so on [58]. Given the criticality
of the network and the emerging services it will be hosting, making the network more
scalable and reliable are among the most important challenges of future mobile network
architecture.
Following broader industry trends, including efforts related to 5G, this dissertation
applied Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and Software-defined Networking (SDN)
as well as big data processing and distributed system techniques to enhance scalability and
reliability aspects of the current mobile core network architecture. It addressed limitations
and problems with the current 4G mobile core network architecture in supporting a large
number of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices and low-latency services (Chapter 3). It en-
hanced mobile network reliability using a data analytics approach by developing a novel
monitoring methodology and system to enable early detection of service failures in the
network (Chapter 4). It designed a reliable control plane architecture to improve mobile
network availability in public clouds (Chapter 5).
21.1 Introduce new functionalities and enhance scalability
in the Mobile Core Network
Future mobile networks (i.e., 5G), will need to support a large number of Internet-
of-Things (IoT) devices, around 26 billion by 2020 according to some estimates [67]. Al-
though most existing IoT devices are using short-range radio access technologies, e.g.,
IEEE 802.15.4, emerging IoT devices are expected to also use cellular radio access technolo-
gies to take advantage of a wider coverage, support of mobility, well-managed and secured
network [25]. The massive number of devices implies a fundamental question of how well
the current cellular architecture would support IoT devices and what the network might
need to change to favor them.
Despite the fact that 4G networks are completely packet based, the architecture was
designed and optimized for human-to-human and human-to-machine communications.
The result is the 4G architecture that works well for a limited number of connections that
generate relatively high volumes of high quality traffic (e.g., smart phones streaming videos
or voice calls) rather than a massive number of devices with a sporadic traffic pattern
(e.g., room temperature sensors uploading a few Bytes of traffic every half an hour). For
example, the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) architecture introduces Evolved Packet System
(EPS) bearer notion in the EPC core network. While EPS bearers support high QoS data
transmission (i.e., via GTP tunnels with 9 QoS Class Identifiers (QCIs) [23] representing
different delay and throughput requirements), setting up or maintaining them incurs sig-
nificant overhead [90]. For example, a standard LTE initial attach procedure incurs up to 6
control messages to set up a bearer, while a service request procedure incurs up to 4 control
messages [24] every time a device has data to send.
Moreover, in the current mobile network, data-path elements (i.e., SGW and PGW) that
forward traffic to the Internet , as well as control plane elements dealing with mobility (i.e.,
MME) and policy (i.e., PCRF), are specialized hardware-based equipment or virtualized
VNFs deployed in a limited number of physical locations (i.e., central offices). This leads
to a high end-to-end latency for mobile services; traffic between endpoints need to travel
to these centralized data centers, adding extra latency to the end-to-end path. On the other
hand, the vision for the 5G network [25, 58] calls for services that will require significantly
lower latencies (e.g., <5ms for tactile Internet), which the current 4G architecture will not
3be able to support.
The above limitations suggest improvements in the 4G architecture to support emerg-
ing devices and services. We argue that end services and the mobile core network’s mobil-
ity functions should be placed closer to users in a distributed manner to improve network
latency. Moreover, in order to support a massive number of IoT devices with sporadic
traffic, the network must have lower overhead. We argue that the mobile architecture
should be changed fundamentally both in control and data planes to reduce network over-
head for a massive number of IoT devices. Specifically, we proposed a Software Defined
Network offloading architecture (SMORE - section 3.1) to seamlessly offload a subset of
mobile data traffic (e.g., IoT traffic) to distributed infrastructure hosting services at the
network edge. We proposed a novel Software Defined mobile edge cloud architecture
(SIMECA - section 3.2) that uses best-effort traffic delivery to reduce control and data plane
overhead for a massive number of IoT devices.
1.2 Enhance reliability in mobile networks
with data analytics and novel
failure detection mechanism
Many critical services such as first response and public-safety are already running
on current mobile networks. The 5G networks are expected to be even more reliable
in order to host emerging services such as remote control (e.g., cloud robotics), E-health
(e.g., remote surgery), etc. [25, 58]. Network operators have spent significant efforts on
monitoring and detecting failures in a timely manner to maintain high service availability.
However, despite the existing monitoring systems, detecting all service disruptions in an
operational network is surprisingly challenging.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, network elements that support service functions are not
always able to alarm on conditions which are in fact service impacting. This may be
the result of, for example, software bugs in the network elements’ firmware, or in the
EMS (Element Management System) for the network elements, or due to configuration
errors. It is possible that, even though all network metrics indicate a healthy network,
customers might be experiencing degraded service or a complete service disruption. For
example, deployment of a new service feature or a software upgrade to address a bug
might trigger an unintended side effect (or indeed a new bug) that the monitoring system
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network monitoring as silent failures. Furthermore, it is difficult to infer service quality
perceived by customers using the status of the network. There is a complex relationship
between the status of the network and the service quality the users experience. Because
of redundancy mechanisms within the network, a particular network failure does not
necessarily imply customer impact. For example, users associated with a failed cell tower
could be picked up by neighboring towers as long as they are in the coverage range of
the neighboring towers and the neighbors still have enough resources to handle the users’
traffic [155].
Moreover, end-to-end user experience could be affected by problems happening be-
yond the network itself. In fact, if the problem happens on the devices themselves there
will be little evidence on the network to detect this kind of disruption. For example, a
bug in a firmware update could cause incompatibility of the device’s Radio Stack with
the Radio Network Controller (RNC). This could result in a large number of devices (e.g.,
all iPhone 6 devices in the U.S.) not being able to use the network. This kind of service
disruptions is usually revealed by the customer-care database (e.g., customer calls) long
after the failure occurred and typically has large customer impact before being noticed
and fixed by the network operator.
This raises the question of what to monitor to efficiently capture all possible service
disruptions (i.e., silent failures) with high fidelity. We propose ABSENCE, a passive ser-
vice monitoring mechanism to detect service disruptions based on customers’ usage. AB-
SENCE argues that users’ usage, or lack thereof, is a reliable indicator of service outages
or severe performance degradations in mobile networks. Although the approach sounds
simple, ABSENCE needs to solve the following challenges: How should we aggregate
customer usage in a way that increases the fidelity of a detection (e.g., ABSENCE must
be able to distinguish a normal drop in customer usage and a service disruption)? How
can we monitor services across multiple dimensions (e.g., device model, geographical
location, etc)? How can we design a system that scales to an operational network with
hundreds of millions of users in real time? We implemented and deployed ABSENCE in
an operational network. ABSENCE was able to process Tera-Bytes of call record data per
day and detected real failures in the network operator (Chapter 4).
51.3 Enhance reliability of the mobile network in
public clouds
While detecting failures and fixing them in real time help increase service availability,
it is more ideal to design and build a highly available network in the first place. In fact,
a mobile network that is not available for a short amount of time could cause many users
not to have services for tens of minutes; a crash in the mobile network could cause up to
an hour of service outage on the users.
A mobile network is a set of distributed state machines. There are per-user states
maintained on the core network’s components and on the user device. It is required that
the mobile core network should be “always” available and the per-user states must be con-
sistent across the mobile core components and the device. Conventional mobile networks
rely on hardware reliability to ensure availability and state consistency. Mechanisms such
as active - standby or persistent UE context storage require either redundant or highly
reliable hardware [98]. Typical cellular grade network components are built with “five-9s”
reliability (i.e., availability of 99.999%) [59, 115].
On the other hand, future mobile core networks expect to use Virtualized Network
Functions (VNFs) running on commodity servers or VMs in data centers or public clouds.
In contrast to the highly-reliable hardware blades, public clouds often are not comparable
in terms of reliability; public clouds are subject to planned or unplanned maintenance and
VM migration. Some surveys show that a typical cloud service experiences unplanned
outage for hours in a month [73] (i.e., “two-9s” or 99% of availability for 1 hour of outage
per month).
This suggests a software-based solution to build a reliable mobile core network compo-
nent on top of an unreliable infrastructure in public clouds. We enhance the reliability of
the mobile network by introducing redundancy and distributed system techniques into
the current mobile core architecture. Our proposal, called ECHO, provides the same
properties that mobile core networks guarantee today. However, ECHO is built on top
of different assumptions about the infrastructure hosting the mobile core network. ECHO
introduces a reliable agent at eNodeBs to guarantee eventual completeness of a request. To
enhance availability, ECHO separates state from the EPC state machines and turns each
EPC component into stateless redundant instances sharing a reliable storage. However,
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multiple instances of a component can process a request in the same time, how to make
the shared state consistent. Second, given multiple instances of a component could create
multiple duplicated state change requests to other components, how to make sure the
requests create a single consistent state change across the EPC components.
ECHO deals with the first problem by making the component instances process re-
quests monotonically and each instance updates the shared state atomically. This ensures
only one component instance is able to update the shared state and no stale requests
could reverse the updated state. ECHO deals with the second problem by making the
component idempotent; duplicated requests will cause the same effect on a component.
This, together with the first solution, ensures that a side effect will always be processed
linearizably, which is equivalent to the processing in a conventional mobile core network.
Moreover, the solutions in ECHO allow component instances to process requests in a
nonblocking manner to improve availability.
We implemented ECHO using commercial smart-phones, LTE small cells and pre-
released EPC core software. We evaluated ECHO in Microsoft Azure. ECHO showed
a significant improvement in terms of reliability while introducing small latency overhead
that is not perceivable by users.
1.4 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions:
• Novel offloading and mobile edge cloud architecture and novel control/data planes to
support a massive number of IoT devices
We present SMORE, an architecture to realize offloading in an LTE/EPC mobile network.
Specifically, we show how offloading for selected traffic of subscribed users can be realized
without modifying the standard LTE/EPC interactions, even when devices are mobile
(Chapter 3.) We propose SIMECA, a novel mobile edge cloud architecture that leverages
NFV, SDN to enable a new service abstraction that is more suitable for IoT devices and ser-
vices. The new service abstraction in SIMECA is realized by novel control and data planes
which scale better and have lower overhead to better support IoT devices, compared to the
current LTE/EPC control plane. We evaluate SMORE and SIMECA using a prereleased
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controller (Chapter 3.)
• Passive service monitoring system to detect failures in mobile networks
We propose a novel service disruption detection technique and a system called ABSENCE
that infers service disruptions by monitoring aggregated customer usage. Our design is
informed by a data driven exploration of the problem domain using real operational data
from a major mobile operator. ABSENCE uses a scalable Hadoop-based implementation
of our approach which is capable of performing service disruption detection by processing
huge volumes of anonymized CDR data (e.g., hundreds of millions of records every hour
for mobile data service) in a streaming manner, for all the mobile services associated with
an operational mobile network. Using data from the same operational mobile network, we
perform a systematic data-driven evaluation of our approach by introducing a comprehen-
sive synthetic set of both network and mobile device failure scenarios. We also compare
our results with ground truth from actual service disruption events and present a number
of case studies showing the effectiveness of our approach (Chapter 4.)
• Novel architecture design to enhance reliability of mobile network components in
public clouds
We propose ECHO, a reliable EPC architecture for public clouds. ECHO is based on
the observation that EPC runs user-specific distributed state machines in parallel. We
proposed the main building blocks for a reliable implementation of the distributed state
machine, and we then mapped these blocks to the original EPC system components. We
proposed a mechanism to ensure consistent state change across replicated components in
a mobile network. We implemented the required EPC modifications into OpenEPC [55]
and deployed ECHO on Microsoft Azure cloud. We performed an extensive evaluation
of the system using real mobile phones as well as synthetic workloads. We showed that
ECHO is able to cope with host and network failures, including several data-center com-
ponent failures, without end-client impact. ECHO showed performance comparable to
commercial cellular networks today.
81.5 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter (Chapter 2) will provide
basic background knowledge in order to understand motivations and contributions in
the following chapters. The chapter describes the mobile network’s architecture, its data
service, connection abstractions, mobility, and network stacks. The three chapters after
that describe the three contributions of the dissertation. Specifically, Chapter 3 describes
enhancing scalability and introducing new functionalities in the Mobile Core Network
using Software Defined Networking, novel network architecture and network protocols.
Chapter 4 describes enhancing reliability in Mobile Networks with data analytics and a
novel failure detection mechanism. Chapter 5 describes enhancing reliability in Mobile
Networks with distributed system techniques and a distributed mobile control plane. The
last chapter (Chapter 6) concludes the contributions and discusses future research direc-
tions related to the topics of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter provides background knowledge of the LTE/EPC architecture: its net-
work architecture overview, data service, connectivity abstractions, data and control planes
and network stack. This information is required to understand the contributions in the
following chapters.
2.1 Overview of network architecture
As shown in Figure 2.1, a LTE/EPC network consists of a wireless radio access network
(Radio Access Network or RAN) and a wired mobile core network (EPC core network).
The RAN consists of multiple base stations (eNodeBs) that communicate with end devices
(User Equipment - UE) over a radio interface. The EPC core network consists of a data
plane and a control plane. The control plane interacts with the UE to authenticate and set
up or modify connections in the data plane to enable end-to-end communications between
the UE and other IP networks. The control plane also keeps track of the UE when it moves
across eNodeBs. The data plane consists of gateways that forward IP packets from the
eNodeBs to another IP network or Internet.
A minimum EPC core network that provides data service will have Mobility Manage-
ment Entity (MME), Home Subscriber Server (HSS), Policy and Charging Rules Function
(PCRF) in the control plane, Serving Gateway (SGW) and Packet Data Network Gateway
(PGW) in the data plane. Table 2.1 shows the abbreviations and their full names that are
frequently used in this dissertation.
An overview of interactions between components in a LTE/EPC network is as follows.
After power up, a UE synchronizes with a nearby eNodeB and sets up a control plane
channel with the network’s control plane (i.e., MME). The UE then authenticates itself
and the network by exchanging a shared secret it has on its preinstalled SIM card with
the MME. During authentication, the MME queries the HSS to obtain the UE’s subscriber
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Figure 2.1. LTE/EPC architecture
Table 2.1. Acronyms and their full forms
Acronym In Full
LTE Long Term Evolution
EPC Evolved Packet Core
EPS Evolve Packet System
PDN Packet Data Network
APN Access Point Name
GTP GPRS Tunneling Protocol
TEID Tunnel Endpoint Identification
UE User Equipment
eNodeB Evolved NodeB
MME Mobility Management Entity
HSS Home Subscriber Server
PCRF Policy and Charging Function
SGW Serving Gateway
PGW Packet Gateway
QCI QoS Class Identifier
GBR Guaranteed Bit Rate
PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol
RLC Radio Link Control
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information. If the authentication is successful, the UE then requests to connect to an IP
network, e.g., Internet. When it receives a connection request, the MME messages the
SGW which in turn messages the PGW to set up an Evolved Packet System (EPS) bearer in
the data plane. After setting up the EPS bearer, MME replies to the UE with the bearer
information and the UE is able to communicate with the IP network via the eNodeB.
Similar interactions happen when the UE moves across eNodeBs. The UE requests a
handover procedure with the MME which in turn updates the data plane to the target
eNodeB.
2.2 Data service in LTE/EPC
The LTE/EPC network is designed for IP services; the role of the RAN and the EPC
core network is to provide IP communications between two end-points, the UE and an IP
host that the UE is communicating with. All applications running on the UE can make
use of the IP connection to exchange IP packets with the other end-point. The applications
could either be provided by the mobile operator, by a company in a corporate IP network
or by a normal service provider in the Internet.
Figure 2.2 shows an application running on a data service in LTE/EPC. After success-
fully attaching to the LTE/EPC network, the UE is assigned an IP address. From the UE’s
perspective, the gateway node (i.e., PGW) is the first IP hop for the assigned IP of the UE.
There is a point-to-point link between the UE and the PGW through an eNodeB and a
SGW (not shown in the figure). All traffic generated by the applications on the UE must go
through the PGW via the point-to-point link. This way, the PGW is an IP anchor for the UE
upon mobility. When the UE moves across base stations, the point-to-point link changes.
However, its associated PGW never changes and therefore the IP connection survives the
mobility.
2.3 Connectivity abstractions in LTE/EPC
The LTE/EPC network provides different connectivity abstractions for the UE. A UE
could have one or multiple Packet Data Network (PDN) connections to one or multiple IP
networks. A PDN connection is the most coarse-grain connectivity abstraction a UE can
have. Under each PDN connection, the UE can set up multiple EPS bearers each with a
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different QoS class that is needed by applications. More details about PDN connections
and EPS bearers are as follows:
2.3.1 PDN connections
When a UE powers up it will request at least one PDN connection to an IP network.
The PDN connection is identified by its Access Point Name (APN). For example, as shown
in Figure 2.3, a UE can have two PDN connections, one to the Internet (APN name is
Internet) and another one to a Corporate “ABC” at the same time. The UE could also
request an additional PDN connection to an IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) for services
such as VoIP if needed. With each PDN connection, the UE is assigned an IP address
associated with that IP network.
2.3.2 EPS bearers
A UE can request multiple EPS bearers under a PDN connection. All of the EPS bearers
under a PDN connection will have the same end-point IP address (i.e., the IP address
assigned to the UE by that IP network). Each bearer, however, has a different QoS specifi-
cation that is used for traffic differentiation. An EPS bearer is a point-to-point connection
from the UE to the PGW in Figure 2.2.
The EPS bearer represents a fine-grained level of QoS control in the LTE/EPC. By
default, a PDN connection must have a default bearer that has the same life time as the
PDN connection. The default bearer often does not provide strict QoS guarantees. Ad-
ditional dedicated bearers could be requested by specific applications on the UE. Dedicated
bearers often provide specific QoS guarantees for applications. For example, low-latency
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applications might request a low-latency dedicated bearer to send data. The dedicated
bearers are ephemeral and will be removed if the applications no longer need them.
A bearer associates with a QoS class identifier (QCI) that specifies a delay budget
and a loss rate budget of that bearer. A bearer could be Guaranteed-Bit Rate (GBR) if it
guarantees a minimum bit rate or Non-BGR if it does not. Table 2.2 shows the standardized
QCIs, the delay and loss budgets and their example applications.
2.4 Mobility
Mobility is the core feature of a mobile network. Since an eNodeB can only cover a
certain geographical area, a moving UE could break its association with an eNodeB if it
moves out of the coverage of that eNodeB and initiates another association with a nearby
eNodeB. The primary goal of the LTE/EPC network is to provide functionality of mobility
Table 2.2. Standardized QCIs and example applications.
QCI Type Priority Delay budget Loss rate Applications
1 GBR 2 100ms 10−2 Conversational Voice
2 4 150ms 10−3 Conversational Video
3 3 50ms 10−3 Real-time gaming
4 5 300ms 10−6 Buffered Video
5 None-GBR 1 100ms 10−6 IMS signaling
6,8,9 6 300ms 10−6 TCP-based Www, ftp, etc.
7 7 100ms 10−3 Live voice streaming
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which ensures the following:
• The network or traffic from other IP networks can reach the UE given the association
point (i.e., eNodeB) of the UE is changing due to mobility. This UE-eNodeB association
could change either when the UE is radio-active (i.e., sending/receiving data) or radio-idle
(i.e., not sending/receiving data).
• Ongoing sessions from/to the UE must be maintained as the UE moves. This means
the end-point IP address on the UE does not change and the connections are seamlessly
adjusted during mobility.
The following describes two different modes of mobility in LTE/EPC. The mobility
management described here only applies for intra-LTE mobility, i.e., mobility between
eNodeBs in a LTE/EPC network.
2.4.1 Idle-mode mobility
In idle-mode mobility, a UE is radio-idle and does not have any ongoing IP sessions
with PDN network(s). The network, however, needs to keep track of the location of the
UE in case it wants to reach the UE when traffic to that UE is generated. The UE reports its
location to the network even when it is radio-idle.
The eNodeBs are grouped into Tracking Areas (TAs). Each TA consists of a number of
eNodeBs depending on the deployment as shown in Figure 2.4. A UE reports its location
periodically after a fixed interval of time regardless of whether the UE is radio active or
not. UE also reports its location immediately if it moves out of a TA. This way, the network
knows “roughly” where the UE is at the granularity of a TA. Note that the smaller the TA,
the more accurately the network can track the UE with higher signaling overhead due to
more frequent location update.
When the UE is idle and the network wants to reach it (e.g., if there is traffic destined
to that UE), the network pages the UE for its location before sending the traffic (i.e., paging
procedure). The MME sends a probe signal to all SGWs which in turn notify the eNodeBs
in the TA that the UE was last seen. The eNodeBs broadcast the signal to all UEs and the
UE that is being looked at for replies. The UE then activates its radio interface and sets up
a connection with the network for traffic delivery.
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Figure 2.4. Tracking Areas in LTE
2.4.2 Active-mode mobility
In active-mode mobility, a UE has ongoing IP session(s) with PDN network(s). The
network needs to maintain the IP sessions when the UE moves from an eNodeB to another
eNodeB. When connected to an eNodeB, the UE periodically reports the signal quality
of its neighbor eNodeBs. If a neighbor eNodeB has “better” signal quality, the current
eNodeB triggers a handover procedure to handle the UE to the target eNodeB. After the
handover, the point-to- point connection between the eNodeB and the PGW changes: the
point-to-point connection switches from the old eNodeB to the new eNodeB.
2.5 Components in LTE/EPC
This section provides more details about components of LTE/EPC and their roles in
the architecture. The components are divided into Control Plane and Data Plane.
2.5.1 Control plane
•MME. The main component of the control plane is the Mobility Management Entity
(MME) which controls the LTE access network. It is responsible for: (1) selecting SGW
during an initial attach and handover, (2) tracking the UE during idle-mobility and paging,
(3) activating or deactivating the EPS bearers on the data plane per request from UE, (4)
authenticating the UE if necessary based on the subscribing information from HSS.
• HSS. HSS is a database of the network that stores user data such as credentials for
authentication, default APNs of users and users’ access authorization information.
• PCRF. PCRF encompasses policy control decision and flow-based charging control
functionalities. The PCRF receives service information from an Application Function (AF)
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server and decides how the data flow for a service is handled. The AF server typically
lives in the Internet. The UE contacts the AF server via its default bearer.
2.5.2 Data plane
• SGW. The gateway serves as an aggregation point for multiple eNodeBs in a geo-
graphical area and an anchor point for intra and interarea mobility. When the UE moves
within an area, traffic towards the UE always go to the SGW of that area. When the UE
handovers to an eNodeB served by a different SGW, traffic towards the old SGW will be
forwarded to the new SGW. SGW also serves as a buffer of downlink data traffic when a
paging procedure happens.
• PGW. This gateway connects the mobile network with the Internet or other IP net-
works. The PGW allocates an IP address to the UE. It also performs deep packet inspection,
packet filtering, or implements the QoS aspects of EPS bearers. PGW is also an IP anchor
point for intertechnology handovers (e.g., LTE to WiMax handover).
2.6 Data plane protocol stack
This section provides detailed information on how data plane IP packets are processed
at each component and how an EPS bearer delivers IP packets by GPRS Tunneling Protocol
(GTP) tunnels.
2.6.1 Data plane protocol stack
Figure 2.5 shows the protocol stack of the data plane of LTE/EPC. The UE maintains an
IP session with the PGW which in turn maintains another IP session (e.g., using Network
Address Translation (NAT)) with the server. The application on the UE runs on top of these
IP sessions.
At the RAN, the UE and eNodeB exchange IP packets using Packet Data Convergence
Protocol (PDCP) and Radio Link Control (RLC) Protocol and LTE MAC/PHY. When they
arrive at the eNodeB, IP packets from a UE will be delivered to the PGW through GTP
tunnels running on top of an IP network (UDP/IP) between eNodeB, SGW, and PGW.
The following shows an example of how an uplink IP packet is processed at each
component. When arriving at the eNodeB the IP packet popped out of the PDCP layer
is then encapsulated using GTP on top of UDP/IP transport. Note that the relay at the
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eNodeB needs to look up which GTP tunnel to use because there are multiple GTP tunnels
per UE. The GTP-encapsulated packets will be sent to the SGW which decapsulates the
packet and encapsulates it again with a different GTP/UDP header. The SGW then sends
the GTP packets to PGW. The PGW then decapsulates the packets to get the inner IP
packets. It will send the IP packets to the server or alternatively NATs the packets with
its routable address and sends out to the server.
2.6.2 EPS bearer and GTP tunnels
Figure 2.6 shows an EPS bearer in LTE/EPC. An EPS bearer is a point-to-point link
between the UE and the PGW. The IP packets from/to the UE are delivered to/from the
PGW by the EPS bearer. A UE has at least one default EPS bearer and optionally multiple
dedicated EPS bearers per PDN connection. The interfaces of eNodeB-SGW/SGW-PGW
pairs are called S1-U and S5, respectively.
An EPS bearer consists of 6 GTP tunnels: 3 GTP tunnels for each uplink and downlink
direction. At the RAN interface between the UE and eNodeB, a radio bearer is set up per
EPS bearer. This radio bearer is identified by a Data Radio Bearer (DRB) Identifier. Between
the eNodeB and SGW are 2 S1-U GTP tunnels that are identified at the eNodeB and SGW
by UL-S1U Tunnel EndPoint Identifier (TEID) and DL-S1U TEID. Similarly, there are 2 S5
GTP tunnels between SGW and PGW that are identified by UL/DL-S5 TEIDs.
The mobile network also uses GTP for supporting per user mobility and quality of
service. Each tunnel can be distinguished by a unique Tunnel EndPoint Identifier (TEID).
When a packet is encapsulated, the TEID field in the GTP-U packet header is set to the
value expected by the tunnel destination. The eNodeB/SGW/PGW obtains the TEIDs
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Figure 2.6. An EPS bearer and GTP tunnels in LTE/EPC data plane
from the control plane (MME) during the connection set-up or modification. The GTP
tunnels between SGW and PGW stay persistent unless the UE moves across SGWs. The
GTP tunnels between eNodeB and SGW are ephemeral; when the UE is radio-inactive the
tunnels are removed. When the UE has data to send it signals the LTE/EPC control plane
to set up these tunnels before sending data packets.
CHAPTER 3
INTRODUCE NEW FUNCTIONALITIES AND
ENHANCE SCALABILITY IN THE MOBILE
CORE NETWORK
This chapter focuses on enhancing scalability of the Mobile Core Network using Soft-
ware Defined Networking and Network Function Virtualization. It first presents SMORE,
a practical mobile offloading architecture using Software-defined Networking. SMORE’s
offloading mechanism also allows alternative mobile core networks to be deployed in
parallel with the current Evolved Packet Core (EPC) network. It then presents SIMECA,
a SDN-based mobile core network architecture designed specific for a massive number of
Internet-of-Thing devices.
3.1 SMORE: Software-defined networking
mobile offloading architecture
3.1.1 Introduction
Unprecedented growth in data traffic on mobile networks [89] is driven by the popular-
ity of smartphones and tablets, advances in bandwidth available on mobile networks and
the availability of a myriad of mobile applications and services. Despite these undeniable
successes, the delay experienced across core mobile networks is still problematic for many
applications that need near-realtime communication. Online gaming applications, for
example, have stringent quality of service (QoS) demands and latency can negatively
interfere with game play [50, 77].
A key architectural reason for delay remaining relatively high in the mobile core is
the fact that the gateway nodes (i.e., Packet Data Network Gateways (PGW) in LTE/EPC
nomenclature), are deployed in a highly centralized fashion [32]. This results in inefficient
hierarchical routing and high delay—packets travel for a significant distance in the mobile
core network before even reaching the Internet [57].
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Approaches to reduce end-to-end delay involve various offloading strategies [75, 99],
including offloading to data centers inside the mobile provider core network footprint [34].
Despite the potential benefits of these approaches, they are inherently difficult to deploy
in real networks—because of the fundamental complexity of mobile architectures, ap-
proaches that require significant changes to those architectures are very hard to realize
in practice.
In this work we propose an alternative approach to realizing offloading in a mobile
network: our Software defined network Mobile Offloading aRchitecturE (SMORE). Like
previous offloading approaches [34], we propose to deploy offloading data centers within
the core of the mobile network and to selectively redirect traffic to these data centers. The
defining characteristic of SMORE is that this offloading is accomplished without requiring
modifications to the functionality of the core network proper, that is, without modifications
to the functionality of network elements in the core mobile network. SMORE is realized by
deploying an SDN infrastructure at aggregation points in the mobile core network. This
SDN infrastructure allows two functions critical to the functioning of SMORE. First, it
enables monitoring of the mobile network control plane through a lightweight monitoring
component. The SMORE monitor continuously extracts information from the mobile
network control plane and makes this information available to the SMORE controller.
Second, based on this information and the service logic executed by the SMORE controller,
the SDN infrastructure is used to transparently realize the offloading of selected traffic
to offloading data centers. We argue that the ability to deploy these changes without
modifying functional components of the mobile core is critical to making the deployment
of new functionality such as offloading practical.
This work makes the following contributions:
• We develop the SMORE architecture to realize offloading in an LTE/EPC mobile net-
work. Specifically, we show how offloading for selected traffic of subscribed users can be
realized without modifying the standard LTE/EPC interactions, even when devices are
mobile.
•We present a prototype realization of our architecture using an LTE/EPC testbed and an
Open vSwitch (OVS) based SDN. Specifically, our OVS enhancements allow transparent
encapsulation and decapsulation of offloaded traffic.
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3.1.2 Motivation
Latency is an important factor that impacts mobile applications performance. An end-
to-end latency of more than 30ms causes a normal video streaming application to drop its
frame rate that is noticeable to human eyes [92, 132]. Moreover, 5G networks are expected
to host new use cases that require even lower latency. For example, remote closed-loop
control applications [7] require a low-latency network to deliver commands to the remote
machine and receive feedback in real-time; virtual or augmented reality applications [58]
also require lower latency to transfer camera’s video frames to servers for processing. Even
for web browsing, a low-latency network is preferable to increase service revenue [6].
On the other hand, the end-to-end delay of 4G LTE networks is high; a typical round-
trip latency between a mobile device and a service is 70-75ms [78]. In the end-to-end la-
tency picture, the latency between base stations and the core network’s gateways (SGW,PGW)
contributes the largest portion (i.e., mobile core network’s latency). Given a typical LTE
radio latency between a mobile device and a base station is around 15ms RTT [16] and the
latency between the mobile gateway (PGW) and the service is small, the mobile core net-
work’s latency is around 45-55ms RTT. Even though the 3GPP standard has mechanisms to
prioritize traffic for different applications [23], prioritizing won’t help given the network
latency.
The reason for such a high latency in the mobile core network is the physical distance
between base stations and the mobile gateways (SGW, PGW); while base stations are
distributed, the mobile gateways are only available in a limited number of locations in the
country [32, 151]. As mobile network components are hardware-based, proprietary and
highly-capable, it is expensive and wasteful to deploy them in a distributed manner. This
results in high network latency between the base stations and the gateways. A possible
solution is to offload traffic at the network edge to a local edge cloud to eliminate the
mobile core’s latency. However, unclear questions are (1) where should an operator deploy
the offloading to reduce the latency while not increasing the cost of deployment too much?
and (2) how to offload traffic in a transparent way? In other words, the system only
offloads traffic that require low network latency and leaves other LTE traffic untouched.
These are also the two main contributions of this work.
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3.1.3 Typical deployment of a LTE/EPC network
Figure 3.1 also depicts typical deployment information that is relevant to our approach.
EPC components (MME, SGW and PGW) are typically deployed in a small number of
centralized locations (or central offices), e.g., on the order of 10 in the US [32, 151]. This
means that each such centralized location serves a large geographic area, with thousands
of eNodeBs. LTE/EPC is a packet-based architecture, which means that there exists a
packet “transport network”, i.e., a regular IP network, in between the eNodeBs and the
centralized EPC locations. For efficiency, connectivity from a set of eNodeBs gets aggre-
gated at a regional aggregation point. As shown in Figure 3.1 these aggregation points
are called (or co-located with) Mobile Telephone Switching Offices (MTSOs) and there are
typically an order of magnitude more MTSOs than centralized EPC locations in a typical
deployment. As such, MTSOs are an attractive deployment location for offloading data
centers [34].
3.1.4 SMORE architecture
The SMORE architecture is depicted in Figure 3.2 in the context of an LTE/EPC mobile
network. The service goal of SMORE is to reduce end-to-end delay for selected traffic
by offloading such traffic to offloading cloud infrastructures close to mobile devices. Re-
gional aggregation points in the form of MTSOs represent an ideal target for deploying
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Figure 3.1. LTE/EPC architecture and its deployment.
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these offloading infrastructures for two reasons. First, based on current centralized mobile
network deployments, all traffic passes through MTSOs en-route to the Internet. Fur-
ther, the MTSO locations in a typical deployment are at a sweet spot, both in terms of
geographical coverage (to reduce delay) and the number of locations (filling the space
between approximately 10 central office locations and thousands of eNodeB locations). As
shown in Figure 3.2, SMORE assumes that the offloading cloud platform and the SMORE
SDN substrate are deployed at MTSO locations. The SDN substrate enables offloading to
the offload cloud and also allows the SMORE monitor to snoop on the LTE/EPC control
plane. The SMORE monitor continuously monitors the control plane, extracting relevant
information. The monitor enters information into a database and also provides triggers
to the SMORE controller about UE attach and mobility events. The SMORE controller
interacts with the SMORE SDN substrate to effect offloading when needed and provides a
front-end that Internet based service providers can interact with to register for offloading
services. Note that in all cases service providers using the SMORE service will only be
able to offload traffic associated with their own services.
•On-demand use case. The interactions between these components are best explained
with a typical use case, using the numbered steps from Figure 3.2. The SMORE SDN
and monitor allow the control plane to be continuously monitored (#1 in the figure). To
simplify exposition, we assume an Internet-based service provider, e.g., a gaming provider,
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who wants to make use of the SMORE service. Note that this generalizes to any Internet
service provider that wants to make use of the SMORE offloading service. End-users of
the game service access the Internet-based gaming frontend server via the normal data
path after attaching to the mobile network (#2). Realizing that it wants to offload the user
in question to an offload instance, logic in the gaming frontend server requests offloading
via the interface provided by the SMORE controller (#3). The SMORE controller consults
the SMORE database to determine the current location of the UE in question, and proceeds
to configure the SDN substrate in the appropriate MTSO location to set up offloading of
the desired subset of traffic (#4). When the UE connects to the game server, this traffic will
be transparently redirected to the offload server in the MTSO cloud (#5).
• Subscription use case. Service providers (or end users) can also opt to make use of a
subscription model for offloading. Once subscribed, information about the subscriber UE
is maintained in the SMORE database. In this case, every time a subscriber UE connects to
the network, the offloading path is constructed without the need for step #3 in the previous
scenario. When the UE attaches, the SMORE monitor detects this event and signals the
SMORE controller, which immediately installs the appropriate rules in the SMORE SDN.
• Interaction with standard LTE/EPC. We now consider in more detail how SMORE
can realize its functionality without requiring any modifications to LTE/EPC network
elements. We specifically consider how the SMORE monitor extracts information from
the LTE/EPC control plane during UE attach and handoff procedures. The information
obtained from these procedures triggers the installation of rules in the SMORE SDN to
realize offloading in a transparent manner.
• Attach. Figure 3.3 shows how the SMORE monitor snoops on the control plane
interactions between the eNodeB and the MME during UE attach and subsequently helps
trigger the pushing of required offloading policies in the SMORE SDN via the SMORE
controller. Specifically, during the UE attach procedure, the SMORE monitor extracts the
UE’s IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) and TAI (Tracking Area Identifier)
from the ‘attach request message’ sent to the MME via the eNodeB (#2). When the MME
responds with the ‘attach accept’ message (#5), the monitor extracts the UE’s IP address,
SGW’s IP address, SGW’s TEID, and UE’s GUTI (Globally Unique Temporary ID). Finally,
the monitor obtains the eNodeB’s IP address and eNodeB’s TEID when the eNodeB re-
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sponds with the ‘context setup response’ message (#8). At this point, the SMORE monitor
has all the information required to trigger offloading and sends it to the SMORE controller
(#9) which, in turn, updates its database. In the case of a subscription-based use case, at
this point the SMORE controller pushes the required flows to the SMORE SDN (#10),
which enables offloading of game server specific traffic to the game server hosted in the
in-network cloud platform. For the on-demand use case, when the SMORE controller
receives the offloading trigger from the gaming frontend server (#13), it retrieves the UE’s
bearer information from the database and pushes the required flows to the SMORE SDN
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(#14) to enable offloading.
• Handover. Figure 3.4 shows the steps required to enable offloading in presence of
user mobility. Specifically we consider X2-based handover between eNodeBs without
MME and SGW relocation. (This is the common handover case in LTE/EPC.) As seen in
the figure, when the source eNodeB decides to hand over the UE (based on measurement
reports) to the target eNodeB, it sends a handover request (#2) to the target which, in
turn, does the necessary resource allocation and sends back a handover acknowledgement
message (#3) to the source. The target also sends a path switch request message (#4) to the
MME that contains the target eNodeB information (IP address and TEID), which will sub-
sequently be used by the SGW to forward downlink packets. The SMORE monitor extracts
this bearer information, and sends it to the SMORE controller (#5), which proactively
constructs a new rule to be pushed to the SMORE SDN to enable processing of downlink
packets corresponding to the target eNodeB. Note that all the other UE bearer information
remains unchanged (including the SGW identifiers) and the SMORE controller obtains
the other required information from its database. When the SGW updates the user bearer
to forward downlink packets to the target eNodeB instead of the source eNodeB, the
MME sends back a path switch acknowledgement message (#10) to the target indicating
the success of the path switch request. When the SMORE monitor sees this message, it
sends a path switch trigger request (#11) to the SMORE controller, which, in turn, pushes
the previously constructed rule to the SMORE SDN and deletes the previous rule (#12).
Subsequently, the SDN substrate routes (after proper encapsulation) all downlink packets
from the cloud based game server to the target eNodeB.
3.1.5 Implementation
We developed a prototype implementation of the SMORE architecture and deployed
it in a local LTE/EPC testbed based on the OpenEPC LTE/EPC architecture implemen-
tation [55]. As shown in Figure 3.5 the RAN part of our current setup is based on an
emulated implementation from OpenEPC. Each component shown in the figure is realized
as a physical machine instance in the Emulab [148] facility. Our implementation did not
support the handover mechanism described in the design because our LTE/EPC testbed
did support handover.
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Below we consider the prototype implementations of each SMORE component in more
detail.
• SDN. To implement SMORE SDN, we used Open vSwitch (OVS) 2.0 which supports
the OpenFlow 1.3 standard. Tunneling in OVS is implemented using a virtual port (vport)
abstraction which simplifies header manipulation [88]. As shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7,
we added three vports to realize offloading, GTP decapsulation, and GTP encapsulation.
By default the SMORE SDN component works as a standard layer 2 switch. It forwards
packets from the eNodeB to the SGW/MME and vice versa. However, when it receives
a traffic offload request from the SMORE controller, flow rules are setup to divert UE
connections to alternate destinations.
Packet processing in the uplink direction is shown in Figure 3.6. The SMORE SDN
first checks whether the incoming packet is GTP data traffic (whether it has 2152 as UDP
port number). If so, the offloading vport extracts the SGW TEID in the GTP header and
the source and destination IP addresses from the inner IP layer (i.e., the UE source and
destination IP). If this information matches a SMORE OVS table entry, then the packet is
destined for an offloading server and is sent to the GTP decapsulation vport. Otherwise,
the packet is sent along the default path to the SGW. When the GTP decapsulation vport
receives a packet, it removes the GTP header, replaces the destination MAC address, and
forwards the packet. The replacement MAC address is that of the next hop along the route
to the offload destination.
Downlink packet processing is shown in Figure 3.7. Packets arriving from the SGW/MME
are forwarded toward the eNodeB as per normal. However, if the packet is from an
offloading server, the SMORE SDN uses the IP addresses (src: offloaded server IP, dst:
UE IP) to find the correct encapsulation information for this exchange. The packet is
forwarded to the GTP encapsulation vport along with the associated tunnel information
(outer IP addresses (src: SGW IP, dst: eNodeB IP) and GTP (eNodeB TEID) identifiers). It
is also necessary to replace the destination MAC address with the next hop’s MAC address
(in the direction of the UE). With encapsulation complete, the GTP packet is forwarded on
toward the eNodeB.
•Monitor. We implemented the SMORE monitor using tshark, a terminal-based ver-
sion of wireshark. The monitor listens to the interface between the eNodeB and the MME
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and processes all messages that are exchanged to detect bearer setup and tear-down events.
Specifically the monitor implements the information extraction and triggers as described
in the attach description in Figure 3.3.
• Controller. We implemented a prototype of SMORE controller using the Ryu Open-
Flow controller. The SMORE controller has a simple database storing registered offloading
server IP addresses and IMSIs of UEs that subscribed to offload services. We extended
the Ryu API to support GTP flow modification control messages. The SMORE controller
modifies the flow table of the OVS using the extended API of Ryu controller. The SMORE
controller compares the bearer setup information provided by the SMORE monitor with
its database of registered UEs and offloading service addresses to decide whether to push
offloading flows for a specific UE to the OVS flow table.
3.1.6 Evaluation
We measured the SMORE SDN processing time, the responsiveness and latency of the
SMORE monitor and controller, and illustrated the potential for latency reductions with
our approach. Our evaluation was performed using machines with a single 3 GHz CPU
and 2 GB RAM.
3.1.6.1 Smore SDN
OVS has two tables, smorely, the OpenFlow flow table in userspace and a simple
flow table called datapath in the kernel. The data path table is essentially a cache for
active flows. The userspace table is consulted when no match is found in the datapath,
typically for the first packet of a flow. We evaluated both the datapath and Openflow table
processing of our SDN implementation. We measured the processing time for each port
and vport using the getnstimeofday() kernel function.
• Datapath processing. A breakdown of the processing time when a flow entry exists
in the data path table is shown in Figure 3.8. SMORE (Cloud) means the path between the
RAN and Offload cloud. SMORE is the path between the RAN and the EPC when SMORE
rules are installed. OVS is the same path when no SMORE rules are installed. Compared
to (native) OVS, SMORE (Cloud) and SMORE increased uplink processing by 5.366us and
1.911us and downlink processing by 2.105us and 0.058us respectively. SMORE shows
slightly longer processing time in ETH input than OVS because more complex matching
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Figure 3.8. Breaking down processing time of each port in datapath
rules are used and there are more flow entries in the datapath.
• Openflow table processing. Figure 3.9 shows a similar breakdown for the case
where a flow entry does not exist in datapath but in only in the OpenFlow flow table.
As expected, the processing times are much longer because of the userspace processing
involved. However, this is only incurred on the first packet of a flow. In both cases the
overhead is modest compared to the end-to-end delay in LTE.
3.1.6.2 SMORE monitor and controller
• SMORE controller microbenchmark. We measured the time the SMORE controller
takes to install offloading flows into the OVS when it receives a trigger (i.e., a trigger for
either on-demand or subscription use cases). The average processing time is 4.677ms.
• SMORE monitor microbenchmark. We generated a series of synthetic UE attaching
events to measure the time taken to detect a UE attach event. The average detection time
is 2.973ms (not including packet reading time incurred by tshark). Our current packet
capture realization based on tshark is quite inefficient, contributing an additional 850ms.
• Subscription use case evaluation. We evaluated the responsiveness of SMORE for
the subscription use case described in Section 5.4. Since an attached UE might immedi-
ately start to interact with the offloading server, this case demands fast response from the
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SMORE monitor and controller.
We measured the elapsed time (tres) between the moment when the ‘attach complete’
message (#8 in Figure 3.3) arrives at the OVS and when the offloading flows are success-
fully installed (in the OVS) by the SMORE monitor and SMORE controller. We measured
tres for 10 different UE attach events and found the mean value for tres to be 1.056s with
a standard deviation of 18ms. This is an acceptable delay as it is of the same order of
magnitude as application startup delay on a mobile device.
3.1.6.3 Rtt improvement
We measured the RTT between a UE and the top websites in the U.S. [27]. We derived
a synthetic delay from previous measurement works as the delay of the cellular core
network [42]. Specifically, the core network delay is calculated as: core network’s delay
= UE-server’s delay - PGW-server’s delay - radio’s delay. The one-way delay from UE to
server was set to 35ms as reported in [79]. The PGW-server delay was set to 8ms as a
typical “regional” Internet delay reported in [116]. The delay on the radio link was 4ms
one-way [42]. In total, the synthetic delay of the core network (from OVS node to PGW)
was set as 23ms. The delay between the OVS node and the offloading server was set to a
typical “local” link and it was almost negligible, i.e, less than 1ms.
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We pinged each server 50 times and reported the average RTT in Figure 3.10. As ex-
pected and shown in the figure, the delay when using the offloading server is significantly
smaller than using the servers in the Internet.
3.1.7 Related work
The issues associated with current hierarchical routing approach in the cellular net-
works have been identified in works like [57, 152]. To alleviate the burden of the core
network and enable efficient routing, the 3GPP standards body has proposed Local IP
Access (LIPA) and Selected IP Traffic Offload (SIPTO) – for offloading mobile traffic to
a local network using femtocells and, to the Internet via regional gateways closer to the
user locations, respectively [9]. However, these methods require significant changes in
the current standard and expensive additional infrastructure for their realization. Our
aim, in this work, is to enable efficient offloading without requiring any changes to the
existing standard. Other works have proposed opportunistic offloading of delay tolerant
cellular traffic using alternative access technologies like WiFi [33, 75]. Our work is focused
on efficient offloading strategies in cellular networks specially for traffic with strict delay
requirements (e.g., real time gaming).
We draw inspiration from research works exploring the possibility of leveraging SDN
to enable more flexibility in the core mobile network [84, 88, 95] and using cloud resources
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Figure 3.10. RTT of different Internet services and the offloading server
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in user proximity to enable low latency applications [132]. Our work is grounded in
the reality that it is not economically feasible for the mobile network operators to partake
in a major overhaul of the existing infrastructure built on standards compliant closed-
source vendor specific equipment. Our proposed architecture can be deployed in strategic
locations to co-exist with the current infrastructure and enables much needed flexibility in
the mobile network using emerging technologies like SDN and cloud, without requiring
any changes in the existing architecture.
Our work is strongly inspired by MOCA [34]. MOCA proposed an SDN-based ar-
chitecture for cellular networks to offload selected traffic to a cloud-based local S/P-GW
(service and packet gateway) instance and an offloading server inside the core network.
In MOCA architecture, although modifications in the current network were intentionally
minimized, the MME still played a central role and needed to be modified. With SMORE
we designed and prototyped similar functionality without requiring modification to any
LTE/EPC network element.
3.1.8 Conclusion
We leveraged SDN to introduce an offloading architecture for cellular networks. The
architecture allows traffic to be intercepted and rerouted to offloading servers located
inside the cellular core. The SMORE approach allows us to realize offloading with no
modifications to the current network architecture.
3.2 SIMECA: SDN-based IoT mobile
edge cloud architecture
3.2.1 Introduction
Future networks, including future mobile networks (i.e., 5G), will need to support a
large number of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices; around 26 billion by 2020 according to
some estimates [67]. Most existing IoT devices are using short-range radio access technolo-
gies, e.g., IEEE 802.15.4, but emerging IoT devices are expected to also use cellular radio
access technologies to take advantage of mobile network features, such as wider coverage,
better support for mobility, well-managed and secured [25]. The massive number of de-
vices implies a fundamental question of how well the current cellular architecture would
support IoT and what might need to change to both IoT applications, without adversely
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affecting the network.
While some expect the 5G architecture to be radically different from 4G [31], it will
nonetheless be informed and derived from 4G principles and approaches [35, 36, 38, 85,
105]. In this work we follow a similar approach by considering the limitations of 4G net-
works, in particular the EPC core network, in supporting IoT and then combining evolved
and refactored 4G mechanisms with software-defined networking (SDN) and network
function virtualization (NFV) to realize an IoT friendly mobile (core) network architecture.
The 4G network architecture is heavy-weight and optimized for human-to-human and
human-to-machine communication. This is, however, a poor fit for IoT devices, where we
might expect a much larger number of devices with different traffic patterns. For example,
millions of simple sensors that might send only a few bytes of data every half hour. Such
applications might prefer low overhead over high quality data delivery.
Further, the control signaling in 4G networks has grown significantly and already present
significant pressures on network components even just to support conventional devices
and services. Control traffic grows 50% faster than data traffic while generating no rev-
enue [14]. MME (a main control entity in LTE/EPC network) already experienced up to
1500 messages per User Equipment (UE) per hour under adverse conditions [56]. Scaling
the control plane in 4G [35] would help mitigate the load problem. However, significant
overhead in the protocols remains, especially when a large number of IoT devices attach to
the network. This suggests fundamental changes in both network control and data planes
in order to support IoT devices and services.
In terms of service abstractions, current 4G networks offer connectivity services for
user devices to connect to other networks via a centralized gateway (packet data network
gateway - PGW). Although this abstraction is suitable for human-centric devices where
the network mostly needs to deliver an “Internet” service (e.g., web browsing), it is ill-
suited for machine-to-machine or machine-to-human type communications. For example,
peer-to-peer (P2P) communications, which are expected to be prevalent in IoT space, are
not natively supported by the architecture and must be enabled by mechanisms such as
NAT traversal on the gateways (PGWs) [70, 133]. The centralized nature of current 4G
deployments [90] adds extra latency to the end-to-end path, especially for IoT P2P traffic
whose end points might be geographically close. Also, since current mobile networks
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offer only network connectivity service via their mobile infrastructure, end-services are
typically deployed in the Internet. This hurts the end-to-end latency and forces IoT devices
to use the LTE service despite the unsuitable service abstractions.
Mobile network operators are considering (or in some cases already deploying) highly
distributed small-sized data centers and clouds at the network edge [18]. Industry ef-
forts are also underway to deploy distributed cloud platforms close to the mobile edge
to support cloud based radio access network (RAN) functionality [49], as well as mobile
edge computing efforts in support of traffic-offloading for low latency applications [63,
121]. This trend of highly flexible platforms close to the mobile network edge offers a
new opportunity for network operators to more efficiently provide existing or emerging
services and is specifically well aligned with emerging IoT services, some of which support
an enormous number of devices, with low network latency requirements.
In this work we present an SDN-based IoT Mobile Edge Cloud Architecture (SIMECA).
SIMECA leverages SDN for forwarding and NFV for network function deployment to
realize a new service API that replaces LTE/EPC and is geared towards IoT devices and
services. The design of SIMECA is based on following insights: (1) we argue that best-effort
forwarding is more suitable for IoT devices instead of high QoS delivery in LTE/EPC.
Best-effort forwarding eliminates core network components (i.e., SGW/PGW) and there-
fore reduces control plane overhead involving end-to-end connectivity; (2) Instead of extra
tunneling overhead in LTE/EPC, SIMECA proposes a packet header translation mechanism
realized by SDN forwarding that reduces packet header overhead and favors small pay-
load traffic; (3) Separating end-point identity and routing identity together with a proper
address resolution mechanism enable seamless mobility and peer-to-peer communications
in SIMECA; and (4) Services and mobility functions are hosted inside edge clouds to
improve network latency.
We make the following contributions:
• We propose a novel mobile edge cloud architecture, SIMECA, that leverages NFV,
SDN and cloud computing to enable a new service abstraction that is more suitable for IoT
devices and services. Our service abstraction enables direct P2P communication for IoT
end devices. Our distributed architecture reduces the EPC core network latency signifi-
cantly while being able to scale to multiple geographic areas.
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• We propose novel control and data planes which scale better and have lower over-
head to better support IoT services, compared to the current LTE/EPC control plane. Our
design involves an IP header translation forwarding scheme which reduces data plane
overhead by up to 20% for small sensor payload sizes (e.g., <100 Bytes). Our SDN-based
control plane reduces control plane overhead by up to 37% while performing up to 76%
faster.
• We validate our architecture by prototyping and evaluating our approach by refac-
toring precommercial EPC software and using an SDR-based eNodeB to realize SIMECA.
Using applications running typical IoT protocols, our evaluations show promising results
of SIMECA compared to LTE/EPC.
3.2.2 Motivation and overview
With reference to the current LTE/EPC architecture [117] our architecture targets three
limitations in the current EPC core architecture, i.e., limitations in the radio access (includ-
ing power consumption dues to radio protocols) and security aspects are not in our current
scope and will be considered as future works.
• Inappropriate service abstraction and inflexibility. While built according to well-
defined standards, the current LTE/EPC data network was designed to provide Internet
service and its equipment is proprietary and closed. This results in several draw-backs
for IoT devices: (1) These devices must use the LTE/EPC abstraction even when the ab-
straction is not well suited to its characteristics, i.e., LTE/EPC incurs high latency and
overhead for IoT devices [80], (2) devices cannot establish a (native) peer-to-peer (P2P)
communication, as the architecture does not offer a direct way to do it, and have to rely on
additional techniques such as NAT traversal [70, 133].
We argue that there should be a more suitable service abstraction for IoT devices that
should: replace the Internet abstraction in LTE/EPC by a new abstraction that is more suit-
able for IoT communication models, e.g., supports peer-to-peer communications natively.
The abstraction should also be realized by control/data planes that favor IoT devices, e.g.,
less signaling and lower data overhead. Moreover, the network should apply NFV/SDN
to allow flexible new service deployment and resource management, e.g., 3rd-party service
providers could deploy their own services on top of a shared infrastructure provided by
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an operator.
SIMECA proposes a new IoT service abstraction (ISA) based on typical IoT commu-
nication models. ISA hides the complexity of supporting mobility and connectivity and
exposes a simple interface for IoT devices to initiate both client-to-server and P2P commu-
nications. The ISA is realized using NFV/SDN technologies that run on a local edge cloud
to enable flexible resource scaling and full end-to-end control (§ 3.2.3.2).
• Heavy weight data and control plane. The current LTE/EPC network was designed
to support devices streaming large volumes of high quality data/voice (e.g., a smart phone
streaming a video or making a voice call) rather than massive IoT/M2M devices with
sporadic, best effort traffic (e.g., millions of meters sending a temperature sample every
20 minutes.) For example, data packets are delivered by EPS bearers in the EPC core
network which are GTP tunnels. Although those tunnels support QoS (via different QCI
indexes [23]) which might be needed for human devices (smart phones), setting up or
maintaining them incurs significant overhead [90]. For example, a standard LTE initial
attach procedure incurs up to 28 control messages, while a service request procedure incurs
up to 14 control messages [24]. On the other hand, a sensor sending a temperature sample
of 2 Bytes prefers a lighter control plane to reduce traffic delivery overhead. Moreover, an
EPS bearer (which consists of 4 GTP tunnels uplink and downlink) also corresponds to 8
tunnel end-points (i.e., 2 at eNodeB, 4 at SGW, and 2 at PGW). This would add significant
overhead to network elements when large numbers of IoT devices attach to the network.
In the data plane, the GTP tunnels add data plane overhead to IoT traffic. This overhead
becomes relatively more significant if the packet’s payload is small. For example, a body
temperature sensor generates 1.5 Bytes of data per sample requires 36 Bytes of additional
GTP/UDP tunneling overhead. Moreover, as the RAN capacity is expected to dramat-
ically increase with emerging access technologies in 5G [58], increases in the amount of
traffic would exacerbate the problem. For example, our analysis shows that if 90% of the
LTE/EPC traffic consists of large packets (e.g., smart phones streaming videos with 1400B
TCP packets) and the rest is small-payload traffic (e.g., meters sending 2B temperature
samples), the packet header overhead (GTP/UDP) in the EPC core to deliver the total
traffic is only 7%. However, if 90% of the traffic is small-payload traffic, the EPC core
network header overhead increases to about 47%.
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SIMECA proposes a light-weight IoT control and data plane to realize the IoT service
abstraction (ISA). Specifically, the SIMECA design eliminates the notion of bearers in
the EPC core network. Instead, SIMECA proposes to use light-weight, best-effort data
forwarding in the data path right after the RAN. SIMECA leverages an intelligent-edge
dumb-core principle: packet classification happens only at the base stations, while the
dumb-core network simply forwards the packets. Moreover, instead of adding tunnel-
ing headers to packets, SIMECA’s packet classification scheme translates/replaces packet
header at the network edge (i.e., base stations) for forwarding, thereby reducing packet
header overhead (§ 3.2.3.3). By eliminating tunnels inside its network, SIMECA reduces
the control plane signaling to maintain or modify them. Removing tunneling also reduces
the number of fine-grain forwarding states (i.e., tunnel IDs) in the network (§ 3.2.3.4).
• Centralized deployment of core mobile network functions. In current LTE/EPC
networks, core mobile network functionality, e.g., data-path elements that forward traf-
fic to the Internet (i.e., SGW and PGW), as well as control plane elements dealing with
mobility (i.e., MME) and policy (i.e., PCRF), are specialized hardware-based equipment or
virtualized NFVs deployed in a limited number of physical locations. Traffic between end-
points needs to travel to these centralized locations, adding extra latency to the end-to-end
path. The vision for 5G networks [25, 58] and recent efforts [53, 147] call for services that
will require significantly lower latencies (e.g., <5ms for tactile Internet), which the current
LTE/EPC architecture will not be able to support.
On the other hand, IoT/M2M devices are mostly static or have a low degree of mobil-
ity [58, 138]. This gives an opportunity to move away from a centralized network architec-
ture (e.g., a large geographical area shares a PGW) to a more distributed architecture with
computation and connectivity mostly local (e.g., spanning a metro area). A more “local”
environment would allow local deployment of computational resource (i.e., services) and
therefore reduce end-to-end latency.
We argue for a more distributed architecture where core mobile network functions,
as well as compute resources, are placed closer to the mobile network edge, i.e., a mobile
edge network and edge cloud architecture. The SIMECA architecture consists of regions,
each covering a relatively small geographical area. The distributed edge cloud and edge
network reduce network latency as mobility functions and services are deployed closer to
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users and help solve the scalability problem associated with centralized data centers.
3.2.3 SIMECA architecture
We present our work on SIMECA, an SDN-based IoT Mobile Edge Cloud Architecture
to enable efficient and flexible support of IoT services in future mobile networks. This
architecture is based on three main assumptions/design principles: i) A mobile infrastruc-
ture consists of a set of SDN-enabled base stations, an SDN-enabled mobile edge network,
and an edge cloud (Fig. 3.11). Both services and virtualized mobility functions (NFVs) are
deployed in the edge cloud. (ii) A new service abstraction, i.e., IoT service abstraction (ISA),
is designed with fully functional, low overhead and scalability goals in mind, running on
top of the infrastructure to provide connectivity and mobility that is optimized for IoT
devices. (iii) The infrastructure and the abstraction are able to scale to a large geographical
area by dividing an area into multiple smaller regions each controlled by a separated
control entity.
3.2.3.1 SDN-based mobile edge network and
cloud infrastructure
Figure 3.11 depicts the infrastructure that SIMECA runs on. The infrastructure is
distributed and consists of smaller regions. (We note that our assumed infrastructure is
aligned with broad industry vision towards an infrastructure in support of mobile edge
computing [63, 121].) Each region consists of a set of SDN-enabled base stations, an SDN
Figure 3.11. Mobile edge network and cloud infrastructure
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edge network, and a local edge cloud. Each region has a gateway switch and regions
are interconnected by programmable optical links with low latency [10]) (§ 3.2.3.5). We
envision a region could correspond to one or several metropolitan areas and provide a low
latency network. Specifically, the infrastructure consists of:
• SDN-enabled base stations - S-BS: In SIMECA base stations are SDN-enabled, allowing
them to apply the SDN match/actions paradigm to modify flows as dictated by an SDN
controller. The SDN-enabled Base stations are responsible for packet classification (i.e.,
modifying packet’s source and destination IP) for packets forwarding inside the SDN edge
network.
• SDN edge network: The SDN edge network consists of multiple SDN switches that
connect the S-BS and a local edge cloud. This SDN edge network has several gateway
switches that connect to neighboring regions SDN. intraregion traffic is forwarded by this
SDN edge network based on header destination address, while interregion traffic goes
across regions via gateway switches.
• Edge cloud: The edge cloud consists of multiple computation nodes that are capable
of running both virtualized mobility functions (NFVs) and IoT services. The edge cloud is
connected to the SDN edge network via an SDN switch to enable end-to-end SDN control.
We envision the edge cloud infrastructure explained above would be managed by a
single infrastructure operator. The infrastructure is shared by multiple IoT service providers
who deploy and manage their own IoT applications. Infrastructure resource allocation and
isolation are performed by the infrastructure operator (e.g., network slicing). A service
provider requests a slice of network and compute resource of the shared infrastructure to
run their service on demand. For example, an IoT service provider may request an addi-
tional slice from the infrastructure operator to host their new Health Monitoring Service.
The service provider can also scale the resource when the number of patients grows.
Compared to the current 4G infrastructure, SIMECA’s infrastructure would need an
additional distributed mobile edge cloud infrastructure and SDN programmability in base
stations. The distributed mobile edge cloud is well aligned with broad industry vision of
a highly distributed edge infrastructure to support mobile edge computing [63, 121]. The
SDN programmability in base stations could be implemented either in the base station
architecture or by adding a SDN-enabled switch colocated with the base station. SIMECA
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could transparently coexist with current 4G networks as long as there is a mechanism
at the Radio Access Network to distinguish and forward SIMECA traffic to SIMECA
infrastructure while leaving normal 4G traffic untouched [52].
3.2.3.2 IoT service abstraction (ISA)
In this section we provide details on how ISA abstracts the mobility and computation
infrastructure to provide a simple interface to IoT devices.
• ISA exposed interface. Unlike conventional smart phones, there are two communica-
tion models for IoT applications: client-server and publisher-subscriber. The client-server
model is suitable for one-to-one communications, e.g., client controls an actuator. The
publisher-subscriber model is suitable for many-to-many communications, e.g., multiple
publishers publish data to a broker and multiple subscribers get data from the broker.
These two models suggest both device-to-edge cloud communication (i.e., we call this C2S
communications) and device-to-device communication (i.e., we call this P2P communica-
tions) [17]. The ISA therefore exposes to the IoT devices computational resources and an
interface to request end-to-end connectivity between end IoT devices (i.e., P2P connectivity),
or between devices and services (i.e., C2S connectivity). Table 3.1 shows the interface that
an ISA instance exposes to a service provider.
To manage computational nodes (VMs) for its service, an IoT service provider could
instantiate a number of VMs in the edge cloud using the same interactions as it would
normally do in existing clouds (e.g., Amazon EC2), i.e., the network operator exposes a
north-bound API through its Infrastructure Controller (IC in Fig. 3.11 - The IC is out of
scope of this work. Therefore we depict it as a dashed box) and lets the service providers
request resources (VMs) dynamically. The IC then provisions and exposes the VMs back
to the service providers. Having instantiated its VMs, the service providers could deploy
Table 3.1. Interface exposed by an ISA
Interface Effect Example
C2S-attach
Connect a device Device A attaches
to a server to server 1
P2P-attach
Connect a device Device A attaches
to another device to device B
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their services on the VMs and let IoT devices connect to the services (VMs). Similarly, they
can scale up/down the VMs as needed.
The ISA is realized by two control plane entities: Mobility Network Functions (MF)
and Mobility SDN Controller (MC). Unlike LTE/EPC, the two control entities in SIMECA
could run on commodity servers and therefore the control plane could scale relatively
easily.
•Mobility functions (MF). The MF mainly deals with mobility specific functionalities
such as: tracking the location of a device, performing mobility procedures with devices
and base stations. As shown in Figure 3.12, the MF consists of 3 components (depicted in
yellow boxes): Mobility Interface, Device Tracking, and Identity Management. The Mobility
Interface component speaks standard protocols with the devices and base stations (i.e.,
NAS and S1AP protocols in 3GPP [20]). Using the interfaces provided by this entity, an IoT
device can request end-to-end connectivity in the network (i.e., Attach procedure). This en-
ables SIMECA to operate with base stations with normal 3GPP control plane. The Device
Tracking component keeps track of the attachment point of devices that move around, i.e., it
keeps track of which base station a device currently attaches to. By tracking the attachment
points of devices, SIMECA is aware of where to forward traffic to when devices move.
The Identity Management component manages identities for devices. Specifically, a device
in SIMECA has two identities: one for end-point application use and one for network
routing. This identity separation allows seamless handover in SIMECA (details about
identity, device tracking will be described in more detailed in § 3.2.3.3).
For example, a device turns on, authenticates with the network using existed protocols,
and sends an “Attach to Server A” request to the Mobility Interface (step 1 in Fig. 3.12). The
Mobility Interface then requests identities with the Identity Management and replies to the
device. The Identity Management updates the Device Tracking component with the current
location of the device (step 2).
•Mobility SDN controller (MC). While the MF deals with mobility functionalities, the
MC mainly deals with end-to-end path implementation via an OpenFlow API, i.e., after
dealing with mobility requests and assigning identities, the MF notifies MC to implement
paths accordingly. As shown in Figure 3.12, the MC consists of 4 components (depicted
in green boxes): Connectivity, Handover, OpenFlow (OF), and Network Information Base (NIB).
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Figure 3.12. IoT service abstraction (ISA)
The Connectivity component is specific to implement end-to-end paths (e.g., set up a path
from a device to a server when the device attaches), while the Handover component is
responsible for modifying paths during mobility events (e.g., forward traffic to a new base
station if the device moves). The two components use OpenFlow interfaces (OpenFlow
component) in combination with network topology information (i.e., NIB component)
to implement the paths. The NIB includes information such as on which base station
OpenFlow rules should be installed to realize end-to-end connectivity.
For example, after receiving the “Attach Request” from the device, the Mobility Interface
tells the Connectivity component in the MC to install a path from the base station (e.g.,
cell-ID) to server A (step 3 in Fig. 3.12). The Connectivity component uses the NIB to trans-
late the base station ID to the SDN data path object and use OF to realize the end-to-end
connectivity (step 4, 5).
3.2.3.3 Lightweight IoT data plane
In contrast to heavy-weight tunneling with QoS guarantees in the standard EPC core,
SIMECA’s best-effort forwarding data plane could benefit IoT services. It: (1) reduces
packet header overhead for IoT devices, (2) reduces the number of forwarding states inside
the network, while (3) enabling seamless mobility.
• Device identity and forwarding identity. A device in SIMECA is identified using
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two identities: device identity (DI) and device routing identity (RI). Each device has a unique
DI assigned by the network when the device attaches to the network. This DI is associated
with the device and does not change until the device detaches from the network. As this
DI does not change upon device mobility, applications running on the device use this DI
to enable continuous operation, i.e., seamless mobility. In the SDN edge network, packets
are forwarded using a separate RI (different from the DI). This RI is also allocated by the
network when a device attaches to the network. Unlike DI, RI is specific to a base station
and changes when a device moves to another base station. Under a specific base station,
there is a unique mapping between DI and RI.
Note that SIMECA’s device identity is simply an identity that is compatible with the
end-device’s network stack. This allows SIMECA to work regardless of the IP technology
used for the device identity (i.e., a device identity could be an IPv4 or IPv6 address, or even
a hash string). Similarly, the routing identity used in SIMECA is also flexible; the only
constraint for routing identity is that it must have two parts as described in Figure 3.13.
An operator might choose to allocate different sizes for each part (BID and EID) in a routing
identity depending on network topology and other optimizations for an IoT service.
• Lightweight header translation. Unlike in EPC where extra tunnel overhead is
added to packets at eNodeB and S/PGW for delivery over a transport network, SIMECA
does not add any extra overhead to packets. SIMECA instead uses header translation
mechanism to translate DI-RI at the network edge (i.e., base stations). Inside the SDN edge
network, packets have source and destination RIs in their header for forwarding. When
the packets reach end-points, they have DIs as their source and destination for seamless
mobility. When a device moves across base stations, it has a new RI and therefore the DI-RI
mapping also gets updated accordingly. To realize this DI-RI mapping, an SDN controller
installs SDN rules to base stations in a proactive manner during device attach/handover.
• Seamless mobility. SIMECA supports seamless mobility as it separates device iden-
tity, which is unchanged by mobility, and forwarding identity which changes with mobil-
Base station 
ID (BID)
End-point
ID (EID)
Figure 3.13. Routing identity header structure
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ity. When a device moves to a new base station, it is assigned a new RI that has the new
base station’s BID. Note that the DI of the device does not change. Therefore from the
end-points (device, server) perspective, the RI change is transparent.
For example, device A with DI of 192.168.3.33 attaches to base station 1 and gets RI
192.168.10.10/24. When it moves to base station 2 it gets a new RI 192.168.20.10/24. Packets
inside the SDN edge network are now forwarded to base station 2 where device A is
currently attached using the new BID 192.168.20.0/24. However, packets arriving at device
A and server still have device A’s DI 192.168.3.33 in the header.
• P2P forwarding and device location tracking. Unlike EPC, SIMECA naturally en-
ables peer-to-peer communication in which a device is reachable via its DI. This type of
communication is enabled when a device requests a P2P-attach to the other device with the
destination device’s DI specified (e.g., “Device DI1 attaches to device DI2”, Section 3.2.3.2).
When receiving a P2P-attach request, the SIMECA control plane needs to know the RI
of the destination device to install SDN rules in the source base station for DI-RI header
translation. This DI-RI mapping information is dynamic as the peer device moves across
base stations. SIMECA control plane stores this DI-RI mapping in a centralized table
(location tracking table) and updates the table accordingly when a device changes its
attachment point (hands over to another base station).
Table 3.2 shows an example of location tracking table in SIMECA. A new entry is
created by SIMECA control plane when a device attaches and registers itself as a reach-
able service (Section 3.2.3.2). It is updated when the registered device moves across base
stations (more details in Section 3.2.3.4).
• Example of packet forwarding. Figure 3.14 shows the translation of device identity
to routing identity at base station for intraregion forwarding: P2P forwarding on the left
and C2S forwarding on the right. For P2P forwarding, device 1 initiates a flow to device
2 in the same region. The packet header at device 1 is [DI1, DI2] where DI1 and DI2 are
Table 3.2. Attachment point tracking table for P2P communications
Device identity Routing identity
192.168.3.33 192.168.10.10/24
192.168.3.34 192.168.11.11/24
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src: DI1 dst: DI2
D1
src: DI1 dst: DI2
D2
src: RI1 dst: RI2
src: DI3 dst: A
D3
src: RI3 dst: A
A
BS1
BS2
BS3 BS4
Figure 3.14. Packet header translation: packet forwarding example
device 1 and 2’s device identity. Base station 1 has an SDN flow rule that replaces uplink
packets header with device 1 and 2’s routing identity and forwards the packets to the SDN
edge network. The SDN edge network has preinstalled SDN rules that matches on base
station ID in packet header (i.e., [RI1, RI2]).
Upon arriving at destination base station 2, the packet header is translated back to
[DI1, DI2] and delivered to device 2.
Similarly for C2S forwarding, base station 3 translates packets source address from
DI3 to RI3. The destination address which is the server address does not change (i.e., A in
Figure 3.14). The SDN edge network forwards uplink packets based on server destination
address. For downlink packets from the server, the SDN edge network simply forwards
packets by matching the destination address in the packet which is embedded in the uplink
packets (i.e., RI3).
• Reduce number of forwarding states. To reduce the number of forwarding states
inside the SDN edge network, SIMECA uses an intelligent-edge dumb-core principle. In
the SDN edge network, RI has a predefined structure that aggregates end-points in the
same base station. Specifically, as shown in Figure 3.13, an RI consists of a Base station
ID-BID and a End-point ID-EID. The BID specifies a base station in the network and EID
specifies a device in that base station. Inside the SDN edge network, packets are forwarded
by matching on BID only. When packets arrive at the edge (base stations), the base stations
demultiplex packets to corresponding devices using EID. Therefore, the number of for-
warding states in the SDN edge network only depends on the number of BIDs allocated
regardless of the number of devices.
For example, if using the IP address structure, a RI would look like 192.168.10.10/24
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where 192.168.10.0/24 is the BID and 192.168.10.10 is the EID. Inside the SDN edge net-
work, packets are forwarded using the BID 192.168.10.0/24. Upon reaching a base station,
the EID 192.168.10.10 is used to deliver the packets to the corresponding device (using
DI-RI mapping in the base station).
For each end-to-end connection, there are only 2 SDN rules installed at base station
in SIMECA (the rules in the SDN edge network are shared among devices of the same
base station), while there are 8 GTP tunnel IDs maintained per EPS bearer in the EPC core
network (i.e., 2/4/2 GTP tunnel IDs at eNodeB/SGW/PGW per bearer).
3.2.3.4 Lightweight IoT control plane
• Eliminate tunneling to reduce control plane overhead. By eliminating EPC tunnels
in SDN edge network and allowing packet classification at the edge, SIMECA eliminates
control signaling overhead to set-up/maintain the tunnels and reduces the number of
forwarding states in the data path. Compared to EPC, SIMECA’s control plane is more
lightweight for multiple reasons: (1) packet classification happens only at the network
edge (base stations) and therefore requires fewer interactions to set-up a path (i.e., the
SDN controller only needs to push OpenFlow rules into the base station as opposed to
interactions between eNodeB, SGW, PGW and MME in EPC); (2) SIMECA’s dumb-core
eliminates the overhead to set-up forwarding states in SDN edge network as compared
to GTP-U tunnels in EPC, which also results in a lower number of forwarding states
in the data plane in SIMECA; (3) unlike in LTE/EPC networks the forwarding states
in SIMECA do not expire due to radio bearer release, therefore eliminating the control
signaling overhead incurred by re-establishing the data path when devices become active
again after an idle period (i.e., Service Request and Paging), and (4) OpenFlow control
messages are more lightweight than EPC bearer creation/modification messages.
Figure 3.15 shows forwarding states in the data path of SIMECA (upper) and LTE/EPC
(lower). As SIMECA classifies packets at the network edge, only 2 OpenFlow rules (red
arrows) are installed in each base station per C2S-attached device as opposed to 4 GTP-U
tunnels (uplink and downlink) per EPS bearer (i.e., according to 8 forwarding states or tunnel
IDs) at eNodeB, SGW, and PGW in EPC. Installing OpenFlow rules at base stations also
incurs less control signaling than setting up tunnels between multiple components as in
49
Dumb-core 
(SDN edge)
MC
eNB-1
eNB-2
MME
S-BS
SGW PGW Internet
S1AP
S11
S5S8
OPF/S1AP
EPC-core
BS1
BS2
GTP-U tunnels
SDN rules
S1-U
SIMECA
LTE/EPC
GS
MF
UE1
UE2
REST
M1
M2
Figure 3.15. Tunneling in EPC vs. SDN rules in SIMECA
EPC: only 2 OpenFlow f low mod messages and a RESTful message are needed for each
C2S-attached per device as opposed to 8 GTP-C and S1AP messages exchanged on S11,
S1AP, S5S8 interfaces as in EPC [24] to set up both ends of each tunnel.
• Example of OpenFlow rules installed in a P2P attach procedure. Figure 3.16 shows
how SIMECA controllers interact and install OpenFlow rules to implement a P2P path
between device D1 and D2 when D1 requests a P2P attach to D2. Table 3.3 shows Open-
Flow (OF) rules installed in base station 1 (BS1) and base station 2 (BS2) after each control
plane step. To be specific, in this example let’s assume (DI,RI) of D1 is (192.168.3.33,
192.168.10.10/24) and (DI,RI) of D2 is (192.168.3.34, 192.168.11.11/24) (x in the table rep-
resents the prefix 192.168).
At the beginning, D2 is already attached to the network. Its (DI,RI) is recorded in
Table 3.3. OpenFlow rules installed at base stations to implement a P2P connection in
SIMECA
Step Base Station OpenFlow Rules on Base Station
4
1
1.Match(from RAN, ip.src==x.3.33, ip.dst==x.3.34)
Action(ip.src←x.10.10, ip.dst←x.11.11, to SDN)
2.Match(from SDN, ip.src==x.11.11, ip.dst==x.10.10)
Action(ip.src←x.3.34, ip.dst←x.3.33, to RAN)
2
1.Match(from SDN, ip.src==x.10.10, ip.dst==x.11.11)
Action(ip.src←x.3.33, ip.dst←x.3.34, to RAN)
2.Match(from RAN, ip.src==x.3.34, ip.dst==x.3.33)
Action(ip.src←x.11.11, ip.dst←x.10.10, to SDN)
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Figure 3.16. Control plane interaction during a P2P attach request
the Device Location Table (Ltable) (we omit OF rules installed when D2 initially attached in
the table). At step 1, D1 requests a P2P attach to D2 using DIs (i.e., 192.168.3.33 attaches
to 192.168.3.34). As this is the first time D1 is seen, the MF allocates a RI for D1 (i.e.,
192.168.10.10/24). MF then tells MC to install a path between D1 and D2 (step 2). As D2
could be located anywhere in the network, MC refers to Ltable to obtain D2’s RI (i.e.,
192.168.11.11/24) and its location (i.e., BS2, step 3). After having all information, MC
pushes OF rules to the base stations to implement a P2P path between D1-D2 (step 4).
After this step, OF rules installed in BS1 and BS2 are shown in Table 3.3: the path D1-to-D2
is implemented by flow rules #1, while the reverse path, D2-to-D1, is implemented by flow
rules #2. After the MC installs the path, it updates (DI,RI) of D1 in the Ltable (step 6).
Compared to Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP) [64], SIMECA’s data plane
and control plane are different in several points. First, in the data plane instead of encap-
sulating packet header with an additional header (i.e., map-n-cap mechanism) or adding
additional routing identifier into the packet header (i.e., address rewriting mechanism),
SIMECA replaces the entire header (DI) with a routing identifier (RI). This allows SIMECA
to use DI and RI that have flexible formats, e.g., IPv4 or IPv6 or even a hash string, while
not adding additional header overhead. Second, the mechanism that triggers a data path
modification in SIMECA is different from LISP; unlike LISP where the Endpoint Identifier-
to-Routing Locator (EID-to-RLOC) mapping is fetched from a mapping database when the
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first (unknown) data packet of a flow arrives, SIMECA’s control plane proactively pushes
OF rules into data plane as a side effect of a control plane request from the end-device
(e.g., a P2P attach request). This proactive path implementation helps switch a data path
faster compared to the LISP’s mechanism especially when the end-point moves rapidly in
a mobile environment.
• Control plane overhead analysis of SIMECA procedures.
• Device attach. Compared to the LTE/EPC attach procedure, SIMECA’s attach pro-
cedure does not involve signaling to set up bearers between multiple components (i.e.,
eNodeB, SGW, PGW and MME). Instead, the SDN controller of the region (MC), only
needs to install OpenFlow rules at base stations. In term of forwarding states (OpenFlow
rules) in the data plane, SIMECA also has fewer states compared to EPC: there are 2/4
OpenFlow rules (as shown in Table 3.3) to realize an intraregion C2S/P2P path per device,
while EPC needs 8/16 GTP-U tunnel states for each bearer (i.e., 2 at eNodeB, 4 at SGW, and
2 at PGW).
In terms of control signaling, for an intraregion connection setup, SIMECA incurs
2/4 f low mod OpenFlow messages to set up an end-to-end C2S/P2P path, respectively
(and a table lookup that is supposed to be local at the MC). Compared to LTE/EPC which
involves 8 messages (i.e., 6 GTP-C messages for S11 (MME-SGW) and S5S8 (SGW-PGW)
tunnels set up and 2 S1AP messages for tunnels set up at eNodeB [24]), SIMECA saves
42% and 37% of signaling traffic per C2S/P2P attach, respectively (as shown in Table 3.4).
Note that SIMECA reuses the authentication procedure of LTE/EPC so that it has the same
control signaling overhead for authentication.
• Service request and paging. In LTE/EPC, when a device does not have data to send/receive,
it will go idle and the network releases its radio resources at the eNodeB (i.e., a device enter
EMM-Registered and ECM-idle state after about 15s in LTE). As the network maintains
EPS bearers across the EPC core and the RAN, when the radio bearer (i.e., Data Radio
Bearer - DRB) is released at the eNodeB, its associated GTP tunnels to the SGW (i.e., S1-
U/S1-C tunnels) also get released. This results in control signaling overhead to re-establish
the tunnels when the device has data to send (i.e., Service Request procedure). Similarly, in
the downlink direction if there is traffic to the device, the MME needs to trigger the Paging
procedure to page the device before re-establishing the tunnels as in Service Request.
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Table 3.4. Control plane message size, LTE/EPC vs. SIMECA
Event Interface Message LTE/EPC SIMECA
Attach
S11
Create Session
564B x
Req./Res.
S5S8
Create Session
369B x
Req./Res.
Control flow mod x 48B×2
S1AP Auth, Security 1060B 1060B
Total 1993B
1156B
(42% ↑)
Handover
S11
Modify Session
1302B x
Req./Res.,
Create Fwd. Tun.
Req./Res.,
Delete Fwd. Tun.
Req./Res.
Control flow mod x 48B×3
S1AP
HO
872B 872B
Req./Res./Noti.
Total 2174B
1016B
(53% ↑)
On the other hand, SIMECA does not maintain the EPS bearer notion and offers best
effort delivery. This allows the data path at base stations and the SDN edge network to be
reused when the device has data to send/receive without incurring extra control signaling
to set up the path. This reduces 5 control messages per Service Request. As Paging includes
a Service Request, this saving also holds for Paging. Moreover, if the DRB information
exists at the base station for the device being paged, SIMECA would require no paging
request for that device and therefore it could save 7 control messages.
• Device handover. Similarly, to modify the flows between source/target base station
and the destination, SIMECA incurs 4/5 f low mod messages to maintain a C2S/P2P con-
nection of the mobile device. In EPC, to realize path switch and forwarding tunnels to
support lossless handover, there are 8 control messages incurred (i.e., 6 GTP-C messages
on S11 interface and 2 S1AP messages for S1 handover [24]). Compared to LTE/EPC,
SIMECA reduces 53% and 49% of control traffic for the two types of handovers (as shown
in Table 3.4.)
• Control plane interaction. As discussed in § 3.2.3.2, the control plane consists of
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following logical components: Mobility Functions - MF, Mobility SDN controller - MC. Also,
to keep track of device attachment point, a Device location table-LTable is used. We will only
describe the interaction of SIMECA control components during a Handover procedure.
Figure 3.17 shows interactions when device 1 (D1) handovers and maintains an end-
to-end connection with device 2 (D2). At step 1, D1 notifies the MF that it is handing
off to base station 3 (BS3). MF makes a request to BS3 and notifies the MC about the
handover (step 2). MC looks up D1 and D2’s current RIs in the local Ltable (step 4) and
installs OpenFlow rules to realize the path switch (step 5): (1) at BS2, packets heading to
D1 are now forwarded to BS3 (originally BS1); (2) at BS3, a new pair of OpenFlow rule
(downlink/uplink) is installed for D1 so that packets arriving at BS1 will be forwarded to
D1; (3) in-flight packets that are heading to BS1 are forwarded to BS3 by a triangular path
set up between BS1 and BS3. The MC then updates the table with the new RI (i.e., RI3,
assigned by the MF at BS3) for D1 (step 6). This completes the handover procedure.
Note that SIMECA’s control plane uses SDN technology because of the inherent pro-
grammability of SDN and the well-defined protocol (i.e., OpenFlow). However, SIMECA
architecture itself is independent of protocols used. If other protocols, e.g., I2RS1 [76],
provide this programmability, SIMECA can operate over those protocols. Also, if SDN-
enabled switches support BGP and MPLS-TE, SIMECA could control these protocol be-
haviors by appropriate North Bound/South Bound interfaces. Moreover, other alterna-
Figure 3.17. Control plane interaction during a handover
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tives would be recent proposals that enable SDN to communicate with legacy protocols,
e.g., SDN and BGP in ONOS’s SDN-IP use case [13].
3.2.3.5 Multiple-region communications
A single Mobility controller and Mobility Function can only support a limited number
of devices in a limited area. To scale to a large geographical area, multiple instances of MC
and MF could be deployed in different smaller regions. We refer to connectivity that extend
through two regions as Interregion communications. The following describes Interregion
forwarding and the interaction in the control plane to make this possible.
• Interregion forwarding. Between regions, SDN edge networks are interconnected by
gateway switches (GSs). Gateway switches are able to deliver IP packets amongst them.
As shown in Figure 3.18, when device 1 initiates a connection to device 2 in another region,
the destination RI address of its packet does not match any base station within its region.
The SDN edge network forwards that packet to its interregion gateway switch (GS1). The
gateway switch encapsulates the packets with [IP1, IP2] IP addresses to deliver packets
to region 2. The gateway switch of region 2 (GS2) then decapsulates the IP packets and
matches on the inner RI to deliver the packets to device 21.
To find the destination tunnel IP for a device for interregion delivery (e.g., as shown
IP2 in Figure 3.18), SIMECA controller looks up the DI-RI mapping table (i.e., as shown
in column 3 in the table in Figure 3.18).
For example, an end-to-end packet processing for traffic initiated from device 1 looks
as follows: at base station 1 (BS1), packet header is translated from [src : DI1, dst : DI2]
to [src : RI1, dst : RI2]. At GS1, packets heading to RI2 are encapsulated using IP2. When
packets arrive at GS2, they are decapsulated and forwarded to BS4 using RI2 matching.
At BS4, packet headers are translated from RI1, RI2 to DI1, DI2. Similarly, the reverse
processing happens for the returning direction.
• Interactions between control components. Figure 3.19 shows the interaction be-
tween components when a device requests P2P connectivity to another device in a different
region. D1 requests an attach to D2 (step 1). The MF assigns a new routing identity
1Note that our design is independent of the transport network between SDN gateway switches. Therefore
it can run other protocols such as MPLS for scalability.
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Figure 3.18. P2P packet header translation: interregion
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Figure 3.19. Interregion routing
RI1 for D1 and looks up the centralized Ltable for device 2’s routing identity (RI2) and
the destination tunnel IP (i.e., IP2) (step 2). The MF then selects ingress/egress GSes in
the source/destination regions. After having the ingress/egress GSes, the MF notifies
the region’s SDN controllers, MC1 and MC2, about the request (step 3). The MC then
implements (1) paths to/from GSes (i.e., BS2 to GS1, BS3 to GS2 in Figure 3.19), and (2)
packet encapsulation at GSes (step 4).
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• Recursive device tracking for scalability. As the number of devices increases, the
number of entries in Location Tracking Table could also increase and the workload of
SIMECA’s controllers (MC/MF) will increase. In order to scale to a large network, SIMECA
divides the network into multiple smaller regions each controlled by independent con-
trollers. To maintain a large number of device identities, i.e., Device ID and Routing ID,
SIMECA adopts a hierarchical approach to structure the Location Tracking Table: the table
is organized as a tree structure with the leaf tables containing entries of the smallest regions
and the root table containing entries of the entire network. At the leaf regions, each region
(a metropolitan area or smaller) maintains a local Location Tracking Table keeping track
of devices and their mobility in that local region. If a device moves across regions, the
parent table that covers the two regions will be updated. If a device ID is not found in
the local region’s Tracking Table, the SIMECA controller (MC) will recursively search the
parent region’s tables until the ID is found. This hierarchical structure enables fast look-up
and update at the leaf regions while allowing SIMECA to scale to multiple regions in the
meantime.
3.2.4 Prototype implementation
• SDN-enabled base station. Figure 3.20 shows our base station architecture. We im-
plemented the SDN-enabled base station (S-BS) by combining a node running a refactored
OpenAirInterface (OAI) software-defined radio eNodeB implementation [11], with a node
running OpenvSwitch (OVS) [119]. We reuse OAI radio stack and radio control plane (i.e.,
RRC, PDCP, RLC, MAC/PHY) and modify the core network data path. Specifically, in the
uplink direction, the radio stack PDCP (Packet Data Convergence Protocol) task associated
with a radio bearer places IP packets in an Intertask Interface (i.e., ITTI) queue. A raw
socket task reads the queue and forwards IP packets to the node running the OpenvSwitch,
which in turn connects to the SDN edge network. Similarly, downlink packets from the
raw socket task will be placed in the ITTI queue. There is a relay demultiplexer that keeps
the mapping between radio bearers (or radio task) and packets destination IP addresses
(the mapping is recorded during bearer setup and device attach/handover). This relay
associates the downlink packets to corresponding PDCP radio tasks based on the packet
destination IP address. The mobility SDN controller interacts with the base station Open-
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Figure 3.20. SDN-enabled base station
vSwitch via the OpenFlow protocol. Note that this SDN-enabled architecture could also
co-exist with conventional LTE/EPC eNodeBs as it has similar relay functionality in the
data path. Figure 3.21 shows our prototype. We used an unmodified Nexus 5 device that
speaks the normal LTE protocols to interact with SIMECA as SIMECA preserves the S1
interface for backward compatibility.
• Mobility function component. We implemented the MF component by refactoring
an OpenEPC [55] MME implementation. The MF reuses the MME authentication func-
tionality but implements SIMECA’s simplified device attach and handover procedures:
The MF shortcuts the attach and handover procedure by removing control messages to
set-up/modify tunnels at SGW and PGW. When it receives an “Attach request”, the MF
notifies MCs to install an end-to-end path and sends “Attach accept” to notify the device
when OpenFlow setup is complete. For communication between MF and MCs, we have
designed RESTful APIs.
• Mobility SDN controller. We implemented the Mobility SDN controller using the
Ryu controller. MCs constantly listen for HTTP requests from the MF and install OpenFlow
rules onto SDN-enabled base stations accordingly. For intraregion routing we used a
58
OpenEPC 
eNB* 1IoT device 1
Attenuator
Mobility 
Func.
SDN 
ctrller-1
SDN 
edge-R1
Server  
OVS 1
Server 
1
SDN-enabled 
Base Stations
SDN edge network
Service platform 1
<1ms
<1ms
<1ms
OAI eNB*Nexus 5
OpenEPC 
eNB* 3IoT device 1
SDN 
edge-R2
Server  
OVS 2
Server 
2
Service platform 2
OpenEPC 
eNB* 4IoT device 1
SDN 
ctrller-2
GS1
GS2
Region 1
Region 2
IoT abstraction
<1ms
LTable
SDN edge cloud
Figure 3.21. SIMECA prototype implementation
simple shortest path implementation that performs forwarding based on matching on an
IP prefix: the SDN controller computes shortest paths based on a known topology of the
prototype. For interregion forwarding we use GRE tunneling for simplicity (MPLS should
be used in actual deployment for better scaling). In our implementation, we used IPv4
addresses for SIMECA device identity.
3.2.5 Evaluation
We used the PhantomNet testbed for our evaluation [51]. Figure 3.21 shows the eval-
uation topology. It consists of two regions: each has two SDN-enabled base stations (both
SDR-based and emulated), an SDN edge network consisting of Open vSwitches (e.g., SDN
edge-R1), and a server platform mimicking an edge cloud. The two SDN edge networks
are connected via two gateway switches that are also Open vSwitches (i.e., GS1, GS2). The
emulated SDN-enabled base stations were developed by refactoring an OpenEPC eNodeB
implementation, while the OAI implementation described in Section 3.2.4 executed on a
USRP B210 SDR platform. The two emulated base stations each connect to a node that
emulates multiple IoT devices. The OAI base station connects to a Nexus 5 smart phone
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via a programmable radio frequency attenuator. In the control plane, the IoT abstraction
consists of two MCs (i.e., SDN controllers, each per region), and an MF (i.e., Mobility
Function, shared by the two regions). The location tracking table is implemented using
a MySQL database. The SDN core network consist of OVSs that performs shortest path
forwarding based on IP header prefix. To mimic a local deployment (e.g., an optical ring
as a metro access connecting multiple Central Offices), the links between the RAN, SDN
edge network, edge cloud, and regions are set to submillisecond one-way latency with
1Gbps link capacity.2
We compared SIMECA with an unmodified EPC network instance (i.e., UEs, eNodeBs,
SGW, PGW etc.) which was also set up in the PhantomNet testbed. To mimic a realistic
LTE/EPC deployment, we configured the links between eNodeBs and SGW to have 1Gbps
capacity and 15ms one-way delay, while the links between the SWG and PGW were con-
figured with to 1Gbps capacity and 5ms delay [80]. The total end-to-end latency for legacy
EPC core is therefore around 20ms. We use machines with a 3.0 GHz core and 2GB RAM
for OVSs, machines that host MF and MC have eight 2.4 GHz cores and 12 GB RAM.
We chose a noncritical health monitoring service with a large number of sensors for our
evaluation. We implemented a simple CoAP [139] client using CoAPthon library [144]. As
multiple CoAP clients run on a single PC, we assigned multiple IP addresses to the PC
and let each CoAP client (which is a process) bind to a unique IP address. The clients
then send/receive payload using the IoT CoAP [139] protocol each with a different IP
address. We scaled up to 2000 clients (devices) in our emulated experiments as there are
limitations in OpenEPC memory management. We did not increase the number of devices
further (using simulations) because the trends were already shown in experiments with
2000 devices.
We mimicked four types of health sensors with payload size and sample rate [124]
as shown in Table 3.5. For control plane evaluation, the mean device session duration is
15 minutes (i.e., devices reattach after each 15m) and with 50% chance of mobility in an
hour [138] (i.e., a device has 50% chance that it is stationary). For Service Request and
2This latency depends on network topology and deployment scenarios. The reference deployment in our
evaluation is that a region is the combination of a single central office and connected network devices, and
network topology is built on optical metro networks with a submillisecond transmission delay [43].
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Table 3.5. Workload of health monitoring sensors
Device Data rate (bps) Sample size (B)
Body Temperature 2.4 1.5
Blood pressure 1920 2
Cardiac Output 640 2
ECG 98304 2
Paging, we assumed devices release radio resource (i.e., go idle) after 15s of idle time. We
ran control plane experiments for 60 minutes.
3.2.5.1 Micro benchmark
• Control plane time. We trigger different requests and measure the time for SIMECA
to process those requests. We compare this with the processing time of an EPC core
network. A request completion time is the elapsed time between a request and a reply
including network latency (e.g., between base stations and MF). For example, the process-
ing time of a device attach event is the elapsed time when the device sends an “Attach
request” until the network (EPC or SIMECA) returns an “Attach complete”.
Figure 3.22 shows the processing time of SIMECA’s control plane (i.e., ISA) for dif-
ferent requests: device attaches to a server (CS2 ATTACH), P2P attach, device handover
while having a C2S connection (C2S HO), and device handover while having a P2P con-
nection (P2P HO). For intraregion events (SIMECA), SIMECA processing time is 76%
and 64% lower for device attach and handover requests as compared with EPC. For P2P
requests, intraregion SIMECA processing time is also small (about 35ms). For interregion
requests (e.g., device in a region attaches to another device in another region, denoted as
SIMECA-I), SIMECA is 55%/34% faster than EPC for attaches/handovers. The perfor-
mance improvement of SIMECA is because (i) network functions (i.e., MF,MC) are now
closer to users so that control plane latency is small (network latency - black box), (ii) less
processing time on control plane components (processing time-crossed box). Interregion
SIMECA has higher latency because there are interactions between regions and database
look-up/update for devices routing identity (grey box) involved.
• OAI eNodeB processing time. To understand how SIMECA affects data plane
performance in OAI eNodeB, we compare packet processing time in the data plane of OAI
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Figure 3.22. Control plane time: SIMECA, LTE/EPC
eNodeB with and without SIMECA. To allow for a fair comparison, in SIMECA eNodeB
we measure the time a raw socket task reads a PDCP packet in the ITTI queue and finishes
sending it to the socket. Similarly, in unmodified OAI eNodeB, we measure the time a
GTPU task reads a PDCP packet and its UDP socket finishes sending the packet.
Figure 3.23 shows data plane processing time in OAI eNodeB with and without SIMECA.
SIMECA processing time is similar to normal GTPU processing time which is about 45
usec uplink and 15 usec downlink.
• Handover functionality. To test seamless mobility functionality in SIMECA we
conducted an experiment with a server sending a UDP flow from an edge cloud sever
to a client. We conducted the experiment using emulated base station as OAI eNodeB
does not support handover control signaling. The UDP sender sent packets with a 5ms
interval and 1000B packet. In the middle of a flow, the base station performed handover to
handoff the client to another station.
Figure 3.24 shows packet sequence number and packet interarrival time at the receiver.
At about sequence 800 the handover happens. After the handover, the flow is not dis-
rupted and the handover was seamless.
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3.2.5.2 System evaluations
• End-to-end latency improvement. End-to-end network latency in SIMECA should
be smaller than regular EPC because of its distributed deployment close to the edge of the
mobile network. Figure 3.25 shows a CDF of the RTT between the Nexus 5 and SIMECA
edge cloud, i.e., C2S. and between Nexus 5 and another client, i.e., P2P. Average RTT
for C2S is 12ms and for P2P 24ms. We further break down the latency to separate the
latency incurred in OAI radio and in SIMECA network. The result shows that OAI radio
dominates the end-to-end latency (i.e., 12ms for C2S and 24ms for P2P), while SIMECA
incurred latency is less than 1ms. This suggests SIMECA is suitable for low-latency appli-
cations in future networks with improved RAN latency.
To show the end-to-end network latency improvement in SIMECA with a large num-
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Figure 3.25. End-to-end latency between Nexus 5 and service via OAI eNodeB
ber of devices, we conducted an experiment with a large number of health sensors sending
traffic to the edge cloud and to another peer in SIMECA and to a server in the Internet in
EPC and measured the round-trip time for packets. As shown in Figure 3.26, in SIMECA
client-to-server RTT is about 5ms and client-to-client RTT is about 10ms. As both SIMECA
and LTE/EPC have the same radio delay in the experiments, this is almost 10x improve-
ment compared to EPC. Note that this latency gain is mostly because services in SIMECA
are deployed in edge cloud which is much closer to users compared to centralized data
centers in LTE/EPC deployments.
• Control plane overhead. To compare control plane overhead in SIMECA and EPC,
we conducted an experiment with multiple sensors performing attach and handover pro-
cedures and measured the amount of traffic in the SIMECA edge network (i.e., S1AP,
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REST, and OpenFlow interfaces) and the EPC core network (i.e., S1AP, S11, S5S8 inter-
faces). For the intraregion experiment we assumed 100% of events are intraregion only
while in the interregion experiment 30% of devices requested an interregion attach.
Figure 3.27 shows the amount of control traffic in SIMECA (SIMECA means intrare-
gion scenario, SIMECA-I means a mixed of intra- and interregion scenario) and EPC as a
function of the number of devices. In total, SIMECA has approximately 37% less control
traffic for 1000 sensors (i.e., according to 4000 attach events as there are 4 events per hour
and one-hour experiment) for intraregion scenario. We further break down the control
signaling into 2 parts: RAN-Core is the signaling between base stations and the SDN edge
network (i.e., or between eNodeBs and the EPC core in LTE/EPC), and Core is the signaling
within the SDN edge network only (i.e., or within the EPC core in LTE/EPC). As shown
in Figure 3.27, SIMECA reduces the control signaling in both the SDN edge network (i.e.,
between MF, MC, and SDN - red box), and the interface with base stations (i.e., simplified
Attach procedure in SIMECA- green crossed box). During the experiment with the regular
EPC setup, the SGW ran out of memory when handling around 500 sensors, requiring us
to increase the memory footprint of the SGW node 10 times to complete the experiment.
With SIMECA the evaluation worked fine on the original node for up to 2000 sensors,
illustrating the scalability advantage of our approach.
For Service Request and Paging, Figure 3.28 shows the amount of control plane traffic
for 1000 devices each sending and receiving periodic traffic (i.e., every 10s, 15s, 30s, etc).
We set the LTE/EPC radio release time to 15s (i.e., if a device goes idle for >15s and
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sends traffic again it will need to re-establish the radio bearers and trigger Service Re-
quest/Paging). As we can see, if devices wake up after each 15s and send a small amount
of traffic (many meters would fall into this category), the Service Request in LTE/EPC
could incur about 230MB of control signaling per hour while SIMECA does not incur any
control traffic. If devices send traffic more frequently (after each 10s), they won’t trigger
Service Request. On the other hand, if devices send traffic less frequently (e.g., after each
30s), they will trigger less Service Request per minute and therefore less control plane
signaling incurs.
• Data plane overhead. To compare the header overhead incurred in SIMECA and
EPC, we allowed 500 CoAP sensors to send traffic in both the SIMECA and regular EPC
configurations. We vary the payload of the application from small (2B) to large (500B)
and measure the packet overhead (i.e., payloadpayload+header ). We also measure the number of
forwarding states (i.e., number of SDN rules in SIMECA and GTP tunnels in EPC) as a
function of number of devices attached. We assume there is 1 bearer per device in EPC and
60% of the devices are C2S devices, 30% of the devices have interregion communications.
Figure 3.29 shows packet overhead (i.e., payload/(payload+ header)) of CoAP clients
with different payload sizes in a POST request in SIMECA and EPC. SIMECA has about
20% less packet header overhead than EPC to deliver a CoAP POST request with a pay-
load that is smaller than 100B. For CoAP POST requests with larger payload, e.g. 500B,
SIMECA’s data plane incurs about 10% less overhead than EPC.
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3.2.6 Discussion
Since SIMECA is designed specifically for IoT devices, it has some trade-offs compared
to the LTE/EPC architecture. We discuss the trade-offs here and their implications.
First, removing the GTP tunnels in the data plane will disable the associated QoS
support for IoT devices. IoT devices will not be able to set up “dedicated channels”
(dedicated bearers) with guaranteed QoSes in the core network as in LTE/EPC. Also,
unlike in the LTE/EPC where each device can have multiple bearers to the same PDN
network on top of a single IP connection, each IoT device in SIMECA can only have
a single “channel” (e.g., an IP connection) with the same QoS support for all possible
applications running on the device. However, removing the fine-grained channels on IoT
devices was a deliberate decision to reduce network overhead, and more importantly most
IoT devices do not require QoS supports and multiple dedicated channels.
Moreover, if IP forwarding is used in SIMECA’s data plane, QoS support could still be
implemented using existing QoS mechanisms for IP networks. For example, the SIMECA’s
SDN controller could adopt DiffServ [4] to add an IP Differentiated Services Code Point
(DSCP) to the IP packet header at base stations. The SDN-edge network switches then
perform Per Hop Behavior to realize end-to-end QoS. Comparing with the mechanism in
the LTE/EPC, this QoS mechanism is still cheaper; in SIMECA, packet classification and
per-device states are stored only at the network edge (i.e., base stations), while in LTE/EPC
the classification and per-device states are kept deep inside the core network (e.g., on the
SGW, PGW).
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Second, SIMECA was not designed to be compatible with other 3GPP architectures.
For example, SIMECA is not compatible with 2G/3G and LTE in terms of supporting
inter-3GPP mobility. Without 3GPP compatibility, the network coverage for IoT devices
is limited. For example, when an IoT device moves out of the coverage of SIMECA’s
base stations it loses the connection even when other 3GPP access networks are available.
To enable 3GPP compatibility, the SIMECA’s mobility controller needs to interface with
other control components in other 3GPP networks (e.g., SGSN in 3G via an S3 interface)
to exchange data plane information upon a handover. On the data plane, the target 3GPP
network (e.g., SGSN) needs to forward packets coming from the new radio access network
to the service hosted inside SIMECA. One way to enable this is to have an access gateway
in SIMECA before the edge cloud. The gateway will serve as an anchor point for IP
sessions and the SGSN can forward packets to the gateway using tunneling (similar to
an S4 interface in LTE/EPC). Note that the gateway in SIMECA maintains GTP tunnels
only with a target 3GPP technology merely for compatibility during handovers. Inside its
architecture SIMECA still eliminates tunnelings to reduce network overhead.
3.2.7 Related work
Leveraging SDN programmability to improve flexibility in cellular networks have been
proposed in [85, 96, 105]. SoftMow addressed the limitation in the number of Internet
egress points and proposed a scalable recursive SDN control plane for cellular networks.
SoftMow proposed a design to compute and install routes for devices in the regions to
access to the Internet via the desired Internet gateway. SIMECA has a similar vision
of edge cloud and edge network with smaller regions to reduce network latency (also
aligns with industry proposals for edge cloud [2, 63, 121]). However, SIMECA targets
device-to-local cloud and device-to-device communications that are required and specific
to IoT devices.
A scalable SDN-based control and data plane to support fine-grained policies for a large
number of mobile devices using middle boxes have been proposed [85, 96]. These works
addressed the scalability problem of chaining middle boxes in cellular core networks to
realize traffic policing at flow granularity. SIMECA uses a similar approach to use SDN to
address scalability and overhead problems in conventional cellular networks. SIMECA,
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however, changes the cellular protocols and abstraction for low overhead, low latency
communication for IoTs.
Decoupling of control and data plane and using SDN to set up paths in cellular net-
works have been proposed in [123, 130]. These works proposed to use an SDN controller as
the control entity and use SDN forwarding rules on the data plane for packet forwarding.
The works preserved the cellular protocols and data plane. SIMECA has a similar model
with SDN controller as a control entity and SDN forwarding rules on the data plane. How-
ever, SIMECA proposes to remove cellular protocols and data plane (i.e., GTP tunneling)
and replace them with light-weight control/data planes.
Offloading of control and data plane using SDN is proposed in [52, 106]. Procel [106]
targeted data and signaling overhead in LTE/EPC by offloading disruption tolerant traffic
to a separate IP network, while SMORE [52] proposed to intercept GTP traffic and of-
fload traffic with low latency requirements to cloud platforms the cellular network. 3GPP
offloading architectures (LIPA, SIPTO [1]) proposed to place gateways (i.e., SGW, PGW)
at eNodeBs to reduce the latency incurred by the EPC core. SIMECA proposes a clean
slate design for such an offloading architecture without preserving the current cellular
protocols. Unlike the other offloading architectures, SIMECA works independently of the
current LTE/EPC core network.
Flat cellular network architecture such as [45] enables base stations to connect di-
rectly to the Internet without going through the cellular core. This architecture would
potentially improve network latency as it eliminates the hierarchical routing problem in
cellular network and sends traffic directly to the Internet without going through the EPC
core. SIMECA’s architecture is even flatter as its services that are hosted in edge clouds
could be accessed directly without going through the public Internet. Moreover, SIMECA
supports mobility while other flat cellular architectures that make local breakout must rely
on other mechanisms to support IP level mobility (e.g., Mobile IP [125]). Other wireless
architectures for IoT devices have been proposed that target large number of IoT devices in
wireless networks [131]. SIMECA targets the same problem but in cellular network with
scalability and mobility challenges.
Future Internet architecture proposals such as MobilityFirst [136] and routing schemes
proposed by industrial research [64] proposed to separate location and end-point iden-
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tity for better support mobility and multihoming. SIMECA uses a similar separation
of end-point identity and forwarding identity to support mobility. However, SIMECA
leverages SDN for address translation to reduce data plane overhead and applies it in
cellular networks.
3.2.8 Repeatable experiment with SIMECA
To enable repeatable experimentation, the SIMECA prototype is published as a profile
in the PhantomNet testbed [12]. Instructions to access the profile is at [15].
3.2.9 Conclusion
In this work, we presented SIMECA, a mobile edge cloud architecture that enables a
new network service abstraction aiming to suit IoT devices communication models bet-
ter compared to the LTE/EPC architecture. The SIMECA architecture leverages NFV
and SDN to enable a more distributed, flexible, and fully controlled deployment of IoT
services. SIMECA realizes the abstraction by a lightweight control and data planes that
significantly reduce signaling and packet header overhead while support seamless mobil-
ity. Through evaluations with precommercial EPC software, SIMECA shows promising
improvements that favor a large number of future IoT devices in cellular networks.
CHAPTER 4
ENHANCE RELIABILITY IN MOBILE
NETWORKS USING DATA
ANALYTICS
4.1 Introduction
The proliferation of sophisticated mobile devices like smart phones, tablets and wear-
able devices [54] have made them an integral part of today’s society. The growth in
the number of mobile devices, the data usage of each device and the types of mobiles
devices of course implies an increased reliance and dependence on mobile networks. To
address this demand, mobile operators are continuously investing in new mobile networks
and technologies. In recognition of the importance of the underlying network, mobile
operators are building redundancy into nearly all components of their infrastructure and
developing sophisticated systems to monitor the health of their networks and to rapidly
respond to any customer impacting events [87].
Despite these efforts, the inherent complexity of mobile networks and their environ-
ments (customer devices, applications) may result in service disruptions that go unde-
tected by monitoring the network elements. Hence, in addition to network monitoring,
modern mobile operators adopt the strategy of deploying service monitoring. Service
monitoring is designed to continuously monitor the end-to-end experience that customers
receive from their network-based services. This contrasts with network monitoring, in
which the status of individual network elements and links are monitored for failures and
impairments (e.g., link losses). Service monitoring is vital as a second line of defense –
capturing network, customer device or application issues as well as interaction issues
among them which may not be detected by the network/applications/devices themselves.
Service monitoring is also crucial to quantifying the service impact of known network
problems for prioritizing issue resolution.
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Somewhat counter-intuitively, network elements that support the service functions are
not always able to alarm on conditions which are in fact service impacting. This may be
the result of, for example, software bugs in the network elements’ firmware, or in the EMS
(element management system) for the network elements, or due to configuration errors.
It is possible that, even though all network metrics indicate a healthy network, customers
might be experiencing degraded service or a complete service disruption. For example,
the deployment of a new service feature or a software upgrade to address a bug might
trigger an unintended side effect (or indeed a new bug) that the monitoring system is not
equipped to detect. We define such service disruptions that are not captured by network
monitoring as silent failures. Furthermore, it is difficult to infer service quality perceived by
customers using the status of the network. There is a complicated relationship between the
status of the network and the service quality the users experience. For example, because
of redundancy mechanisms within the network, a particular network failure does not
necessarily imply customer impact. For example, users associated with a failed cell tower
could be picked up by neighboring towers as long as they are in the coverage range of
the neighboring towers and the neighbors still have enough resources to handle the users’
traffic [155].
However, monitoring service performance across a mobile network is extremely chal-
lenging. Traditional active monitoring approaches – techniques which send test traffic
across the network – simply don’t scale, courtesy of the very large number of cell tow-
ers (end points) that need to be monitored and the diverse set of services supported by
mobile networks. One could alternatively naively imagine looking for service disruptions
by looking for drops in traffic volumes on network elements. However, the inherently
dynamic nature of a mobile network environment makes it difficult to infer service impact
by monitoring individual network elements, e.g., routers or base stations, to distinguish
between changes in traffic volume that are simply the result of the normal operation of the
network, and changes that are the result of anomalous network behavior.
In this work we present our work on the ABSENCE system to address the detec-
tion of service disruptions in mobile networks in a proactive manner. Our key insight
is that service disruptions often impact the traffic consumed by customers, which very
likely reflects in customers’ usage. This seemingly obvious observation, combined with
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a suitable mechanism to monitor customer usage, allows ABSENCE to rely on customer
usage data to detect the possible presence of service disruptions. Specifically, ABSENCE
uses aggregated (e.g., zip code level and handset manufacturer/model level) usage data
for different mobile services (e.g., voice call, data, and short message) calculated from
anonymized call detail records (CDRs). ABSENCE uses the historical aggregated usage
data to predict the expected customer usage for different mobile services at appropriate
aggregations of customers, and compares this with real time customer usage data. A
deviation from the predicted customer usage is highly likely an indication of a service
disruption.
We make the following contributions:
•We present the design of ABSENCE, a novel service disruption detection system for
mobile networks that infers service disruptions by monitoring aggregate customer usage.
Our design is informed by a data driven exploration of the problem domain using data
from an operational mobile network.
•We present a scalable Hadoop-based implementation of our approach which is capa-
ble of performing service disruption detection by processing huge volumes of anonymized
CDR data (e.g., hundreds of millions of records every hour for mobile data service) in
a streaming manner, for all the mobile services associated with an operational mobile
network.
• Using data from the same operational mobile network, we perform a systematic
data-driven evaluation of our approach by introducing a comprehensive synthetic set
of both network and mobile device failure scenarios. Our results show that: (i) Our
variable-scale temporal aggregation improves detection by an order of magnitude over
fixed interval aggregation. (ii) We achieve overall detection rates of 88%, while we achieve
98% or better detection rates for service disruption that have over 10% usage impact within
the corresponding aggregation (e.g., zip code and handset device model).
•We compare our results with ground truth from actual service disruption events and
present a number of case studies showing the effectiveness of our approach. For a set of
confirmed service disruptions, ABSENCE achieves 100% detection rate.
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4.2 Motivation
In this work we define a service disruption to be a scenario in which customers be-
come unable to utilize the offered service(s) that they would normally utilize. A service
disruption can be either due to the network/application failing to complete customers’
service requests, or because customers give up making service attempts due to unaccept-
able service performance. Service disruptions are typically the result of a network, device
or application outage or severe performance degradation. The vast majority of service
issues are rapidly detected via the network and/or application. However, there are a small
number of issues – typically those resulting from complex software bugs – that may remain
undetected by the network and/or application.
Given the challenges of scaling active service monitoring techniques, one could imag-
ine instead simply relying on customers to inform a mobile service provider of service
disruptions as is performed in other industries, such as the power industry. However,
given that individual customer concerns may relate to a large number of underlying causes
– individual customer device issues, customer user error or broader service disruptions –
identifying a significant service disruption would typically require detecting a pattern in
the customer feedback across a number of different customers. This is inherently slow,
and thus a highly undesirable approach to detecting service issues. Figure 4.1 shows an
example of customer ticket volume resulting from a service disruption. The figure shows a
time series of the number of tickets in the customer care system. The actual event occurred
around 16:38 UTC, but was only evident via an increase in customer ticket volumes at 21:00
UTC (i.e., 4.5 hours later), when the number of customer calls rapidly increased. Relying
on customer complaints to detect such failures is thus clearly undesirable – customers are
simply too slow at calling in for this to be a timely approach for detecting service issues.
Given the relative maturity of network management and operation practices [87], and
significant research efforts associated with failure detection [26, 72], network and appli-
cation interaction [57, 78, 107, 127], mobile network performance [44, 68, 112, 113, 153] and
service monitoring [29, 141, 154], the obvious question is: Why are these service disruptions
so difficult to detect?
Active end to end service monitoring is used extensively across mobile and wireline
networks to test service integrity and performance. Active monitoring uses probes placed
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Figure 4.1. Customer care tickets indicating a service disruption
strategically across the network to send test traffic. However, the major challenge with
active monitoring is scale – ideally probes must be deployed so that every combination of
service path, customer device type and application is actively tested on an ongoing basis.
But this is clearly an unrealistic expectation. There are simply too many different types
of customer devices in the market place, a multitude of different applications and a huge
geographic environment to probe. In a wireless environment, service performance can
vary considerably across a very local region even for customers connected to a common
cell site. Thus, even placing a dedicated probe associated with each individual cell site
does not provide a comprehensive view of service experience across the entire region
associated with that cell site. Thus, active monitoring in a mobile network provides only
a sampling of service experience and, depending on the extent of the deployments, will
likely not be able to detect all service impairments.
One may alternatively use passive monitoring of customer traffic to detect service
impairments. Such monitoring can be performed on traffic aggregates, and thus does not
need visibility into individual customer experience. However, service outage detection
cannot be achieved by observing customer traffic – by its very nature customer traffic is
expected to disappear during an outage. Thus, detecting a service outage using passive
monitoring entails looking for an absence of expected traffic. Thus, one could natively
assume that we could look for drops in load on network elements to identify service
outages. However, where in the network to look for such reductions in carried load is
an intriguing challenge – traffic is regularly shifting around a mobile network, typically
without any service impact. For example, activities such as load balancing or planned
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maintenance events could cause load changes on network devices, yet has no impact on
customers’ service experience. Figure 4.2 shows a load change on a Serving Gateway
(SGW) node in an SGW pool during a load balancing event. Despite the load change
on the individual SGW, there was no impact on users. Simply looking at the load of this
SGW alone is insufficient to determine customer impact.
While detailed network performance metrics have been defined for mobile networks
by 3GPP [21], and are being implemented by equipment vendors, these key performance
indicators (KPIs) are not always sufficient to detect user impact either. For example, 3GPP
defines accessibility as a KPI to measure the probability that a user will be provided with
radio access network (RAN) resources (technically with a radio access bearer) on request.
This metric can clearly provide insight concerning resource shortages in the radio access
network. However, users might still be impacted, even when the RAN accessibility KPI
is good, because users that lost radio coverage are not even accounted for in the KPI
calculation or when the root cause of the service problems are beyond the RAN (e.g.,
congestion on a core network element). In other words, service disruption occurs when
accessibility is bad, but accessibility being good does not necessarily imply that service is
good.
Finally, in order to deliver the end-to-end service successfully, handset device, mobility
network and application need to work together seamlessly. Thus the root cause of a service
disruption could be well beyond the mobility network. For example, a firmware upgrade
on a certain customer device model could result in incompatibility between equipment in
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Figure 4.2. Load reduction caused by load balancing
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the RAN (e.g., a radio network controller (RNC)), and the mobile devices that performed
the firmware upgrade, thus resulting in a large number of devices not being able to access
the network. Similarly, an update in the delivery protocol of a video streaming application
could cause interoperability issues between application and network, which further leads
to service disruptions. These types of service disruption are challenging for mobility
network operators since there is little evidence of it on the network side.
In this work, we argue that users’ usage, or lack thereof, is a reliable indicator of service
outages and severe performance degradations in a mobile network. By monitoring and
analyzing users’ usage, we are able to detect service disruptions that could be challenging
for other event detection mechanisms.
4.3 Approach
With ABSENCE we propose to use historical customer usage data to predict expected
usage that should be generated from customers under normal conditions. Any devia-
tion from expected customer usage indicates an anomaly, which might be indicative of
a service disruption. While this basic approach conceptually seems to make sense, it is
not obvious that the method would be feasible in practice. For example: would customer
usage predictions based on usage data be sufficiently accurate to allow anomaly detection?
Given the number of mobile devices, the variety of services offered on mobile networks
and the complexity of the mobile network infrastructure, is there a level of customer usage
aggregation that would provide fidelity of detection fine-grained enough to detect silent
failures at a granularity that is practically useful? Given that users in a mobile network are
by design using the network while moving around, how should we deal with mobility?
In this section, we present our exploration of these questions using customer usage
data from a large mobile network provider. Before describing our exploration we briefly
describe the nature of Call Detail Records (CDRs) which, when aggregated, constitute the
customer usage data used in ABSENCE.
4.3.1 Customer usage data
ABSENCE aggregates metrics from Call Detail Records (CDRs) to measure customer
usage at different locations and application levels. These aggregates are calculated within
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ABSENCE using individual, anonymized CDRs. Note that these individual CDRs are
only used internally to the system during the aggregation process, and no customer spe-
cific data (anonymized or otherwise) is ever exposed to a user of the ABSENCE sys-
tem. Call Detail Records contain metadata about executed transactions across the mobile
network (i.e., phone call, data session, access to voice mail etc.). Each record captures
information that is needed for charging and debugging such as a time-stamp of the activ-
ity, device specific information (e.g., the international mobile station equipment identity
(IMEI)), network related information concerning the activity (e.g., the sector(s) of a cell
tower that the device is connected to), the duration of the activity (for voice services) or the
volume of data the device downloads/uploads (for data services). Of critical importance
for our approach, CDRs are generated in near real time: for Voice service a CDR record is
generated right after a call finishes, for Data service a CDR record is generated whenever a
PDP context is created and a new CDR record is created every hour if the data connection
spans multiple hours. This allows CDRs to be used as a timely indicator of customer
activity (or inactivity). Note that CDRs do not contain actual customers’ short message,
voice call or data content and ABSENCE only uses anonymized CDRs.
4.3.2 Usage prediction and aggregation size
The primary challenge in calculating aggregate customer usage information is to deter-
mine what level of aggregation is most effective to address the problem at hand. In con-
sidering the question of accuracy of predicting traffic volumes versus fidelity of anomaly
detection, there exists an intuitive tradeoff: At one extreme one might attempt to use the
usage data of each individual. While the network usage pattern of an individual user
might show fairly predictable patterns, at this granularity a deviation from an expected
pattern is clearly not a reliable indication of a service impairment. The user in question
might simply have a change in their normal behavior, e.g., going on vacation. At the
other extreme, the usage aggregated across all customers in the U.S. is highly predictable.
However, at this aggregation level, a service disruption that only impacts a relatively small
number of users, e.g., those associated with a particular cell-tower, would not be visible
at such a coarse grained data aggregation level. The challenge therefore is to find an
aggregation level of usage data that is small enough that it can provide high fidelity of
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detection, but at the same time large enough to render stable usage patterns to allow for
accurate prediction.
For example, Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show the amount of voice calls, respectively, made by a
group of 70 and 3020 randomly chosen devices over the course of three weeks. The amount
of usage on the smaller group is significantly less that in the larger group and the larger
group also shows more stable day-to-day usage pattern between the different weeks.
To understand how the amount of usage affects the tradeoff between the stability of the
usage patterns versus the fidelity of detection regardless of device specific, we conducted
experiments to predict future usage based on historical usage with different amounts of
aggregated data.
• Experiment description. We selected a uniform random sampling of users to form
different groups (with size ranging from 20 to 150,000 users) for Voice and LTE data service.
We assumed that the aggregated service usage follows a weekly seasonal model and we
used 16 weeks of data for our training. We constructed a weekly seasonal usage pattern
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79
using the additive decomposition technique described in Section 4.4. The seasonal pattern
is the predicted usage for the future usage and the “noise” is the absolute distance between
the usage and its seasonal data point. We then used the above seasonal usage pattern to
predict another week of usage.
• Metric. To quantify the prediction accuracy, we used the normalized noise ratio as
the metric. We formally define the noise ratio in Section 4.4. In short, the noise ratio
is the “noise” between the testing data and the training data normalized by the training
data. Intuitively, if the usage of an hour deviates too much from the seasonal pattern, the
noise of that hour is high and therefore results in a higher normalized noise ratio. We
sampled the noise ratio at two regions of a time series (i.e., during the peak usage period
17:00-23:00 UTC and during the low usage period 03:00-11:00 UTC), and plot the noise
ratio as a function of usage.
• Results. Figure 4.5 shows the noise ratio as a function of the usage for LTE and
voice. Overall, for a sufficient aggregation (i.e., above 1,000 of usage), the usage is quite
predictable (i.e., the noise is about 10%). Moreover, the noise ratio is high for a small usage
and reduces when the amount of usage increases. This matches the intuition that the usage
of an individual user is less predictable than the aggregated usage of a group of users.
The figure also suggests that after a certain amount of usage data, the predictability of
an aggregation does not increase significantly. This suggests that the size of an aggregation
should not be too large for both good predictability and high sensitivity, e.g., if we monitor
usage of an entire city as an aggregation, a failure that impacts only a single ZIP code area
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Figure 4.5. Noise ratio of LTE and voice usage
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might not cause a significant enough drop on the total usage for a system to detect.
4.3.3 Practical user aggregation
In this section we consider the question of how groups of users can be selected in
practice. While network and service failures can be highly diverse in their impact scope,
the mobile network design and operational practice would inherently cause the service
failures to be localized to geographically close-by regions and/or user devices with some
common hardware or software. For example, rolling out a software upgrade on Radio
Network Controllers (RNCs) would typically take place in a few geographical regions,
and the upgrade may introduce an unexpected compatibility problem with certain phone
models that was not captured by the RNC equipment vendor during lab testing. As
another example, a software bug in a packet data network gateway (PGW) may cause the
service that the PGW supports (e.g. visual voice mail) to become unusable, and all service
requests originated from certain geographical regions that are routed toward this PGW
are affected. Hence, grouping users geographically and by device hardware and software
and tracking usage by different service features would have the best chance of capturing
service failures.
• Geographical hierarchy. In this grouping method, we utilize the geographical hi-
erarchy in the ZIP-code system to group users. We use the ZIP-code hierarchy for three
reasons: (i) the ZIP-code system was designed for efficient postal delivery and therefore
each ZIP-code naturally covers a sufficient and relatively equal amount of users; (ii) the
ZIP-code hierarchy is geographically driven and the structure of the ZIP-code has geo-
graphical meanings; (iii) by utilizing the ZIP-code hierarchy, the system can quickly scale
up and down the size of aggregation based on the structure of the ZIP-code, i.e., groups
of states, states, large cities etc. Moreover, a ZIP code area is relatively large enough for
sufficient usage prediction and small enough to obtain good sensitivity A ZIP code area
also often belongs to either an urban or a rural area and therefore users in a same ZIP
code often have the same usage pattern. The detailed ZIP-code hierarchy is presented in
Figure 4.6.
• Device type hierarchy. Under each geo-group (i.e., a node in Figure 4.6), we divide
devices into smaller groups based on operating systems (i.e., Android, IOS, Windows,
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Figure 4.6. Geographical hierarchy
BlackBerry OS), device make (i.e., Samsung, Apple, Nokia, etc), and device type (i.e,
Samsung Galaxy S5, iPhone 4, Nokia Lumia 512, etc). This way the system can monitor
not only geographical aggregations (e.g., Salt Lake City) but also specific device types in
the area (e.g., all Samsung Galaxy S4 devices in Salt Lake City). As shown in Figure 4.7,
this device hierarchy can be applied at different levels in the geographical hierarchy.
4.3.4 Temporal usage aggregation
Recall that in Section 4.3.2 we found that in order to get good predictability the aggre-
gations being monitored should have a large enough usage (Figure 4.5). Daily network
usage follows a well known diurnal pattern with well established busy and quiet times.
During the network quiet time (i.e., after midnight), hourly usage is typically small and
might not be sufficient for good predictability. Figure 4.8 shows the CDF of hourly voice
usage during low usage period (i.e., 03:00 UTC to 11:00 UTC) and peak usage period (i.e.,
17:00 UTC to 23:00 UTC) of all ZIP codes. Almost 95% of the hourly usage measurements
during low usage period are smaller than 500 which reduces the accuracy of prediction
over hourly aggregations, i.e., at the ZIP code level, simply grouping usage into hourly
bins results in insufficient usage to obtain a good prediction. In contrast, 48% of the hourly
usage measurements during peak period are smaller than 500. Moreover, usage can also
be low if, when using the geographical or device aggregation, the chosen aggregation level
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Figure 4.7. Device hierarchy
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Figure 4.8. CDF of hourly usage during low usage hours and peak usage hours across ZIP
code aggregations
only has a small number of users (e.g., a ZIP code in a rural area or a ZIP code with a small
number of subscribers).
This suggests the utility of grouping multiple hours during low usage period or of
small spatial aggregations into a single temporal aggregation. Note that using longer time
periods over which to do the usage aggregation would present higher accuracy at the
cost of increasing the potential detection time, i.e., when the usage is low this technique
increases the likelihood of detecting a failure after several hours while the conventional
technique cannot detect it. Based on this observation we employ a variable scale aggregation
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strategy in Section 4.4 to improve the accuracy of prediction in ABSENCE.
4.3.5 Usage aggregation
ABSENCE uses aggregate service usages to detect service disruptions. In order to
generate these aggregates, ABSENCE groups individual anonymized CDRs from a set
of similar users. In ABSENCE, users are considered similar to each other if their mobile
devices are from the same manufacturer/model or from the same ZIP code. Aggregation
usage from users with the same mobile device manufacturer/model is straight-forward.
In the section, we only focus on how to group users based on the ZIP code that they are in.
The inherent challenge stems from the mobility nature of mobile network users. Thus
the set of users in a particular ZIP code area is changing over time. For example, the num-
ber of mobile users in a ZIP code covering a business or educational campus might vary
by thousands, or even tens of thousands, over the course of a day as workers/students
arrive for the work day and leave again at the end of the day. In this section we explore
mechanisms to deal with this inherent variability in ABSENCE.
Our approach hinges on the observation that for our purposes in ABSENCE, the ex-
act location and mobility patterns of specific users at a particular point in time are not
relevant. Rather, we are interested in knowing these properties with sufficient accuracy
for a statistically meaningful aggregate of users. Moreover, approximated users’ location
could be used to localize geographical location of a failure to benefit root cause analysis.
Thus, to calculate the ZIP code level usage aggregates we simplify the internal operation
of our ABSENCE system by simply aggregating over those customers that are typically
in the given ZIP code for that time of day. Thus, within ABSENCE, for each (anonymous)
user, we derive a user ZIP code profile which approximates the user’s mobility pattern at
ZIP code level over time. This user ZIP code profile is derived within ABSENCE using
the anonymized CDRs. After calculating an individual user profile, the usage of a user
is counted toward his/her profiled ZIP code regardless of the current ZIP code of the user.
For example, during summer some students leave their campus for internship. Those
students’ usage will be counted toward their approximated ZIP code, i.e., their campus.
• ZIP code level profiling. We evaluated a number of strategies to derive the user
profiles. We assumed users’ mobility pattern follows a daily pattern during weekdays and
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weekends (i.e., weekends are treated differently). To obtain a user’s location, we observe
in the CDR where the user uses the network. For example, if the user makes a call in a ZIP
code, the ZIP code is recorded in the CDR. We explored 2 parameters used to approximate
users’ ZIP code profile: how many ZIP codes in a day a user has and the length of training
data used for the approximation.
• Accuracy of location approximation and complexity trade-off. Intuitively, the finer-
grain the user location profiling the more accurate the location estimation is. However,
the finer-grain the location profiling results in multiple ZIP codes for a user and more
resources required to store the historical data and extract usage in real time. For example,
if the location estimation is done on an hourly basis, then a user is in 48 ZIP codes during
weekdays and weekends (i.e., 24 hours for weekdays and 24 hours for weekends). With
48 locations, each user will have 48 different historical usages. Given hundreds of millions
of users, maintaining 48 historical profiles per user is expensive. Moreover, the user’s
accurate location information is not available even in an operational network; per-hour
location report is not available due to privacy and overheads. Therefore, we are interested
in knowing the trade-off between accuracy of location estimation and the computational
complexity.
Somewhat surprisingly, our findings show that per-hour location estimation in fact
does not predict a user’s location significantly better than other coarse-grain estimations.
In contrast, predicting users’ location based on their home and work hours yields the most
accurate estimation. The home/work estimation is also cheapest in terms of computational
complexity and is what we use in ABSENCE. An explanation is that users tend to not have
a predictable mobility pattern on a per-hour basis, e.g., 1-2PM on Monday and 1-2PM on
Tuesday a user tends to be at different locations. On the other hand, users tend to be in
their home/work locations during their home/work hours. Moreover, note that because
we use CDR to derive users’ location, the estimation is less accurate if users are mostly
silent.
With the home/work profile approach we make the simplifying assumption that user
mobility can be approximated as follows: Depending on the time of day and day of week,
a user is typically either at home or at work. Specifically, during week days and working
hours, i.e., 9 a.m. to 7 p.m., the user is assumed to be at work, while during weekends and
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the remaining week day hours, the user is assumed to be at home. Given this assumption,
what is required to derive a home/work profile is to determine the user’s home and work
base station. We make use of historical CDR data over a relatively long period of time, i.e.,
a couple of months, and simply use the most frequent base stations for the appropriate
time (i.e., work or home) to determine the respective base stations for home and work
hours. For example, if a user uses a base station most frequently during 9 a.m. to 7 p.m
in a month period, his/her work hour ZIP code profile will be that base station’s ZIP
code. The home/work profile is clearly quite scalable requiring only two ZIP codes (and
associated historical information) to be maintained for each user.
• Experiment. We evaluated the accuracy of the home/work ZIP code level profile.
We first derived the users’ ZIP code profiles as described above using historical CDRs. We
varied the amount of the training data used to evaluate its impact on our approximation
by 1, 2, 4, and 8 weeks. We then used the derived profiles to predict users’ ZIP code using
the same amount of future CDRs. We measured the percentage of users’ ZIP codes that
were correctly predicted (i.e., the hit rate - whether he/she makes calls in the estimated
home/work ZIP code) using the user profiles.
• Results. Table 4.1 shows the results of this evaluation. As shown the duration of the
historical (training) data does not significantly improve the accuracy of the approximation.
Given the computational cost to consider this suggests that the home/work ZIP code
profile, with monthly updating, will be the most suitable for ABSENCE. Note that this
location estimation exercise is more useful for root cause analysis, e.g., to get the exact
location when an anomaly is detected. The estimation, however, would not affect the
anomaly detection because ABSENCE only uses the statistical feature (i.e., usage) of an
aggregation regardless of where the aggregation is. For example, ABSENCE is always
able to detect when an anomaly happens to an aggregation regardless if the aggregation is
labeled as “downtown Salt Lake City” or “downtown Los Angeles”.
Table 4.1. Hit rate of ZIP code approximations
1-week training 2-week training 4-week training 8-week training
Home/work 57.03% 57.92% 58.91% 56.05%
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4.4 System overview
In this section we describe ABSENCE and how the data are processed. The logic blocks
of the system are shown in Figure 4.9. From left to right, “raw usage data” (anonymized
call detail records) go through a pipeline, which consists of multiple stages: spatial ag-
gregation, variable-scale temporal aggregation, event detection and false-alarm removal
before the detected events are shown to the operators. While we show this step for com-
pleteness in Figure 4.9, our current focus is on developing an effective usage-based detec-
tion system and we therefore do not consider this aspect.
• Spatial aggregation. ABSENCE groups users based on their profiled zip-codes:
users that are geographically close are grouped together using their zip-code profile. Users
in the same area are often being served by the same set of network elements and therefore
likely to be impacted as a group. Moreover, events that impact a group of geolocated users
are more likely to be actionable to network operators.
• Temporal profile generation. After grouping the users, ABSENCE needs to extract
the usage data of the group over time in order to detect abnormal usage for the group. Sim-
ply grouping usage into hourly bins is not optimal for usage predictability and anomaly
detection. Instead, if the hourly usage is smaller than a predefined threshold (e.g., after
Figure 4.9. Data processing pipeline of ABSENCE
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midnight or the spatial aggregation is small), ABSENCE groups multiple hours of usage
into a single bin in order to satisfy the usage threshold.
To realize this, ABSENCE needs a temporal profile for each spatial aggregation to do the
grouping. ABSENCE assumes a weekly seasonality for the aggregations, i.e., the usage of
an aggregation repeats every week. To generate the temporal profile, ABSENCE first uses
hourly historical data to find a regressed weekly time series such that every data point in
the regressed weekly time series is the median of the historical data points. Note that the
historical time series and the regressed weekly time series consist of hourly usages. Having
calculated the regressed weekly time series, ABSENCE then runs a greedy algorithm
(Algorithm 1) that groups consecutive hours together until the total usage is larger than
a predefined threshold (i.e., K in algorithm 1) and repeats this until all the hours in the
weekly time series are grouped. If the last temporal bin of a week appears to be too small
then it will be combined with the first hours of the following week until the threshold K is
satisfied. The output of the algorithm is a temporal profile consisting of multiple bins each
having at least an amount of K of usage. Note that ABSENCE needs to run this training
process only once every several months given that the temporal profile of the aggregation is
usually stable.
• Variable-scale temporal aggregation. After obtaining the temporal profile for each
spatial aggregation, ABSENCE uses the profile and the hourly time series from the spatial
aggregation to create a variable-scale time series. The output of the variable-scale temporal
aggregation is a time series which has multiple temporal granularities and each data point
satisfies a predefined usage threshold. This time series is used for event detection. We com-
pare this variable-scale approach with the plain hourly temporal aggregation. Note that
ABSENCE currently aggregates usage data on an hourly basis at the finest granularity.1
• Event detection. After generating the variable-scale usage time series of a group,
ABSENCE appends the usage with the corresponding variable-scale historical usage and
feeds the entire time series into a time series decomposition and event detection module
that analyzes the time series and outputs abnormal events. Due to the large number of time
series that need to be processed, ABSENCE adopts the additive time series decomposition
1While an hour might seem long from the perspective of detecting a network outage, it does represent a
reasonable tradeoff in the context of network operations scale.
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Algorithm 1 Generate temporal profile
Input: Weekly regressed usage time series T = (t0, t1, ..., t167) for 168 hours in a week, threshold K.
Output: Temporal profile j and P = (p0, p1, ..., pj) as the starting hour of j continuous segments of
each profile bin
1: Initialize: i← 0, accumulate usage← 0, j← 0, tag← 0
2: while i < 167 do
3: accumulate usage← accumulate usage + ti
4: if ∑(accumulate usage) ≥ K then
5: pj ← tag, accumulate usage = 0, j← j + 1, tag← i
6: end if
7: i← i + 1
8: end while
9: if j == 0 then
10: return 0, ()
11: else
12: if accumlate usage == 0 then
13: return j, P
14: else
15: {remainder wrapping around to the beginning of the week}
16: p0 ← tag
17: return j, P
18: end if
19: end if
approach, which is a light-weight time series analysis algorithm and has been found very
effective in modeling economic data and recently in network traffic as well [129]. At a high
level, the time series decomposition technique deconstructs a given time series into the
secular trend component ({Tt}), the seasonal component ({St}), and the noise component
({Nt}) [48]. In the additive model, the original time series ({Vt}) is the summation of these
three components.
Figures 4.10 (b), (c), (d) show the corresponding components for the time series in
Figure 4.10 (a). The general idea of time series decomposition is very simple – with a
specified seasonality window W, secular trend can be obtained through smoothing over
long term (multiples of W), i.e., by centered moving average:
Tt =
W−1
∑
i=−W
Vt+i/2W
Note that to be able to decompose the variable-scale time series, the seasonality window W
here is set to the number of temporal aggregations of the temporal profile generated, i.e., j in
Algorithm 1, and W varies for different spatial aggregations.
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Figure 4.10. Trend, seasonal, and noise components
The seasonal trend can be obtained by averaging the phase value (after removing
secular trend) across seasons, i.e., by seasonal moving average:
St =
K
∑
i=0
(Vt−iW − Tt−iW)/K
where K is the number of seasonal windows contained in the historical data. And the
remainder becomes the noise component:
Nt = Vt − Tt − St
Note that time series decomposition can be applied to analyzing both long range historical
data and in a moving window fashion for the recent data (as new data is appended to the
time series).
In our approach, we further model the noise components, Nt, at different phases as
zero-mean Gaussian variables with different variance, σ2t|W , where the phase t|W repre-
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sents t mod W. We tag the corresponding time series value, Vt, as anomalous (critical
value 1.96 at 95% confidence interval) if
|Nt/σt|W | > 1.96 (4.1)
This is consistent with classic anomaly detection techniques. We also apply an iter-
ative process such that we remove the anomalous points in the previous iteration from
the trends and noise variance computation, which makes our approach robust to bad
data/known anomalies.
An example of how the event detection works is shown in Figure 4.10. The two dips
(green dots) in Figure 4.10 (a) correspond to the two dips in the noise component in
Figure 4.10 (d) (red solid line) and those two dips are smaller than the lower 95% con-
fidence interval of the noise component at the points (blue dashed line). This results in
two detected anomalies in the time series.
4.5 Implementation
Processing the anonymized CDRs is computational intensive (e.g., hundreds of mil-
lions of records every hour for data service and tens of millions of records every hour for
voice service) and normal serial processing methodologies will not be scalable. Since CDRs
can be processed independently, we use a Hadoop Map-Reduce cluster to process the data
in parallel to speed up the process.
• Running environment. As shown in Figure 4.11, ABSENCE consists of four com-
ponents: historical usage retrieval, hourly usage retrieval, time series processing and user
location profile retrieval. ABSENCE runs on two environments: usage retrieval is done on
a Hadoop cluster and time series processing is done “locally”. The Hadoop cluster hosting
ABSENCE consists of 100 nodes each with 32 cores CPU and 128GB RAM and runs on an
HDFS file system. The local environment is a single node in the Hadoop cluster.
• Historical/hourly usage retrieval component. We use Apache Pig (pig.apache.org),
a platform that offers a high-level language for expressing map-reduce programs, for the
usage retrieval components. The hourly usage retrieval component wakes up every hour
to extract the usage of the last hour while the historical usage retrieval component is
triggered every month to extract the usage of the last months that is used as a historical
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Figure 4.11. ABSENCE components
usage baseline of the coming month. The output of the historical/hourly usage retrieval
component is transferred to a local machine for time series processing.
• User location profile retrieval. We build the user location profile retrieval using
native Hadoop Map-reduce. The location profile retrieval component is triggered every
month to construct the latest location profile that is used for the following month. The
user location profile is stored on the Hadoop HDFS file system as the usage aggregation
components need the information (Figure 4.11).
• Time series processing component. This component is located locally on a single
node in the Hadoop cluster. The component consists of light-weighted modules such as the
time decomposition module, the anomaly detection module, false-alarm removal module
etc.
4.6 Evaluation setup
Obtaining ground truth about service disruptions is inherently difficult. To allow a
systematic evaluation of our approach we introduced synthetic service disruptions into
data obtained from a U.S. mobile provider.
• Data overview. We used CDR data collected in a large US mobile network from
July 2014 to December 2014 in our evaluation. We used all 6 months worth of data to
build up the historical data used in ABSENCE. With 6 months of historical data and the
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weekly seasonal model, we maintain 6 ∗ 4 = 24 usage histories for each of the nodes in our
geographical hierarchy to use as reference points for anomaly detection in current usage
data. This amount of historical usage data is sufficient to maintain acceptable confidence
intervals for the time decomposition algorithm. The total amount of data used in our
evaluation is 45 TB. The volume of collected CDR data varies from 15-20 GB per hour, de-
pending on user activity, with the monthly volume of 7-8 TB. For the synthetic evaluations
presented below, we excluded a week’s worth of data from the 6-month data set and used
those days as “current usage data” in which the synthetic failures were introduced.
• Synthetic service disruptions. To allow for a systematic evaluation of ABSENCE we
emulate service disruptions due to both the network and the device failures. ABSENCE
performs service disruption detection by identifying changes in the expected usage data.
As such, to emulate both network and device failures, our approach is to remove the corre-
sponding data (i.e., data that would disappear if the failure had occurred) from the CDR
data for each synthetic scenario.
We mimic network failures at the granularity of a base station, i.e., when a base station is
down, the service at that base station is lost. In the CDR data, every call record is associated
with a list of base stations that served the call, i.e., the “serving list”. When we emulate the
failure of a base station, we use the serving list to remove call records associated with the
base station in question.
We similarly emulate device failures by removing all call records associated with the
emulated device failure. For example, a firmware bug could affect all devices from one
manufacturer after a firmware update and prevent users from making calls even when
the network is healthy. To introduce this type of failures, we remove call records with the
device make/model associated with the emulated failure.
To introduce different failure scenarios for our evaluation, we combine the basic net-
work and device failures described above with geographic information at different gran-
ularities and a severity factor to be applied. We vary the severity of a failure by failing
different numbers of base stations or devices in the chosen aggregation, e.g., 10% of base
stations in a ZIP for less severe failures and 100% of base stations in a ZIP for large outages.
• Sensitivity to failure impact. ABSENCE detects anomalies based on variations
in the expected normal usage patterns. A key question to answer with our evaluation
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of this approach is what degree of impact ABSENCE will be able to detect. To answer
this question we investigated two factors: (i) failure impact ratio and (ii) absolute impact.
Failure impact ratio is defined as the ratio of the total amount of usage reduction during
the failure over the total amount of a normal usage, or
impact ratio =
total usage reduction
total normal usage
.
Absolute impact is defined as the total usage reduction during an injected or detected
event. For example, if during a 5-hour event, 4,000 out of 5,000 calls were lost, the absolute
impact is 4,000 and the impact ratio is 80%. The smaller the impact ratio is, the more chal-
lenging it is for an anomaly detection system to identify it. The larger the absolute impact
is, the more important it is for operators to pay attention to it. We use both metrics in
evaluating ABSENCE regarding the sensitivity and performance in detecting anomalies.
• Failure scenarios. We consider two different geographical aggregation levels: city
and ZIP-code area. In terms of devices, we consider two popular mobile-device manufac-
turers namely A and B and two popular mobile-device models, A-1 and B-1. Combinations
of the two geographical aggregations and two specific device types allow a variety of test
scenarios: city (e.g., all phones in Los Angeles), city+device make (e.g., all A phones in Los
Angeles), city + device model (e.g., all A-1 phones in Los Angeles), ZIP code (all phones
in ZIP code 07921), ZIP code + device make (e.g., all B phones in ZIP code 07921), etc. To
come up with our final failure scenarios we consider three additional attributes: the type
of service, the time, duration and the severity of the event (i.e., failure impact ratio).
In order to thoroughly evaluate ABSENCE we generate failure scenarios randomly
based on different aspects we want to evaluate. Table 4.2 shows all aspects and the evalu-
ation values from which we randomly selected to make up our failure scenarios. The table
also shows an example scenario for each aspect.
We randomly chose 100 ZIP codes and 10 cities for the geographical aggregations to
evaluate. We generated failures with different impacts by varying the amount of failed
base stations when generating the failures, i.e., the impact ratio. There are 11 impact
ranges, and each is 5% of impact ratio wide, i.e., [0%-5%], [5%-10%] etc.
We randomly picked 100 failures (i.e., 100 samples) for each impact range, e.g., we
picked 100 failures that have [10%-15%] of impact, 100 failures that have [15%-20%] of
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Table 4.2. Aspects and evaluated values of generated failures
Aspect Evaluated values Example of a failure
Geographical 100 ZIPs, 10 cities All devices in L.A. fails
aggregation
Device make A, B All A devices in ZIP 07921 fails
Device model A-1, B-1 All A-1 devices in L.A. fails
Service Voice, LTE All devices in ZIP 07921 can’t make calls or
can’t access the Internet
Start time quiet period (06:00 UTC), All devices in ZIP 07921 fails starting from
busy period (20:00 UTC) 20:00 UTC
Duration 1, 2, 3, 6, 12 hours for busy; Voice service in ZIP 07921 outages for 8 hours
8,10,12 hours for quiet starting from 06:00 UTC
Severity impact 0% to 55% of the total usage A failure that causes 20% reduction of the normal
usage in ZIP 07921
impact, etc., until all the impact ranges are covered. Note that for each impact range
the randomly generated failures should be uniformly distributed across attributes. For
example, 100 failures in the (ZIP code + device make) aggregation could happen either
to all A devices or B devices and could last for 1, 2, 3 or 6 hours etc. This way, the
set of generated failures should uniformly cover many failure types across attributes and
therefore ABSENCE would have a set of diverse failure scenarios to evaluate against.
After generating this “pool” of failure scenarios and using ABSENCE to detect them,
we gather the results and break them down into different dimensions based on the aspects
in Table 4.2. In this manner we generated a total of 11,000 synthetic failures across our
evaluation space. We present our evaluation results in Section 5.6.
• Evaluation metrics. We evaluated ABSENCE using two metrics: detection rate (%)
and loss ratio (%). Detection rate is defined as the ratio of correctly detected failures
(true positive,TP) over the total amount of introduced failures (true positive,TP + false
negative,FN).
Detection Rate(%) =
TP
TP + FN
.
Detection rate quantifies how effective ABSENCE is. The higher the detection rate, the
more effective ABSENCE.
Loss ratio is defined as the ratio of the total net-loss until detection over the total amount
of normal usage during the failure.
Loss Ratio(%) =
netloss until detection
normal usage during f ailure
.
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For example, if the normal usage during a failure is 5,000 and ABSENCE detects the failure
when 1,000 calls get dropped then the loss ratio will be 1/5 (20%). In short, for a long
lasting failure, the lower the loss ratio means the faster ABSENCE detected the failure.
4.7 Evaluation results
4.7.1 Variable-scale decomposition
The variable-scale decomposition technique is designed to ensure that ABSENCE uses
sufficient usage data to enable accurate detection. To evaluate the effectiveness of this ap-
proach we evaluated ABSENCE with and without the variable-scale decomposition tech-
nique. We focused our evaluation on ZIP code level aggregations during quiet hours.We
introduced failures starting from 03:00 UTC (typically the start of network quiet time) and
lasting for 8 hours for voice service. The impact of the failures is in the range of 5% to
100%. We ran the two decomposition techniques (with and without the variable-scale
mechanism) over the same set of failures and compared the detection rate of the two.
As shown in Figure 4.12, the variable-scale decomposition technique improves the
detection rate during the low usage period by 8-10x, e.g., ABSENCE detected 91% as
opposed to 10% of failures that affect more than 2,000 calls in 8 hours, respectively, with
and without the technique.
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Figure 4.12. Failure detection during low usage: with and without the variable-scale
decomposition
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4.7.2 Synthetic failure evaluation
• Overall results. As shown in Table 4.3 first row, out of 11,000 introduced failures for
both Voice and LTE service, ABSENCE was able to detect 9,676 with a detection rate of
88.0%. For failures with an impact larger than 10%, ABSENCE was able to detect 97.7%
(8,064 out of 8,254 failures), and for failures that are larger than 20% of impact, ABSENCE
detected 99.0% (6,189 out of 6,254 failures).
Table 4.3 breaks down the detection rate by different aggregations. Overall ABSENCE
detected 98% of failures that have more than 10% impact across different aggregations
from large aggregations (e.g., city level - all users in LA) to smaller aggregations (e.g.,
(ZIP code + make) level - all Device A or B devices in a ZIP code). Next, we look into
different factors (i.e., failure impact ratio, absolute impact) that affect the detection rate of
ABSENCE. With each factor, we also break down the results into different aggregations.
• Failure impact ratio and detection rate. We would like to understand the effective-
ness of ABSENCE as a function of the severity of failures, i.e., the impact ratio, for different
failure scenarios.
• Overall results. Figure 4.13 shows the overall detection rate as a function of the
impact ratio of failures across all aggregations and service types. ABSENCE was able to
detect 96% of failures that have a 15%-20% of impact across all aggregations, services and
device types. For outages (with 50% of impact or more severe), ABSENCE detected 100%
of them. For failures that are less severe (i.e., smaller than 10% of impact) ABSENCE
detected 20%-67% of them.
Table 4.3. Overall results break down by different aggregations
Break down Aggregation All failures ≥ 10% ≥ 20%
of impact of impact
Total All aggregations 88.0% 97.7% 99.0%
Geographical break down City 89.6% 98.1% 99.0%
Zip code 87.5% 97.8% 99.4%
Service break down Voice 85.2% 96.5% 98.7%
LTE 90.7% 98.9% 99.3%
Geographical + device break down City + device make 88.9% 99.0% 99.3%
(e.g., A devices in LA)
City + device model 88.3% 97.3% 98.6%
(e.g., A-1 devices in LA)
ZIP code + device make 85.5% 96.3% 98.6%
(e.g, A-1 devices in 07921)
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Figure 4.13. Overall detection rate vs. impact ratio
• Failures at different aggregation levels. Figure 4.14 shows ABSENCE’s detection rate
for failures with small impact at different aggregation levels: city, city + device make, city +
device model, ZIP code, ZIP code + device make. Overall, for failures with more than 15%
of impact, ABSENCE is equally effective across aggregations with a detection rate of 94%
or better. This trend continues for failures with higher impact. For failures with lower
impact (0%-5% and 5%-10%), ABSENCE’s detection rate reduces to between 5% and 80%.
For those failures, ABSENCE was slightly more effective for large aggregations such as
city and city + device make.
• Failures happen to different service types. Figure 4.15 shows ABSENCE’s detection
rate for failures occurring in LTE and voice services. For failures with more than 15%
of impact, ABSENCE’s detection rate is high for both voice and LTE (i.e., around 97%).
For less severe failures (i.e., less than 15% of impact), ABSENCE detected failures to LTE
service slightly better than voice service.
• Failures happen to different mobile device types. Figure 4.16 shows ABSENCE’s
detection rate for failures associated with two popular device makes (A and B) and two
popular phone models (A-1 and B-1) at city level. ABSENCE detected around 94% of
failures with 15%-20% of impact associated with those mobile device makes and models.
• Failures breakdown by duration. Figure 4.17 shows ABSENCE’s detection rate for
failures with different durations. Overall ABSENCE is equally sensitive across durations
of the failures: it detected about 95% of failures with 15− 20% of impact for both short and
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Figure 4.14. Small failures at different aggregation levels
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Figure 4.15. Failures for different service types
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Figure 4.17. Failure duration
long-lasting failures. For failures with 0%-10% impact, ABSENCE detected 10%-63% of
them.
• Absolute impact and detection rate. To understand how effective ABSENCE is
in detecting failures ranked by the absolute size, we looked into ABSENCE’s detection
rate as a function of the absolute impact of the failures. Figure 4.18 shows that for LTE
ABSENCE detected 94% of failures that cause more than 2,000 PDN connections to be
dropped at the ZIP code level and 96% of failures at the (ZIP code + device make) level.
• Loss ratio of detected failures. To understand how quickly ABSENCE can detect
long-lasting failures, we obtained the loss ratio (Section 4.6) of detected failures that last at
least 6 hours for all services across different aggregations. We are interested particularly in
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Figure 4.18. Absolute impact - LTE service
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long-lasting failures because those failures often cause larger impact and early detections
mean lower impact.
Figure 4.19 shows the CDF of the loss ratio of detected failures during quiet hours (i.e.,
low usage period) and busy hours (i.e., peak usage period). In general, during busy hours
98% of the failures were detected when less than 10% of the total loss happened (i.e., if the
issue is fixed at the detection time, 90% of the usage would be recovered for 98% of the
failures). During quiet hours, 90% of the failures were detected when there was less than
10% of loss. Given that the detected failures are at least 6 hours, 10% loss suggests that the
failures are mostly detected right after the first hour of the failures.
• Impact based event prioritization. Because of resource constraints, in an operational
setting providers typically need to prioritize the events that they investigate. Because it
is inherently usage based, ABSENCE lends itself to an “operational knob” that operators
can tune to distinguish large impact events from the small impact ones, so that they can
rapidly respond to more severe conditions. Here we evaluate the tradeoff through such a
knob, in the form of a “cut-off” threshold – the threshold above which events are defined
as of high priority – between the number of high priority events and the detection rate
(rate of high impact events to be included in the high priority list).
Figure 4.20 shows the detection rate (Y1-axis) and the fraction of synthetic events that
are of high priority (Y2-axis) as functions to the threshold for the ZIP code level. We
observe that if we only focus on events that have an absolute impact of over 4,000 records,
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Figure 4.19. Loss ratio of detected failures that last for at least 6 hours
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Figure 4.20. “Cut-off” threshold - LTE service at ZIP code level
ABSENCE achieves the detection rate of 97% among the 82% of the events.
• Implications. Our evaluation of ABSENCE shows that: (i) ABSENCE has a very
high detection rate across all scenarios for failures with medium to high impact (i.e., above
15%). (ii) ABSENCE can detect failures relatively quickly (i.e., has a low loss ratio), thus
reducing the impact of failures. (iii) Prioritizing events based on the absolute number
of missing records provides a simple operational knob that enables operators to tune
the number of high priority events generated by ABSENCE. These results suggest the
practical feasibility of using ABSENCE to perform service disruption detection at the scale
of modern mobile networks.
4.8 Operational validation
In this section, we validate service impacting events detected in the operational data
via ABSENCE with known historical service outages. Specifically, we use events that
resulted in anomalous volumes in customer care calls as our known customer impacting
network events. Customers can call into customer care centers to report service issues
and to discuss other concerns. The vast majority of customer calls relate to individual
customer concerns; they may be the result of individual customer device issues or user
errors, for example. However, in some situations, these customer calls may be the result
of a broader service impacting event. Network, device type or application disruptions
can thus result in a spike in the number of customer complaints. These events – spikes
in customer care calls – are captured in a database along with their associated underlying
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network/device/application root cause, and are used here to provide a source of ground
truth of service disruptions that we use to compare with those detected by ABSENCE.
We first attempt to validate service disruptions detected by ABSENCE with customer
complaint events over a corresponding time period. We then investigate a number of
specific use cases in more detail to verify ABSENCE functionality.
4.8.1 Comparison with customer complaints
From the customer care database, we can extract customer complaint events at a market
level, i.e., which market the event is in and the event’s start/end time. We obtained a list of
19 such events from the customer care database that happened to Voice and LTE data ser-
vices. Operations had confirmed that each of these was a true service disruption. We then
attempted to detect these with ABSENCE using CDR aggregates for the corresponding
dates.
We ran ABSENCE to get a list of detected events at the ZIP code level and compared
the detected events with the 19 customer complaint events mentioned above. Customer
complaint events were aggregated at the market level (i.e., a market typically consists of
several geographically close cities), while we were detecting events at the ZIP code level.
As a result, before performing the comparison, we mapped the ZIP code of ABSENCE
detected events to the corresponding market. We considered a match between an event
detected by ABSENCE and a customer complaint event if the two events are spatially and
temporally matching. Using this approach, ABSENCE was able to detect all 19 customer
complaint events. We noted that ABSENCE also detected possible service disruptions that
are not included in the customer care database. Due to lack of ground truth available in
this study, it is challenging to investigate these further.
4.8.2 Alarm rate and true positive rate
ABSENCE detected events that are not included in the customer care database. Due to
lack of ground truth it is challenging to determine whether those events are false positives.
However, to make ABSENCE practical, the number of events per day (i.e., alarm rate)
should be reasonable for an operations team to handle while the true positive rate should
be maintained. To adjust the alarm rate, ABSENCE uses different cut-off thresholds (i.e.,
amount of usage impacted per hour) to filter out events with relatively small impact, i.e.,
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if the impact of an event is smaller than a certain threshold, the event will not trigger
an alarm. We used the 19 events in the customer database as the ground truth for the
true positive rate and varied the cut-off threshold to observe the alarm rate of ABSENCE.
Figure 4.21 shows the alarm rate and the true positive rate as a function of the cut-off
thresholds. As we can see, both the alarm rate and the true positive decrease as the cut-off
threshold increases. To protect proprietary information, we show the alarm rate and the
cut-off threshold as relative numbers. If ABSENCE only triggers alarms for events which
impact greater than 4n calls/PDN connections per hour, then the operations team will
need to investigate around m such events per day and ABSENCE detects all of the 19
events above (i.e., 100% true positive). We confirmed that m is manageable by Operators
and thus ABSENCE is practical in an operational environment.
4.8.3 Use cases
In this section we explore a number of specific use cases where ABSENCE was able
to detect anomalies that also showed up in the customer care database. In this section,
ABSENCE used 4n as the cut-off threshold for the number of calls or PDN connection per
hour.
• Voice service in a large metropolitan area. This failure was on the voice service in
several ZIP codes of a large metropolitan area. Users in these areas were not able to receive
calls from landline devices. The event started at 16:00 UTC on a given Tuesday according
0
20
40
60
80
100
500
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Tr
ue
 p
os
iti
ve
 (%
)
A
la
rm
 ra
te
 (a
la
rm
s/
da
y)
True positive
Cut-off threshold
Alarm rate
m
2m
3m
4m
5m
6m
7m
n 2n 3n 4n 5n 6n 7n4 6 8 10 12n
Figure 4.21. Alarm rate and true positive of ABSENCE
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to the customer ticket data. Figure 4.22 shows the time series in UTC of the historical
usage data for voice services of one of the affected ZIP codes (dashed line) for previous
Tuesdays and the abnormal usage on the date of the service disruption (red solid line).
ABSENCE was able to detect an anomalous event at 16:00 UTC (red point) as the usage
falls significantly outside of the range of the normal historical usages.
• Voice service in a large metropolitan area. This failure was on the voice service in
several ZIP code areas in another large metropolitan area. The failure was first evident in
customer ticket volume at 12:00 UTC on a Friday according to the customer complaints
and the reports by the operator. Figure 4.23 shows the historical usage (dashed lines) of
previous Fridays and the usage of the day that the failure occurred (red solid line) for one
of the affected ZIP code areas. As we can see, there are drops in the usage on the day of
the failure and ABSENCE can detect the anomaly at 14:00 UTC (red point) – two hours
after it commenced. Note that the sudden drop later in the day is due to the change in the
number of users in the area according to the change of the zip-code profile.
• Voice mail. In this use case the failure happens to a much larger area (i.e., all ZIP
codes in a large metropolitan area). This failure started around 18:00 UTC on a Monday
and was associated with one of the operator’s Voicemail services – a data service that
is available to only a subset of user devices. This use case is an example of the failure
of a particular service that impacted only particular device types within a given area.
ABSENCE detected a series of anomalies happening to devices in the metropolitan area
commencing at 18:00 UTC (when the failure itself commenced) (Figure 4.24 solid red line).
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4.9 Discussion
• Special events. Special events and holidays may affect users’ usage and mobility
pattern, which can be challenging for a passive monitoring approach. For example, people
make fewer calls on holidays, or during a sport event. Correlated usage reduction in large
scale can cause ABSENCE to generate false positives. If users’ service consumption does
not change but their mobility pattern changes (e.g., gathering at a stadium and using the
phones as normal), ABSENCE will not generate false positives because the location profile
will handle this and their usages are counted toward the profile location regardless of
where they are.
• Metrics to use. ABSENCE uses number of calls and number of PDN connections
as the metric for detecting service disruptions. Those two metrics could quantify users’
experience in most cases, e.g., if a base station fails and users could not attach or make
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calls/create PDN connections. Potentially, there are other metrics that could be used such
as duration of calls or number of Bytes downloaded/uploaded. These metrics would
capture other types of failures. For example, a failure at the routing system in the network
may cause voice calls to be routed to voice mail instead of reaching the callee. In this case
the total duration of calls would be a better indicator of a potential service impairment
worthy of investigation.
• New services in data network. Network operators may introduce new data services
such as Wi-Fi offload. Such new services may affect the usage captured in the CDRs, as
load is (deliberately) reduced. Since ABSENCE uses multiple months of historical usage
as the baseline, if Wi-Fi offload skews the usage, the baseline will be rebuilt. After a
sufficiently long period of training (typically 3-4 weeks if a weekly seasonal model is used),
the new baseline will include the Wi-Fi offload and ABSENCE will be able to operate in
the new environment.
4.10 Related work
There are quite a lot of related works in the area of service disruption detection in-
cluding both commercial systems such as Keynote [8] and Gomez [5] and various efforts
by the research community [66, 91, 156, 158]. All of them share two limitations. First, their
effectiveness is typically limited by the coverage of deployed probes. Second, they all need
to inject unnecessary probing traffic into the system, which could affect legitimate users.
By contrast, ABSENCE detects service disruptions in a nonintrusive (passive) manner by
purely depending on the existing traffic from real users.
Our work also relates to various mobile network performance studies. For example
measurements from mobile devices have been used to study the performance of mobile
networks [112]. Several studies have investigated protocol level performance aspects of
mobile networks [78, 107, 127]. While these detailed performance aspects of mobile net-
works are related to our work, ABSENCE is a network management tool dealing with the
operational health of a mobile network. As such ABSENCE is most related to various
network operations tools [100, 101, 141, 154, 157]. A framework for network anomalies
based on a principal component analysis approach has been proposed in [157]. A per-
formance troubleshooting tool [100] and a service quality assessment mechanism [141] for
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IPTV networks have been developed. Service anomaly detection [154] and troubleshooting
tools [101] have been developed for ISP networks. In contrast ABSENCE is focused on
service disruption detection in mobile networks and deals with the specific mobility and
scalability challenges of that environment. Production tools such as [47] are installed on
user devices to collect users’ service experience yet they are not available on most Samsung
and iPhone popular models due to privacy issues. ABSENCE in contrast works for all
device models without installing any software on the device.
4.11 Conclusion
We presented our work on ABSENCE, a service disruption detection system for mobile
networks. ABSENCE makes use of customer usage data, in the form of aggregated and
anonymized call detail records, to derive historical usage patterns for groups of customers.
Appropriate selection of these groups results in stable and accurate predictions of usage
patterns, allowing ABSENCE to detect deviations as possible service disruptions. We
presented a data driven exploration of the design space. We performed a systematic
evaluation of ABSENCE by introducing synthetic failures in data from an operational
mobile network and compared ABSENCE’s detection results with known ground truth
events from the mobile network. ABSENCE is currently operating in a preproduction
environment. Our future plans include integration of ABSENCE with the operator’s
production environment and fine tuning the parameters to improve the accuracy and
utility of our approach in an operational setting.
CHAPTER 5
ENHANCE RELIABILITY IN MOBILE
NETWORKS USING DISTRIBUTED
SYSTEM TECHNIQUES
5.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a tremendous uptake of cloud computing. More and more
companies move their services to the public cloud to take advantage of the economies of
scale, the resource elasticity and scalability that the cloud offers. In stark contrast, the
telco industry today faces major challenges in equipment upgrading, scalability, and in-
troducing new services [61]. Cellular core networks are largely still based on custom-built
hardware mandated by the strict reliability requirements posed by running a network core.
To alleviate these challenges, telcos and cellular operators are attempting to virtualize
their core networks through network function virtualization (NFV). Typically, this is in
the form of a move to a private-cloud setting, where the telco provider has full control of
the infrastructure and can optimize the whole stack for its particular services. Indeed,
owning the whole cloud stack can provide direct mechanisms for fault tolerance and
management – open source cloud software stack OpenStack and its OpNFV layer provide
such services (e.g., see Vitrage [118] and Doctor [120]). However, such a deployment model
still cannot take full advantage of the economies of scale a public deployment can offer.
Telco providers will have to manage and maintain the new private cloud deployments,
while at the same time, super-optimized cloud stacks for a particular core service might
not be able to scale to the size of a public cloud, and may be at odds with the requirements
of a new service to be introduced.
Instead, the question we address is whether it is feasible to implement a cellular core
network on top of a public cloud, such as Amazon AWS or Microsoft Azure. To achieve this,
one has to address two main challenges. First, reliability – a cellular core network today
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requires “five 9s” reliability (i.e., availability of 99.999%) [59, 115]. Typical public cloud
availability SLAs are four 9s or less, which means an order of magnitude more expected
outages. Second, service abstractions mismatch. Naturally, public clouds are optimized for
general workloads, offering basic network abstractions such as a network node, a private
network, or a load balancer. Cellular core networks are complex, with multiple different
components implementing distributed state machines that will need to be redesigned atop
the cloud’s abstractions.
In this work, we introduce a distributed cellular network architecture for the public
cloud. We focus on the evolved packet core (EPC) [19], which provides core network con-
trol and data plane functionality for all cellular radio technologies (2G, 3G and 4G/LTE),
and we present ECHO, our proposal for a distributed EPC cloud-based architecture. While
operator networks consist of the EPC and middleboxes, ECHO focuses on the core EPC
as much effort has already been devoted to virtualizing conventional middleboxes ([65, 69,
135, 140]).
ECHO provides the same properties that EPC guarantees today. The role of the EPC
is to manage user devices (Section 5.2.1); this is driven by a distributed state machine
that stores user device states across multiple components, as well as on the user’s mobile
device. All these states need to be consistent in spite of potential component and network
failures. Inconsistencies can lead to long service outages (Section 5.3.1). This is fundamen-
tally different from the requirements of conventional middleboxes where state is typically
shared only across multiple instances of the same appliance.
To achieve consistency, our design leverages the “necessary” reliability of access points
– mobile devices are only connected to the network as long as their associated access points
are operational. ECHO introduces a thin software layer (entry point agent) on access
points which enforce consistency between the state at the mobile device and corresponding
states on components in the cloud. The entry point serializes all state updates from a
single transaction across all EPC components in the cloud. This scales well since each user
only executes a limited number of transactions, and the scalability is required across users.
This effectively means that EPC components in the cloud can be replicated by refactoring
their functionality into a stateless front-end and persistent backend storage in which state
is stored after each operation. ECHO further takes care of a nontrivial task of keeping
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interactions among these cloud components (which we call side-effects) consistent. In
doing so, ECHO avoids modifying the standard core protocols and provides abstractions
that nicely overlay with the existing cellular standards.
In spirit, ECHO is similar to other reliable distributed cloud services, and it relies
on well-known techniques like redundant stateless components, external state storage,
and state machine replication for high availability and strong consistency. The key chal-
lenge in ECHO is dealing with distributed side effects, which must appear to execute
atomically and in order (linearizably) from the client’s perspective. Ordinarily, this is
achieved through mutual exclusion, but ECHO must be fully nonblocking to provide high
availability.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
•We propose ECHO, an EPC architecture for the public cloud. ECHO is based on the
observation that EPC runs user-specific distributed state machines in parallel. We identify
the main building blocks for a reliable implementation of the distributed state machine,
and we then map these blocks to the original EPC system components.
• We demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed architecture by implementing it in
full. We implement the entry-point agent software and deploy it on a COTS LTE small
cell [82]. Additionally, we implement the required EPC modifications into OpenEPC [55]
and deploy ECHO on Azure.
•We perform an extensive evaluation of the system using real mobile phones as well as
synthetic workloads. We show that ECHO is able to cope with host and network failures,
including several data-center component failures, without end-clients noticing it. ECHO
shows performance comparable to commercial cellular networks today. Compared to a lo-
cal deployment, ECHO has reasonable overheads that are introduced by the extra-needed
reliability – less than 10% latency increase and throughput reduction on control procedures
if replicated within one data center.
To the best of our knowledge, ECHO is the first attempt to run an EPC on a public
cloud. We hope that it will be a step towards relieving telcos the burden of managing their
own infrastructure and will further inspire the next generation of 5G cellular networks,
which will require even more scale and more decentralization than the current architecture.
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5.2 Background
This section presents a brief overview of today’s mobile core architecture and makes
the observation that, effectively, the network core implements multiple distributed state
machines, one per user.
5.2.1 Mobile core network architecture
A cellular network consists of a wireless radio access network and a wired mobile core
network. The core network consists of a control plane and a data plane.
• Control plane. The main component of the control plane in LTE/EPC is the Mobility
Management Entity (MME) which is responsible for handling registration/authentication,
connection setup, device mobility, etc., for mobile clients (also called User Equipment –
UE). MMEs do not participate in packet forwarding but only modify routing entries in the
gateways on the data plane.
• Data plane. The data plane consists of a Serving Gateway (SGW) and a Packet Gate-
way (PGW). They are responsible for routing and forwarding the data packets from the
UEs to and from an external IP network (e.g., the Internet). When it receives a connection
setup request from the control plane (MME), a data plane gateway installs a state locally
and in some cases, triggers requests to other gateways, which in turn create local state
associated with the request.
•UE context. The MME keeps track of a UE context for each attached UE. The UE context
consists of subscriber information (authentication key, UE’s capability), the current state
(connected or idle), and the data connection information the UE has on the data plane.
The UE context on the MME reflects the “real-world” states on the data plane gateways –
it contains a data connection profile (called an Evolved Packet System bearer or EPS bearer)
that consists of a QoS profile and end-point IDs that are set up on-demand.
Most of the UE context information is created and exchanged between the MME and
the UE the first time the UE attaches to the network. However, the UE context can change
after attachment depending on whether the UE is active or not; when the UE is idle for a
certain amount of time (e.g., half a minute), the eNodeB releases its radio resource and
triggers a resource release procedure on the gateways. If the UE has data to send, it
requests the MME to re-create the data connection again via a Service Request procedure
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(Figure 5.1). Note that in all cases, it is required that the UE context be updated to match
the actual states on the data plane.
5.2.2 Mobile core: a distributed state machine
The cellular control plane implements a distributed state machine for each UE, as
illustrated on the Service Request example in Figure 5.1. As shown in the figure, once
a control channel has been established across the Radio Access Network (RAN) (i.e., RRC
setup), a request from the UE - Service Request - triggers the MME to make changes to the
UE context and sends a Modify Bearer Request (MBR) as a side effect request to a Serving
Gateway (SGW). This side effect message requests to set up a data bearer for the UE on
the SGW. When it receives the MBR, the SGW sends another MBR to Packet Data Gateway
(PGW) to set up a tunnel endpoint for the UE on PGW. If this request fails, a timer on the
MME expires and as a result the MME retries (message #3, 4). If the retry goes through
successfully, the PGW acknowledges the SGW which acknowledges the MME. At this
point, the MME knows that a data bearer is created for the UE (messages #6, 7). The MME
then informs the eNodeB with information of the data bearer (message #8). The eNodeB
then sets up a E-UTRAN Radio Access Bearer (ERAB) with the UE acknowledges the MME
(message #9) when the ERAB is created.
The state machine is distributed across multiple components and a transition may
involve communications and state changes across multiple other components. The control
UE eNodeB MME SGW PGW
RRC setup
1.Service Request
2.Modify Bearer Req.
6.Modify Bearer Rsp.
7.Modify Bearer Rsp.
8.ERAB setup Req. 
ERAB setup  
9.ERAB setup Rsp.
X4.Modify Bearer Req.
5.Modify Bearer Req.
3.Modify Bearer Req.
Figure 5.1. Service Request procedure in LTE/EPC.
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plane runs many such state machines in parallel, one for each UE. A generalized depiction
of this distributed state machine, which is common across all mobile core operations and
components, is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Specifically, the distributed state machine deals with the following events and mes-
sages:
•Request from UE. Most of the changes in the state machine are triggered by a client or
mobile device. For example, when an idle UE has data to send, it sends a Service Request
(message #1 in Figure 5.1)) to the MME.
• Side effect request. Upon receiving a request from a UE, the MME may alter the
states at other components. In the Service Request example above, the MME must set up a
bearer in the data plane. The MME sends a bearer setup request to the SGW (message
#2), which sends a bearer setup request to the PGW (message #3). We call these two
messages side effect requests. They are generated by components in the cellular core; they
are indirectly triggered by the main request that originated in the UE.
• Timers. A state transition can also be triggered by a time-out. For example, if an
SGW does not respond to the bearer setup request, the MME will trigger a retry when its
timer expires (message #4). This retry generates another side effect request to the system.
A timer can be set and triggered by any component, if so required by the protocol.
• Control messages. Components in the system communicate through various control
messages, such as messages that trigger requests, ACKs, NACKs and other state update
messages (message #1 – #9 in Figure 5.1).
Component 1Request
Reply
Request
Reply}
Side effect (stateful change)
Request
ReplyLocal
State/Timers
Component 2
Local
State/Timers
Component 3
Local
State/Timers}
Side effect (stateful change)
Client/
Mobile
Device
Figure 5.2. Distributed state in core mobile network. Components 1, 2 and 3 map to the
MME, the SGW and the PGW in Figure 5.1.
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5.3 Reliability in cloud-based EPC
Through examples, we highlight the strict reliability requirements of the cellular core
network. We then present the state of the art of reliability in the current mobile core
network using hardware. We contrast today’s cloud availability with hardware reliability
through a 3-month-long study.
5.3.1 Mobile network reliability requirements
We conducted experiments with a real mobile device (Nexus 5), an LTE eNodeB (IP.Access
smallcell) and the OpenEPC core network to demonstrate the core network’s sensitivity to
failures and its reliability needs. The results motivate ECHO’s key design requirements
(§5.4).
• High availability. An MME outage would immediately cause a service outage on
many UEs. Moreover, a service outage on an MME would also be interpreted as a con-
gested mobile network, so UEs are required to back off from the network. We demonstrate
this with an example scenario in which, after 5 unsuccessful Attach attempts lasting 1
minute in total, the UE entered silent state for 12 minutes before it retries to attach again.
Hence, a short MME outage can result in disproportionate experienced outages in UEs. To
illustrate this behavior, we triggered the UE to attach to the LTE network and left a bug in
the MME so that the UE failed to attach. Figure 5.3 shows the MME’s log with timestamps
illustrating this experiment. This suggests the network must be highly available.
• Persistent state. The UE context exchanged during the attach procedure is kept in the
MME. If this context is lost, the MME cannot process UE requests, leading to an outage for
the UE. We show experimentally that when the MME loses the UE context, the UE loses
connectivity for 54 mins!
13:09:47 mme_selection_pgw():331>4Looking4for4[test.apn.epc]4<failed>
13:09:58 mme_selection_pgw():331>4Looking4for4[test.apn.epc]4<failed>
13:10:10 mme_selection_pgw():331>4Looking4for4[test.apn.epc]4<failed>
13:10:21 mme_selection_pgw():331>4Looking4for4[test.apn.epc]4<failed>
13:10:33 mme_selection_pgw():331>4Looking4for4[test.apn.epc]4<failed>
{UE4slept4for4124mins.}
13:22:34 mme_selection_pgw():331>4Looking4for4[test.apn.epc]4<failed>
13:22:45 mme_selection_pgw():331>4Looking4for4[test.apn.epc]4<failed>
Figure 5.3. Examples of real-world outages: 5 consecutive Attach failures caused UE to
sleep for 12 mins
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Figure 5.4 shows the MME’s log with timestamps when the MME loses context for an
attached UE. The UE attached to the network (17:05:26), and after a period of inactivity,
the UE released a portion of the connection (at 17:06:14, note that the UE context should be
kept by the MME). After this the MME crashed and the UE context was lost. The UE then
requested service (i.e., it had data to send) but did not get any service (from 17:10:01 to
17:54:03). Approximately 54 mins after the Attach, the UE performed a periodic Tracking
Area Update (TAU) procedure (18:00:15). This TAU also failed because the MME does
not have any context of the UE. The TAU timed-out after 15 seconds. The result of this
unsuccessful TAU is that the UE is moved to the EMM deregistered state and as defined in
the protocol [20] it performed a new Attach Request (18:00:30). This Attach Request was
performed successfully and the UE exchanged its context with the MME. After having the
UE context, the MME was able to serve the UE as normal (18:02:05), ending the extended
UE service outage. This suggests that the EPC network must persist UE’s state to guarantee
continuous operation.
• In-order message delivery and execution. To maintain state consistency, requests
from the same UE should be executed in First-In-First-Out (FIFO) order on the MME. We
demonstrate this with an experiment which shows an example where the FIFO execution is
violated, resulting in state inconsistency and service outage for the UE. In the experiment,
a sequence of requests 〈R1, R2〉 of the same UE arrive at the MME. However, request R1
was delayed and executed after R2. The result was that the stale request R1 overwrote
the effect of request R2 which causes inconsistency between MME’s state and UE’s state.
17:05:26mme_sm():1725>-[1:NAS__Attach_complete]------
17:06:14mme_sm():1746>-[59:S1__UE_CONTEXT_RELEASE_COMPLETE]------
{MME-crashed,-UE’s-state-on-MME-was-lost.}
17:10:01mme_sm():1925>-[09:EMM__SERVICE_REQUEST]----------<failed>------
...------
17:54:03mme_sm():1925>-[09:EMM__SERVICE_REQUEST]----------<failed>
{Periodical-Tracking-Area-Update-timer-(T3412)
triggered-after-54-mins-from-the-last-Attach-Request.}------
18:00:15mme_sm():1725>-[16:NAS__Tracking_area_update_req]
{Tracking-Area-Update-request-timed\out.}
18:00:30mme_sm():1725>-[2:NAS__Attach_request]------
18:00:31mme_sm():1725>-[1:NAS__Attach_complete]-------
18:02:05mme_sm():1925>-[09:EMM__SERVICE_REQUEST]-----------<OK>
Figure 5.4. Examples of real-world outages: UE did not have service for 54 minutes
because MME crashed and UE context was lost
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Figure 5.5 shows the MME’s log with timestamps describing this experiment.
In this experiment, after attaching to the network, the radio interface of the UE was
turned off to trigger a detach (11:03:45). That detach was processed by a MME1 thread
which is a slow MME thread. We intentionally caused a delay of 60s on this thread through
a sleep timer while at the same time releasing the session lock. Later the Nexus 5 was
turned on to trigger another attach request which arrived at MME2 thread (11:03:58), up-
dating the state of the UE Context with the Attached state. This was successfully verified by
the MME2 and replied to (11:03:59). However, the slow MME1 thread later was executed
and updated the UE Context with Detached state (11:04:45). The Detached Accept message
was ignored by the UE. At this point, the UE state recorded in the UE Context and the
actual UE state is inconsistent: recorded Detached, while the actual state is Attached. This
caused a UE outage of 54 mins as in our previous experiment. This suggests that the EPC
network must execute requests in the order that they are generated from the UE.
• Summary. The above experiments imply that the mobile network must be highly
available, must persist UE context (state) and maintain state consistencies both between
components and between the mobile device and components. The state consistencies
mean that the core network must ensure (i) in order execution per mobile device – the
distributed components must appear to process the requests in order from the mobile
device’s perspective and (ii) atomic execution – the distributed components must be in either
a “before” or “after” state.
11:01:57mme_sm():1725>-[2:NAS__Attach_request]------
11:01:58mme_sm():1725>-[1:NAS__Attach_complete]------
{UE-attached.}------
11:03:45mme_sm():1725>-[6:NAS__Detach_request]------------------------------<delayed-60s>--
11:03:45mme_sm():1746>-[60:S1__UE_CONTEXT_RELEASE_REQUEST]<delayed-60s>------
{Detach-Request-is-delayed-for-60s-by-MME-thread-1.}----
11:03:58mme_sm():1725>-[2:NAS__Attach_request]------
11:03:59mme_sm():1725>-[1:NAS__Attach_complete]------
{Attach-Request-was-processed-successfully-by-MME-thread-2.}
11:04:45mme_sm():1739>-[46:GTPC__DELETE_SESSION]<old-Detach-Req.-processed>------
11:04:45mme_sm():1725>-[6:NAS__Detach_accept]------
11:04:45mme_sm():1746>-[59:S1__UE_CONTEXT_RELEASE_COMPLETE]---------
11:06:05mme_sm():1925>-[09:EMM__SERVICE_REQUEST]---------------------<failed>------
{54[minute-outage-on-the-UE.}
Figure 5.5. Examples of real-world outages: Violation of FIFO order execution caused state
inconsistency and 54 minutes outage
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5.3.2 Reliable EPC: state of the art
The conventional way to maintain high availability is to introduce redundancy in hard-
ware. Telecom-grade reliable hardware is built with N + M redundancy (N active blades
have M back up blades) [59, 114, 146]. Active-standby techniques [94] allow for state
synchronization (e.g., UE context) between the active and standby instances with the active
one switching over to the standby one in case of a failure. This technique is extended to
an NFV setting where a resource scheduler can quickly detect a fault and migrate service
from a faulty component [118, 120].
Further redundancy is introduced at the protocol layer. The standard EPC architecture
supports a pool of MMEs [24]. An eNodeB can connect to any of the MME instance in
the pool. The MME instances share a common Session Restoration Server (SRS) [97, 98],
which acts as persistent storage for UE context in real time. If one MME instance fails,
the eNodeB will notice that its Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) connection to
MME is broken. It will then attempt to reconnect, and will be connected to another MME
instance.
To maintain atomic and in order execution, there is an SCTP connection between the
eNodeB and the MME that provides retransmission, de-duplication, and request ordering.
The reliable MME then maintains a FIFO queue of the requests and executes them in order,
one at a time until the states are consistent across EPC components. In order for the MME
pool mechanism to work, the failed MME instance must crash cleanly; after the SCTP
connection is broken all of the requests that are already in the crashed MME’s queue are
completely discarded so that no stale requests exist.
There are several aspects of the existing designs which do not map well to the public
cloud infrastructure. Unlike public cloud, hardware appliances and VNFs offer a fine-
grain availability information and scheduling control (active standby or service migration).
This allows for almost instantaneous fault isolation and repair, which is impossible in a
public cloud [74]. A public cloud EPC deployment has to deal with failures proactively,
before the software is certain that a fault has occurred, as we illustrate with public cloud
measurements in the next section. Furthermore, due to higher inherent reliability of con-
ventional nodes, the types of faults that can occur are different. Public clouds run all
software on VMs that can delay executions (e.g., due to an upgrade), causing stale requests
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and inconsistent side-requests (as explained in the examples above). Again, a public cloud
EPC deployment has to deal with these issues in software, as most of today’s distributed
systems deployed in the cloud do.
5.3.3 What does public cloud provide?
Typical telco appliances like the ones described in the previous section provide avail-
ability of 99.999% [115] (“five 9s” availability). The five 9s availability corresponds to an
overall outage of 1 minute in 2 months. Instead, cloud offerings today, such as AWS and
Azure, advertise VM availabilities of “four 9s”, or outages of 1 minute every week – an
order of magnitude larger total outage compared to reliable hardware platforms.
Besides the overall availability in the number of 9s, the mobile network reliability
requirements outlined in Section 5.3.1 highlight that the duration of an outage can be
critical. For example, the system may be able to recover from many short 1-second outages
using transport or other mechanisms, but a few outages lasting minutes can be catastrophic
(example 5.3). It is thus crucial to understand the availability properties (total outage
instances and their duration) of public clouds in practice, beyond advertised SLAs.
To this end, we perform a 3-month-long measurement study in a major public cloud
provider. We expect our findings to be indicative of other providers as well. We monitor
the VM uptimes as well as the reachability of VMs at multiple levels: data center (DC)
cluster, single DC, and across DCs. A DC cluster consists of three VMs in different avail-
ability zones behind a load-balancer within the same regional data center. There are two
clusters per DC. In total, we use 3 DCs, two in Europe and one in the U.S. and perform TCP
pings every 1 second from each VM to all other VMs. Further, we use Azure’s Application
Insights service [104] to monitor the reachability of our VMs from the public Internet.
The service initiates web request to all VMs every 10 minutes from 10 locations across
4 continents. The cloud is available if at least one VM in a cluster is available.
• Results. Our results are summarized in Table 5.1. Each row in the table shows the
observed availability constrained on an outage duration (e.g., in row > 1 min we only
account for outages that are longer than 1 min; at least some of these cannot be handled
by MME retransmissions, as illustrated in example 5.3). We observe that the advertised
SLAs of four 9s are generally met by the cloud. Most of the outages are very short, and
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Table 5.1. Inter-DC availability in a major cloud provider
Cloud World-wide
Outage VM DC Clus. DC DCs VM DC Clus. DC DCs
All 99.9947% 99.9998% 99.9999% 100% 99.988% 99.991% 99.9921% 100%
> 10 sec 99.9947% 99.9998% 99.9999% 100% 99.988% 99.991% 99.9921% 100%
> 1 min 99.9948% 99.9998% 99.9999% 100% 99.988% 99.991% 99.9921% 100%
can possibly be attributed to network congestion, or other instantaneous problems. We
observed intra-cloud outages of more than 1 second, 2,400 times during our study. The
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the durations of such outages is depicted in
Figure 5.6. In all, there are 7 outages that last more than 1 minute and they can all be
attributed to VM failures. However, VMs in the same DC cluster do not tend to fail at the
same time.
The picture is significantly different as observed from hosts in the Internet (“World-
wide” in Table 5.1). Availability is roughly an order of magnitude less compared to intra-
DC measurements, implying that most “outages” are due to public Internet connectivity
problems reaching the cloud. The CDF of the durations of the outages longer than 10
minutes (measurement interval) is depicted in Figure 5.6, and we can see that more than
20% of them last 20 minutes or more.
• Implications: In summary, we observe that our key requirements (high availability
and state persistency) can be achieved with five 9s only if the service is replicated across
multiple VMs across availability zones in a single DC; additionally, coping with public
Internet reachability problems requires service presence across multiple regional data cen-
ters unless a dedicated connectivity service to the cloud [28, 103] is deployed which can
Outage duration [s]
100 101 102 103 104
CD
F
0
0.5
1
Same LB
Same DC
Other DC
World-wide
Figure 5.6. Outage duration distribution across all pairs of VMs
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incur extra cost.
We also note that other studies, such as [73] that gives account of public cloud reliability
over a 7-year period, point out that a median reliability across all public clouds (32 public
clouds studied) is below 99.9% and that the median duration of an outage varies between
1.5 and 24 hours, depending on the type of failure. This reinforces the need for software
replication and proactively dealing with faults.
5.4 ECHO design
Figure 5.7 presents a high-level depiction of ECHO’s operation. ECHO moves the
main components of EPC into the cloud, replicating them for reliability while connectivity
to the UEs is through the base stations which implement our entry point serialization.
Existing public cloud load-balancers provide load-balanced connectivity to the “regular”
Internet and to the Internet-based access “backhaul” between base stations and the public
cloud. We now discuss in more details the problem space, ECHO’s architecture and
operation.
5.4.1 Problem space
As discussed in §5.2.2, the EPC can be viewed as a distributed state machine com-
prising multiple components. Each component stores state for each user. ECHO must
assume nodes and the connections between them can fail; the VM or container hosting a
component could crash and restart or it could be arbitrarily slow, and connectivity between
components is not reliable. Alternatively a node might reply with a correct response, but
the replies could be late or lost.
MME
SGW PGW
Internet
(“regular”)
HSS
PCRF
SGWSGW PGWPGW
PCRFPCRFMMEMME
HSSHSS
Public'Cloud
Internet
(access:“backhaul”)
Figure 5.7. ECHO components at a high level
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ECHO must continue operation despite these failures while producing the same results
as the original core network that assumes components are reliable; ECHO must appear
to execute requests atomically and in the order that the (per-device) requests arrive at the
base station. ECHO must also scale to support a large number of users. Moreover, the EPC
protocols are complex and constantly evolving; we must avoid modifying the protocols or
relying on its implicit semantics for correctness. Finally, a particular challenge is that one
of the component that stores the state is a user’s mobile device, which cannot easily be
modified.
5.4.2 ECHO architecture overview
Figure 5.8 depicts an overview of ECHO. Each control plane component (Components
1, 2 and 3) is replicated (instances 1 to n) behind a data center load balancer (LB) [102, 122].
Each component instance is refactored into a stateless processing frontend, paired with a
high availability persistent storage backend that maintains state for all replicas (and all
components). This allows quick replacement of a malfunctioning component and scaling
based on demand. At each base station, i.e., eNodeB in LTE/EPC parlance, there is a
“necessarily reliable” entry point. This entry point is the key to ECHO’s availability and
correctness (§5.4.3).
Figure 5.9 shows possible interactions when a request is issued in ECHO. At step (1),
a request from the client is queued at the entry point. Step (2), the request is forwarded
to the MME (but fails to be processed). The agent resends the request after a timeout at
step (3). The retry at step (3) triggers side effects at steps (4,5). The side effect at step (4)
triggers another side effect at step (6). Component 3 acknowledges the side effects (5,6)
by ack (7,8). Component 2 after receiving the ack for request (6) sends an ack (9) that acks
request (4). Component 1 then send ack (10) to ack request (1). When generating request
(6), component 2 generates a timeout event for this request and sends it to the agent at step
(11).
In ECHO, each request originates at the UE and is proxied by the entry point at the base
station or access point. Each request gets a unique, sequential ID from the entry point, and
it is queued until completion. The sequence ID captures the order that the requests arrive at
the eNodeB from the mobile device. A component n acknowledges a request to a previous
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Figure 5.9. ECHO request example
component n-1 once all of its downstream requests (requests to components n+1,n+2,...) are
acknowledged. An acknowledgment to the entry point means the request from the mobile
device has been applied at all components. After a timeout, the entry point retransmits the
request until it is acknowledged, only after which will it move to the next request.
5.4.3 Necessarily reliable entry point
The ECHO entry point approach relies on the fact that the base station (eNodeB) is a
necessarily reliable component. Because the network connectivity of a mobile device relies
on wireless access to the base station, connectivity is lost if the base station crashes; there
is no point designing the system to deal with base station failures. Therefore, since the
entry point is as reliable as the base station, it is seen as a “reliable” component of the
system. Moreover, note that because the number of users served by each entry point is
limited by its wireless resources, its scalability constraints are different from core network
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components.
The entry point agent is a thin software layer deployed on a base station. In spirit, it is
similar to a sequencer in other distributed databases [145]. However, it enhances an even-
tual completeness property and relies on the base station to guarantee reliability (instead
of using the state machine replication technique). It provides the following functionality.
• Sequential request IDs. The entry point assigns a sequential ID to each request from
a given UE; different UEs have independent ID sequences. The request is queued locally
and forwarded to the next component (the MME). The entry point serializes the requests
using a FIFO queue: the oldest unacknowledged request is resent until it is acknowledged
and removed from the queue. The sequential IDs are used to ensure that requests are
processed at components in the same order as the UE issued them.
• Eventual completeness. After queuing a request, the entry point persistently retries
until the request is acknowledged before moving to the next one. This ensures a compo-
nent failure in the cloud won’t be visible to the mobile device; if an instance of a component
crashes in the middle of an operation, the entry point transparently issues a retry and the
retry will reach another instance of that component to recover from the crash. As the entry
point is the “reliable” component, its retries ensure a request is eventually processed and
is processed by all core components regardless of failures.
•Reliable timers. As in other protocols, components in EPC must set a timer whenever
they receive a request. However, if components crash timers could be lost. In ECHO, since
the entry point is considered reliable, components’ timers are maintained and triggered by
the entry point instead of by the components; after receiving a request, the component
creates the timer event by sending a set timer request to the entry point. The set timer
request includes a unique ID of the mobile device that the timer applies to, a unique timer
ID, and a timeout value; the request ID of the event is returned. To cancel a timer event,
the component sends a cancel timer request with the user ID and the previously returned
request ID of the timer event.
• State coordination with clients. Since request IDs are added (and removed) at the
entry point, unlike components, client devices cannot rely on them to reliably receive
correctly ordered responses. A failed state update at a component may produce a message
that is sent to a client, and a retry may produce another copy of the same message. This
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must be handled by the entry point. Each client-bound reply is labeled with a request
ID and the sequence number of the message within the request. The entry point ignores
replies that have already been forwarded to the client. Retries always produce the same
responses, but it is important that one and only one gets forwarded. Necessarily reliability
means the client and the entry point can be expected to maintain a single, ordered, reliable
connection (e.g., TCP connection), which safely deals with message loss on the last hop as
long as the entry point correctly orders replies.
• Handovers. Occasionally, a client moves between two eNodeBs and requires a han-
dover. Another entry point must handle the client’s operations, so state must be trans-
ferred between the entry points. This state is very light; it consists of the contents and ID
of the last processed request and any registered timers or control packets. The handover
procedure is augmented so the old entry point sends the context to the new entry point,
which becomes the anchor for the client once the procedure is finished.
5.4.4 Nonblocking cloud components
Given the requests with monotonic request IDs, ECHO needs to guarantee atomicity
and in-order execution properties on each component and across components. ECHO’s
operation is different from distributed ACID transactions because it enhances both atomic-
ity and in-order execution. Also, ECHO cannot simply use existing state machine replica-
tion techniques [134] because ECHO’s operation is not atomic and deterministic; compo-
nents induce side effects on other components, making determinism hard to guarantee.
Algorithm 2 shows how an ECHO component processes a request. Note that the
algorithm describes two types of components, with and without side effects (as explained
in §5.2.2), in a single algorithm. The algorithm is designed to dovetail with required
processing in conventional EPC components; the red lines (14, 17, 18, 19) already exist
in EPC components. Note, the algorithm is nonblocking; multiple stateless instances of
a component can execute the algorithm in parallel without causing any stall on other
instances.
• Component’s atomicity. Replication of components in ECHO and retries from the
entry point mean that a single request could be processed by multiple instances of the same
component. To prevent inconsistency caused by interleaved processing of the same request
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Algorithm 2 Nonblocking cloud component
Input event: Receive a request from eNodeB’s entry point (agent) R, with UE’s ID (R.UE)
and request ID (R.ID).
Output event: Send reply and timeout message to eNodeB’s agent.
1: Fetch session from storage: (session, version) = read(R.UE), where version is version
number of znode.
2: if session not found in storage then
3: Create a session locally. Set session.ID = R.ID
4: Go to step 14.
5: end if
6: if R.ID < session.ID-1 then
7: {Received an obsolete request}
8: Return
9: end if
10: if session.reply and session.timer exist then
11: (Re)send session.reply and session.timer
12: Return.
13: end if
14: Update session.
15: Increment request ID: session.ID += 1
16: Set request ID in side effect msg: session.side effect.ID=R.ID.
17: Send side effect message: session.side effect.
18: Receive side effect reply.
19: Update session.
20: Prepare reply message: session.reply, set request ID in reply message session.reply.ID =
R.ID
21: Prepare timeout message: session.timer, set request ID in timeout message ses-
sion.timer.ID = R.ID
22: Write session to storage: write(session, version)
23: If write OK: Send reply and timeout messages: session.reply, session.timer
across instances, ECHO uses atomic conditional writes provided by the persistent stor-
age (we discuss our persistent storage implementation in Section 5.5). When committing
changes to the reliable storage (line 22 in the algorithm), each component instance ensures
that the stored UE context (session) remained unmodified while it was processing the
request by checking the version number of the session. If the conditional write fails, then
another component instance has already processed the request, so this instance discards
the local session state and backs off. This assures that, even though multiple component
instances can process the same request, only one instance is able to commit the changes at
step 22, guaranteeing atomicity.
• Component’s monotonicity (in order execution). Each component in ECHO needs
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to execute requests in the order that they arrive at the entry point. However, concurrent
retries of a request issued by the entry point can cause processing of an obsolete message
at a component instance. Without care, this could cause the state in the session store to
regress, leading to inconsistency, as illustrated in example 5.5 in §5.2.
A component in ECHO uses the monotonic request IDs to filter out obsolete requests.
As in line 6 in the algorithm, before processing a request, the component instance checks if
the request ID of the request is less than the last executed request ID (which is stored in the
persistent storage). If it is, then the request is obsolete and is discarded. When updating
the persistent storage, the component increments the request ID of the session (line 15) and
acknowledges the request ID to the entry point (line 20).
For example, in example 5.5, the stale Detach Request at 11:04:45 would have been
discarded as its request ID would have been lower than the request ID of the Attach
Request that is last processed at 11:03:58.
• ECHO’s atomicity and monotonicity. Given each single component operates atom-
ically and in order as described, ECHO needs to ensure atomicity and in order execution
across its distributed components.
A side effect is triggered when one component processes a request that generates a mes-
sage to another component. Consistency must be maintained across components despite
side effects, but retries from the entry point can create multiple duplicated side effect re-
quests, and slow instances can generate stale side effect requests. Without care, duplicated
and stale side effect requests could cause inconsistency.
Service Requests example illustrates the inconsistency that can arise from duplicated
side effect requests. Suppose an MME instance A receives a Service Request. In step 17
of algorithm 2, it sends a Modify Bearer Request (request #1) to the SGW component. An
SGW instance receives the request #1, creates and installs a tunnel endpoint TEID1, stores
it in persistent storage and replies to the MME with the information. Meanwhile, suppose
that the entry point times out and retransmits the Service Request. Another MME instance
B receives the retry and sends a duplicated Modify Bearer Request (request #2) in step 17.
Later an SGW instance receives the request #2, and it overwrites and replaces TEID1 with
a new tunnel endpoint TEID2 and replies. The MME component ignores the second reply
because it already moved to a new state when the first reply arrived. In the end, the MME
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component (and the UE) contains TEID1 while the SGW records TEID2; this inconsistency
breaks the data plane.
To keep multiple duplicated side effect requests from mutating component state, retries
of a side effect must induce the same effect on the target component (i.e., side effects must
be idempotent). Algorithm 2 enforces this. When a message is processed, the response is
recorded in the session store with its corresponding request ID, so lost responses can be
reproduced without repeating execution. If an instance receives a request and the com-
mitted session in the persistent storage contains a reply, then another component instance
has already executed the transaction, and it only needs to reply (lines 10, 11, 12). Since
responses are recorded in the persistent storage, they can be obtained by other instances,
in case the current instance crashes before replying.
To solve the inconsistency problem caused by stale side effect requests, a component
also passes the request ID of received requests to the side effect requests it generates
(line 16). The target component then ensures the side effect requests are executed in the
order specified by the request ID. This happens at every ECHO component, so no stale side
effect requests are processed.
5.4.5 Correctness
Here we give a sketch of why ECHO is safe even though components are redundant
and nonblocking under failure. Showing that ECHO appears to process operations atomi-
cally, in mobile device’s FIFO order, one-at-a-time demonstrates safety.
First, we show that a leaf component (a component that does not trigger side effects
to other components) operates linearizably (in an order consistent with some total order
of the client operations). Next, we show that the total order it is consistent with is the
client’s FIFO order. Then, using leaf components as the base case, it can be shown that all
components appear to process operations atomically in client FIFO order.
Lemma 1 (Leaf Instance Linearizability). Each leaf component instance appears to process
requests atomically in an order consistent with client invocation and response.
• Proof. Figure 5.10 shows the processing steps of a component instance handling a
request. The compare-and-swap on the shared storage acts as a linearization point: before
128
Component 
2
Component 
1 (leaf)
Write OK
State 
Storage
Reply n+1
Request n+1
... Write(n+1, version v) Before: (n), version (v)
After: (n+1), 
version (v+1)
Step 22
Step 23
1
2
Figure 5.10. ECHO’s leaf component is linearizable
it no (local) effect of the component instance can be perceived, after it all its (local) effects
are guaranteed to persist. Each processed request with ID n + 1 results in one of four
outcomes: 1) aborted – the component is not in state n or n + 1, so the request is invalid
and ignored; 2) successful – the operation completes successfully, the component instance
updates the state storage, moves the component from state n to n+ 1 at step 22 and replies;
3) crashed before update – the operation fails in 1 before updating the state leaving the
component in state n; or 4) crashed after update – the operation fails in 2 after updating the
state leaving the component in state n + 1.
In case 3, because of the eventual completeness of the entry point, there must be a
retry arrived at another instance that progresses to either case 4 (in-completed) or case
2 (completed). In case 4, when a component instance receives a retry, it simply replies
with the recorded reply which eventually results in case 2. Therefore, a component only
executes requests in the specified order, either completely successful or completely failed.
Because each compare-and-swap is issued from a natural number n to n + 1, only
one instance of any component can achieve a successful outcome in the above proof, so
Lemma 1 can be strengthened:
Lemma 2 (Leaf Component Linearizability). Each leaf component appears to process requests
atomically in an order consistent with client invocation and response.
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Finally, because agents only issue request n + 1 after the successful acknowledgment
of request n (that is, operations are synchronous), no component instance can attempt to
apply n + 1 to shared storage while the state in storage is tagged with a request number
less than n. This strengthens Lemma 2 to:
Lemma 3 (Atomic FIFO Leaf Components). Every leaf component in ECHO processes requests
atomically in the (FIFO) order client issued them to the agent.
Given Lemma 3 as a base case, components that make nested calls to other components
can be shown to be atomic and FIFO as well using induction.
Lemma 4 (Atomic FIFO Components). Every component in ECHO processes requests atomi-
cally in the (FIFO) order client issued them to the agent.
• Proof.
As shown in Figure 5.11, nonleaf components are identical to leaf components except
that they may send requests and wait for responses just before attempting to update shared
storage. Let M be the height of a component, which is the number of nested requests that
must succeed before a leaf component is reached. Leaf components have M = 1.
Induction hypothesis: Assuming a component at height M operates atomically in client
FIFO order, then a component at height M+ 1 operates atomically and in client FIFO order.
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Component 
M
side effect reply n+1
Side effect n+1
...
Request n+1
Reply n+1
Monotonic
Write (n+1, v)
Write OK
Before
After
State
1
2
Figure 5.11. ECHO is linearizable
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Base case: Lemma 3 proves the case for M = 1.
Consider a request arriving at a component at height M + 1. Similar to the leaf com-
ponent proof above, the request has 4 outcomes: 1-aborted, 2-successful, 3-crashed before
update and 4-crashed after update. The crashed after update outcome eventually results in the
successful case as in the proof in lemma 2. In the crashed before update case, the component
instance crashes in 1 and leaves the component M + 1 in state n. Eventually, there is a
retry n+ 1 from the entry point that arrives at another component instance and triggers the
side effect again. If there are multiple retries that trigger multiple side effects to component
M, the effect on component M is still atomic and in client FIFO order by the induction
hypothesis. Therefore, case 4 eventually results in case 2 or 3 (which eventually results in
case 2). Therefore, component M+ 1 operates requests atomically in client FIFO order.
Finally, since the ordinary, unreplicated protocol precisely processes messages atomi-
cally, in mobile device’s FIFO order, one-at-a-time, this gives the essential safety property:
Property 1 (ECHO Safety Property). The set of states observed by ECHO clients is equivalent
to the unreplicated protocol.
5.5 Implementation
Section 5.4 outlines general design principles ECHO uses to provide safety and relia-
bility. Here we discuss specifically how this design applies to a cellular control plane and
a public cloud. The summary of changes to the standard EPC architecture is illustrated in
Figure 5.12.
5.5.1 ECHO agents
ECHO’s agents are lightweight software proxies that provide entry-point functionality
on eNodeB and an interface between eNodeB and MME. There are two agents, one that
resides on the eNodeB and one on the MME, as illustrated in Figure 5.12. The eNodeB’s
agent is implemented as a separate user-mode daemon written in standard C, deployed on
top of embedded Linux running on a commodity small cell [82]. This allows us to easily
port it to any COTS eNodeB without affecting the time-critical LTE radio code. The MME’s
agent is integrated in the source code of the S1AP processing module of OpenEPC [55].
One of the agent’s functions is to proxy S1AP control messages. 3GPP eNodeB and
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Figure 5.12. Modifications of ECHO in LTE/EPC
MME use SCTP protocol for S1AP messages. However, Azure and other public clouds
do not support SCTP protocol, so we implement a proxy agent that replaces SCTP by TCP.
The ECHO agent on the eNodeB opens an SCTP connection to the rest of eNodeB software
stack on one side (which is unmodified and unaware of the agent’s existence) and a TCP
connection to an ECHO MME agent on the other side. The eNodeB agent relays messages
between the two connections. The agent reestablishes the TCP connection on a failure, in
order to attach to a new MME instance (in the same DC or a different DC).
Furthermore, the agent implements the entry point design, described in Section 5.4.3.
The agent adds an extra network layer (ECHO or agent layer) into the LTE/EPC control
network stack, as shown in Figure 5.12. The ECHO layer header consists of the Request
ID; a UE-ID, a unique identifier of the UE, composed of tunnel identifiers readily available
from S1AP messages; and a Timer value, used to set up timers and to inform components
about timer expiry.
5.5.2 Stateless EPC components
We have augmented the most important EPC components (MME, SGW and PGW) in
OpenEPC [55] with ECHO functionality. In the example of MME, our implementation
preserved the original implementation that extracts information from a received S1AP
message, generates side effects and updates the client’s state (e.g., steps 14, 17, 19 in the
algorithm). We extended handlers to accept request IDs from the ECHO layer and to
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add duplicate/stale request checks that adapt processing accordingly (step 6). When the
original MME code finishes processing a request, ECHO sends an acknowledgment to the
eNodeB agent together with a S1AP reply. We made SGW/PGW operations idempotent
by making the SGW reply with a stored message (i.e., with the same bearer information)
for duplicate requests from the MME (so, the duplicates don’t forward effects to the PGW).
In all, ECHO’s extensions to OpenEPC required changing 1,410 lines in 12 files.
We added two additional blocks to the conventional EPC: an agent (described previ-
ously) and a ZooKeeper client (ZK-client). The ZK-client provides a read/write/delete interface
to a ZooKeeper [81] (ZK) cluster that acts as a reliable, persistent storage. ZooKeeper is a
reasonable choice of storage because of its consistency guarantees, small amount of stored
information (a few KBs per UE context) and relatively low request rate. The UE context
(which is extended to include UE replies) is stored as a binary string in a znode in ZK.
ECHO uses the version number of a znode in ZK to realize an atomic state update at step 22
of the algorithm; ZK only allows updating the znode if the version number hasn’t changed
since the beginning of the request.
5.5.3 Cloud deployment
Multiple instances of the same component are deployed in a private network in Azure
behind a load balancer. The load balancer performs consistent hashing on the connection’s
5-tuple, so a connection sticks with the same instance unless there is a failure or a new
instance is added. When ECHO is deployed across multiple data centers, requests that
time out a few times are retransmitted to another data center by the ECHO agent on the
eNodeB.
5.6 Evaluation
We evaluate ECHO in the Azure public cloud across several dimensions. In particular,
we examine the correctness of our implementation, the potential latency introduced across
various components of the architecture, the observed throughput and simulate potential
failure scenarios. Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
• ECHO introduces reasonable overheads as a trade-off for a public-cloud reliable
deployment. When replication within a single data center is used, the response latency
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is increased by less than 10% and there is no visible drop in throughput. Even in more
extreme deployments, we show that total latency is well below standard 3GPP timeouts
and would not be noticeable by the users. The result shows user-perceived latency is
similar in ECHO and T-mobile.
• By emulating typical data center failures, we show that ECHO gracefully handles all
such cases without noticeable user experience impact.
• Evaluation setup. Our base deployment is given in Figure 5.13. It consists of radio
equipment (a UE - Nexus 5, LTE eNodeB - IP.Access small-cell) in PhantomNet [51] and an
EPC core (MME pool with 2 MMEs, a ZooKeeper ensemble with 3 nodes, and other EPC
components - SGW, PGW, HSS) in Azure. We also use a local OpenEPC deployment in
PhantomNet to compare ECHO’s performance.
• Reliability options. We consider two availability options. One is a single data center
deployment, in which all ZooKeeper (ZK) nodes are collocated in the same data center. The
other is ZooKeeper deployment across multiple data centers, as depicted in Figure 5.13.
The network latency between the eNodeB and Azure is around 22 ms round-trip. The 3
Azure DCs are 20 ms round-trip away of each other. A single DC deployment provides
less reliability but also lower latency than a multi-DC deployment. We evaluate both of
them as both can be relevant for different application scenarios.
The reliability also depends on ZooKeeper operational parameters. We evaluated three
ZK logging configurations: synchronous disk (Disk), asynchronous disk logging (Disk-nFC, no
Figure 5.13. ECHO evaluation topology setup
134
force sync) and logging to ramdisk (Ramdisk). Synchronous disk logging is the most robust
and quickest to recover, but introduces the most latency. Ramdisk and Disk-nFC (log to
disc but don’t wait before acknowledging) are two trade-offs that reduce latency but also
slightly reduce the ability and speed of recovery. Table 5.2 shows the deployment options
and failure scenarios that they can tolerate. Disk-nFC and Ramdisk configurations have
smaller latency while 3DCs cloud deployment could tolerate 1 DC failure. We compared
ECHO with OpenEPC which stores UE context in memory. We also compared user per-
ceived performance of ECHO and T-mobile. We introduced node crashes to the prototype
and illustrated ECHO is robust against failure events.
• Correctness. We deployed ECHO on one Azure data center and ran it for 7 days.
We generated 6,720 Service and Context Release requests (20,160 messages) from a Nexus
5 device attached to a eNodeB. The system remained stable and all requests were cor-
rectly processed. We next randomly introduced node reboot and process crash events on
1% of control messages; ECHO recovered from crashes and all messages were correctly
processed.
• Latency. Figure 5.14 shows latency of entire Attach (top) and Service Request (bot-
tom) procedures with different ZK configurations running in DC. The latency is broken
down into EPC core network - the latency between EPC components (including ZK);
Network time - network round-trip time between eNodeB and Azure; and Radio - latency
to set up radio bearers on UE and eNodeB hardware. Overall, ECHO introduces about 7%
(70ms) more latency for Attach compared to OpenEPC which stores UE context in memory,
which is almost negligible. The overall latency is dominated by radio bearer configuration
between UE and eNodeB.
• Individual message overheads. Figure 5.15 shows the latency overhead ECHO
Table 5.2. ZK configurations and cloud deployment options in ECHO evaluation with
their latency and reliability profiles
Option Latency Robust against failuresNode Avail. Zone DC
OpenEPC Low No No No
1DC,Disk Moderate Yes Yes No
1DC,Disk-nFC Low Yes Yes No
1DC,Ramdisk Low Yes Yes No
3DCs,Disk-nFC High Yes Yes Yes
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Figure 5.14. Latency overhead of ECHO: Attach (top) and Service Request (bottom)
procedures latency on 1DC deployment, observed on eNodeB
50
100
150
200
1.
At
ch
-R
eq
.
2.
Au
th
-R
eq
.
3.
Au
th
-R
es
.
4.
Se
cu
r-C
m
d.
5.
Se
cu
r-C
m
p.
6.
In
fo
-R
eq
.
7.
In
fo
-R
es
.
8.
At
ch
-o
k.
1.
Se
r-R
eq
.
2.
C
nt
x-
R
eq
.
L
a
te
n
c
y
 (
m
s
)
Disk
Disk-nFC
OpenEPC
(495,491,498)
Figure 5.15. Latency overhead of ECHO: Latency of each individual message in an Attach
(left part) and Service Request (right part) procedures on 1DC deployment
introduced to each message exchanged between UE and MME in an Attach (left part) and
Service Request Procedure (right part). The odd-numbered messages (1-Attach Request,
3-Authentication Response, 5-Security Mode Complete, 7-UE Information Response, 1-
Service Request) are sent by the UE and are processed by ECHO. The even-numbered mes-
sages (2-Authentication Request, 4-Security Mode Command, 5-UE Information Request,
8-Attach Accept, 2-Context Setup Request) are sent by ECHO and processed by the UE.
As shown, this confirms radio setup and authentication processing on UE (msgs. 2-left,8,2-
right) dominate total procedure latency. Looking at ECHO latency (i.e., msgs. 1-left, 3, 5,
7, 1-right) we can see a clear latency overhead trend among ECHO-Disk,ECHO-nFC and
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OpenEPC. Overall, using disk logging incurs the most latency overhead while using disk
without force sync (Disk-nFC) incurs less latency. The overhead ECHO introduced per
message is noticeable (about 40%) but the overall overhead is small.
• Reliability vs. latency trade-off. Figure 5.16 shows latency of an Attach Procedure
with ZK deployed in a single DC and 3 DCs. ECHO with multiple-DC deployments
will survive DC failure (Table 5.2) yet incur higher latency because of network latency
between ZK nodes (40% or 400ms more for attach procedure). Depending on the reliability
characteristics required, one might favor an option as a tradeoff of the associated latency
costs. For example, public Internet outages can simply be relayed from reachable data
centers if this is a viable option for a particular deployment. However, even with the most
extreme deployment, ECHO incurred overhead is still tolerable for UE operating 3GPP
protocols. We further probe into this by showing a CDF of the latency of each ZK write
(Figure 5.17) and each message on ECHO MME in an Attach procedure (Figure 5.18).
Replication to 3 DCs can incur 10X messaging latency as it may invoke several ZK writes.
Yet, this is still only a fraction of the total latency and well below the smallest timeout value
of a UE – 5s for T3417 (see section 10.2 in 3GPP NAS timers [20], 3GPP S1AP timers [22].)
In future, this could be improved by using closer data centers or closer integration of a
consensus protocol into Algorithm 2 to reduce the number of writes.
• UE-perceived latency. Figure 5.19 shows the latencies of Attach and Service Request
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Figure 5.16. Latency overhead of ECHO: Latency of each individual message in an Attach
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Figure 5.17. Network latency CDF for ZooKeeper write. Baremetal shows optimal,
nonvirtualized performance
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procedures perceived by a UE on ECHO and T-mobile. Since we can’t capture T-mobile
control messages inside their proprietary EPC deployment, we measured the latency by
triggering Attach and Service Request on the Nexus 5, using the same methodology on
both platforms for a fair comparison. To trigger an Attach we toggled airplane mode in the
Nexus 5. To trigger an Server Request we let the device idle to make sure it releases radio
connection, and triggered a Ping request from it to the Internet. We then measured the
time it takes for the Nexus 5 to be network-available (from the trigger-time to the first Ping
packet gets through.) As these latencies include phone-level overheads, they correspond to
end-user perceived latencies, and they are much larger than network measured latencies
(Figure 5.14). Overall, ECHO control procedure latency on one DC is comparable to T-
mobile, but worse on 3 DCs. However, control events are infrequent, so we expect that
this will not affect end-user experience.
• Throughput. Figure 5.20 shows ECHO’s peak throughput on 1DC and 3DCs for
Attach and Service Requests. ECHO throughput is comparable to OpenEPC. Even though
the throughput does not look very high, notice that each procedure consists of multiple
messages exchanged (e.g., 8 messages for an Attach), and it is comparable with throughput
reported in other works [35].
• Failure scenarios. Figures 5.21 and 5.22 show OpenEPC and ECHO operation when
an MME crashes. We synthetically introduced a crash to both OpenEPC’s MME and
ECHO’s MME. The UE attached to OpenEPC was not able to use the network for 54
minutes because of the crash. The MME lost the UE Context therefore following Service
Requests from the UE failed (denoted with red crosses). The service resumed 54 minutes
later after a periodical Tracking Area Update (see Section 5.3.1 for a detailed discussion of
the example). The UE attached to ECHO continued to have service throughout the MME
crash event (note that the 1st attach request on MME2 experienced a slightly higher latency
because MME2 had to contact ZK for the UE’s Context). This illustrates the advantage of
ECHO over OpenEPC in term of reliability against node crashes.
• eNodeB client. We deployed our eNodeB’s ECHO client implementation on IP
Access E40 eNodeB [82] as a user-mode daemon. We configured four mobile nodes to
perform data transfers and then sleep over periods of 1 minute, generating 8 requests per
minute. A typical small cell can support up to 64 active users so this is an expected number
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of requests to get served. The induced CPU load was not noticeable on the embedded
Linux monitor.
5.7 Related work
Our work is related to efforts in network function virtualization in general [60, 62, 69,
149, 150], as well as more closely related virtualized mobile network efforts focused on re-
source management and scalability [85, 126, 128], orchestration of virtualized core network
functions [142], and virtualizing specific core network components [37]. Perhaps most
closely related to ECHO are the virtualized MME architectures proposed in SCALE [35]
and DMME [30]. SCALE and DMME proposed to horizontally scale the MME using load
balancing and state replication. However, SCALE and DMME focus only on scalability of
a single (MME) component. They do not deal with reliability issues – if an MME instance
is slow or crashes, stale requests could cause state inconsistencies.
Various studies have dealt with availability and reliability concerns of cloud platforms [39,
40, 71, 73]. Alternative approaches to our work to address these concerns include mech-
anisms to make clouds inherently more reliable [143], service abstractions to hide the
complexities of dealing with cloud failures from application developers [83] and attempts
to add specialized cloud features to deal with cloud fault tolerance [118, 120]. ECHO took
a different approach to assume the cloud infrastructure is not reliable and instead used
software and protocols to enhance availability.
ECHO’s replication strategies relate to state machine replication (SMR) [134], a well-
known approach to building fault-tolerant, highly available services [46, 81]. However,
as in § 5.4.4, naively reimplementing MME logic in replicated state machines does not
work. It also intertwines scaling, partitioning and fault-tolerance, since state machines are
stateful. SMR plays a role in ECHO, but in the form of ZooKeeper’s [81] fault-tolerant
atomic broadcast protocol, Zab [86].
ECHO’s enforcement of FIFO and atomicity is similar to virtually synchronous CB-
CAST from the ISIS toolkit [41]. However, ECHO is the first to combine atomic and FIFO
processing over distributed components in a cellular network leveraging the reliable base
station. The key challenge is in minimizing changes to the existing EPC protocol and in
interactions with the outside UE, which cannot be modified. Others observed this issue
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with clients in other contexts [93]. The necessary reliability between the UE and its eNodeB
simplify this, since the radio control link offers a reliable, ordered connection with the UE.
Setty et al. [137] proposed “locks with intent” for building fault-tolerant systems on cloud
storage. In ECHO, each client only affects its own state, which eliminates the need for
intents.
5.8 Conclusions
Virtualization of cellular core network protocols onto a public cloud introduces new
and different challenges. This chapter presents ECHO, a scalable and reliable architecture
that can easily be implemented on top of existing core networks. ECHO is proved correct
and significantly improves the reliability of mobile core networks with minimal overheads
when deployed in a public cloud.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary of the dissertation
The next generation (5G) mobile network is expected to host emerging use cases that
have a wide range of requirements; from Internet of Things (IoT) devices that prefer low-
overhead and scalable networks, to remote machine operation or remote health-care ser-
vices that require reliable end-to-end communications. However, the (4G) mobile core
network has several drawbacks in terms of enabling new technologies and supporting new
applications. On the other hand, SDN and NFV are the key technologies that improve flex-
ibility and agility in fixed networks. Applying SDN/NFV together with big-data analytics
and distributed system techniques could enable a flexible, low-overhead, and reliable
mobile core network.
This Dissertation focused on improving scalability and reliability of the mobile network
for future applications. The Dissertation presented SMORE [52] and SIMECA [109] which
use Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) to
enhance scalability of the mobile core network for a massive number of Internet-of-Things
(IoT) devices. It then presented ABSENCE [110] which uses big-data analytics and a novel
failure detection technique to detect failures in an operational mobile network. Lastly it
presented ECHO [111] which uses distributed system techniques to enhance availability
of software-based mobile networks in public clouds.
Chapter 3 focuses on a flexible, low-overhead and scalable mobile core network. 4G
mobile core networks are largely based on proprietary and expensive hardware compo-
nents that limit both new functionalities as well as low latency applications. SMORE is an
SDN-based offloading architecture for LTE/EPC network. Using an SDN infrastructure
and an SDN controller, together with a proper monitoring mechanism, SMORE offloads
a portion of LTE traffic to a local edge cloud to support low latency applications. The
challenges of SMORE are to find a practical solution given the current deployment of the
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mobile network and to be transparent to existing LTE traffic. SMORE intercepts data and
control plane traffic at Mobile Telephone Switching Office (MTSO). It monitors the LTE
control channel to extract data plane information used in data plane offloading. It offloads
registered traffic to the mobile edge cloud and leaves normal LTE traffic untouched.
In terms of network architecture and protocols, the current EPC core network was
designed to support a small number of devices streaming high-quality traffic (e.g., a smart-
phone streaming a Youtube video) rather than a large amount of devices sending small
and sporadic traffic (e.g., a massive number of IoT devices sending a few bytes every 15
minutes).
SIMECA is an SDN-based mobile edge cloud architecture that provides a new network
service abstraction that is more suitable for IoT devices. Unlike the control and data planes
of LTE/EPC that are based on IP tunnels to realize end-to-end communications with QoS
supports, SIMECA’s data plane is best-effort to reduce overheads. SIMECA’s control
and data planes are more light-weight (up to 20%/37% lower data/control overhead re-
spectively) compared to LTE/EPC’s. Removing IP tunnels in the mobile core, however,
raises a challenge of how to support mobility in SIMECA. Moreover, designing data
and control planes that are more light-weight while supporting mobility is not straight-
forward. SIMECA proposed an SDN-based mobile edge cloud infrastructure that is more
distributed and SDN-controlled. To reduce control overhead, SIMECA classifies packets
at the edge (base stations) while core network switches simply forward packets based on
the packet header (i.e., smart edge - dumb core principle). At the base stations, packet
headers are translated to prevent adding any extra overhead to the data plane. A device
in SIMECA has a device ID used for end-to-end applications and a routing ID used for
routing and mobility. This identity separation mechanism together with a routing ID
tracking mechanism allow seamless mobility in SIMECA.
In order to improve service experience and availability of mobile networks, network
operators have already deployed multiple monitoring systems to detect service disrup-
tions and fix problems when they occur. However, detecting all service disruptions is
challenging. Somewhat counter-intuitively, monitoring network components is insuffi-
cient to indicate user experience because of a complex relationship between the network
status and user-perceived service experience. Moreover, service disruptions could happen
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because of reasons that are beyond the network itself, e.g., bugs on the customer’s device.
Chapter 4 presented ABSENCE, a passive service monitoring system that detects ser-
vice disruptions by monitoring customer usage. The main idea in ABSENCE is that
customer usage, or lack thereof, is a reliable indicator of service disruptions or network
problems. Using users’ Call Data Records (CDR), ABSENCE obtains a normal usage
pattern of an aggregation of customers and infers an anomaly if the current usage is less
than expected. ABSENCE uses Map-Reduce and a large compute cluster to extract the
real-time usage of different aggregations of users from Tera-Bytes of CDR generated con-
stantly in the network. It then uses the time series decomposition technique to decompose
the usage time series and detect anomalies. ABSENCE was able to detect failures with up
to 95% accuracy. It also detected real failures that went under the radar in an operational
network.
With technology advancements in SDN and NFV, next generation mobile networks are
expected to be NFV-based. However, in stark contrast to telecom-grade hardware with
built-in redundancy, commodity Off-the-Shell (COTS) hardware in NFV platforms often
can’t compare in terms of reliability. Availability of Telecom-grade mobile core network
hardware is typically 99.999% (i.e., less than 5 minutes of downtime per year) while most
NFV platforms only guarantee 99.9% availability (less than 5 minutes of downtime per 3
days). Therefore, an NFV-based mobile core network running on a less-reliable infrastruc-
ture requires extra mechanisms to guarantee its availability.
Chapter 5 presented ECHO, a distributed mobile core architecture that solves the avail-
ability problem for NFV-based mobile core networks. ECHO preserves the mobile core
protocols as they are complex and constantly evolving. ECHO adds extra abstractions
on top of the mobile core network to compensate for the fact that nodes in an NFV-based
infrastructure could be arbitrarily slow or crashed, and messages could be lost or delayed.
ECHO’s reliability is based on a necessarily reliable agent at each base station that serializes
requests and keeps sending a request until it receives a reply. Mobile core components
are replicated and their state is stored in a replicated and highly available key-value store.
ECHO then uses a nonblocking algorithm to ensure only one stateless instance can modify
the control state, and stale requests are blocked to avoid state inconsistency. The algorithm
is applied on all components in the mobile core in a recursive manner to achieve an atomic
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state change across distributed components as if they were on a single reliable component.
ECHO was deployed on Microsoft Azure cloud peering with an LTE small cell and a mo-
bile smart-phone in PhantomNet [51]. ECHO adds no significant overhead to the current
mobile core network and is more reliable when multiple failure events were introduced.
6.2 Future research directions
This dissertation presented a study on the scalability and reliability aspects of the mo-
bile network. Given the huge shift of the network to the next generation (5G) architecture,
there are still a lot of topics to explore. This section gives a few research directions that
take into account expected changes to future applications and the network infrastructure
to support future requirements. The section first offers some insights about the interac-
tion between applications and the mobile network, and then explores further possible
improvements to the architecture and protocols of a software-based mobile networks in
a distributed Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) infrastructure.
6.2.1 Bridging the gap between applications
and the mobile network
In the current mobile architecture, the end-point device (and applications running on
it) treats the network as a black-box that can’t be tailored to meet the applications’ re-
quirements. However, unlike wired networks, performance of mobile networks largely
depends on the radio link performance and the protocol configuration at the base stations.
A single wireless configuration is not likely to satisfy the wide range of requirements of
all types of applications. For example, a previous work [108] pointed out that real-time
interactive applications such as VoIP might prefer seamless handover while bulk-transfer
applications such as web-browser or ftp might prefer lossless handover.
Bridging the gap between applications and the network allows applications to con-
figure the network (or the network stack), make use of network information, or interact
with the network to satisfy their specific requirements. For example, knowing the current
load of the base station could help an application to adjust its sending rate to prevent
harmful spurious TCP timeouts [108], or a police body camera application could request
the network to reserve a prioritized connection that has enough bandwidth for a crime-site
video-streaming when needed.
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To enable this, we need APIs to expose network’s functionalities, network configura-
tions and the end-point device’s network stack. The network’s functionality API exposes
interfaces to manage resources in the network (e.g., set up or reserve bandwidth of a
connection). The network’s configuration API enables network control/data plane con-
figuration such as handover type, Radio Link Control (RLC) queue size, RLC modes, etc.
The network stack API allows the application to configure the device’s network stack such
as changing TCP’s congestion window, increase TCP’s Retransmission Timeout value, etc.
6.2.2 Architectural and protocol-level improvements
for NFV-based mobile edge computing
Future mobile networks are expected to be NFV-based. However, moving from a
hardware-based mobile network to a software-based solution invalidates many existing
assumptions and raises multiple challenges. One challenge is that unlike telco’s special-
ized high-performance hardware, commodity OTS hardware in an NFV platform can’t
meet the reliability and scalability requirements. For example, a VM clearly can’t store
the state and serve requests from millions of users as a more powerful hardware box
could. Moreover, mobile edge computing makes the network infrastructure become more
distributed. Exploring trade-offs in this new infrastructure is an interesting topic. For ex-
ample, a distributed EPC instance at the edge would have less load per instance (and thus
the need for an extreme scaling of the distributed EPC is reduced), but in the meantime the
distributed EPC instances can only cover a smaller mobility area.
Firstly, one way to improve reliability of NFV-based mobile networks is to add extra
abstractions to the existing LTE/EPC protocols [111]. Another way to enhance reliability
is to redesign the protocols and take into account the new NFV’s assumptions. For exam-
ple, given an unreliable NFV infrastructure, a “good” protocol on the end-device should
proactively check for state inconsistency and fix the state immediately instead of waiting
for a periodic Tracking Area update and reattach [111]. Secondly, to scale the NFV-based
mobile network given relatively small compute instances, a horizontal scaling approach
would help. However, the approach should take into account the architecture of the mobile
core and how the components interact. Interesting questions, for example, are: (1) When
scaling the data plane, how do the network instances store their state in a scalable manner?
(2) How to update the state in the data plane when there is mobility. Lastly, to balance the
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performance and overhead of a distributed EPC architecture in MEC, a hybrid solution
might help: a local EPC could be used to improve performance, while a centralized EPC
could be used for a portion of users (or connections) that requires a high degree of mobility.
This approach needs a proper separation of functionalities of the distributed EPC and the
centralized EPC and how they interact.
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